The 2012 International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety
The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), located in Montreal, Canada is the leading global Crime Prevention organization. Founded in 1994, its mission is to promote international standards of crime prevention and criminal justice with the goal of advancing community safety and improving quality of life for all. ICPC works with member governments, international and local organizations, authorities at all levels of government and is involved actively in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Oceania. ICPC offers a broad knowledge base – both technical and conceptual - on crime prevention and related policies, practices and tools that seek to reduce risk factors associated with crime, violence and insecurity.

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We wish to thank in particular ICPC’s members, who provided us with ideas, information, and direction for this International Report. We would also like to thank our Board of Directors (2010–2011) for their support:

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Many practitioners, researchers, and decision makers provided valuable inputs into this report through their advice, ideas, research, and suggestions for improvement. We cannot name all of them individually, but we wish to extend to them our heartfelt thanks for their time and support.
A Message from the President of ICPC

Crime prevention is now an important component of crime policy throughout the world. For the past sixteen years, ICPC has been at the forefront of the drive to make prevention a central element in successful, efficient, and humane community building through practices and initiatives that enhance safety and foster resilience. The International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety is one of the many ways in which ICPC engages with the wider prevention community, and it serves as its flagship publication. It explores and analyses the latest trends in crime prevention as well as topics that may become central in the near future.

This third edition of the International Report builds on past successes to evolve naturally into a deeper, more analytical publication. The reader will notice important changes in the way it approaches and presents themes. We sincerely hope these allow for more nuanced reflections and also bring to the fore new ideas and initiatives which will spark innovation among policymakers and all those involved in crime prevention.

The International Report 2012 takes on the task of exploring new frontiers in crime prevention as well as analysing those areas in which it is already firmly established. The challenges of high crime rates, violence, and victimisation are many, and will test the creativity of decision makers, communities, and stakeholders for the foreseeable future. ICPC, through its International Report, contributes to the impetus needed to continue on the path to safe and healthy communities through crime prevention and community safety. I sincerely hope the ICPC International Report 2012, through its aggregation of concrete information and analysis from around the world, will help advance effective crime prevention.

Chantal Bernier

President, ICPC
VII

A Message from the Director General of ICPC

Crime prevention today is a consolidated field with a consistent community of practitioners and researchers around the world. Similarly, we see governments increasing their understanding of the benefits of adopting a prevention approach in terms of results, sustainability and guarantees of fundamental rights.

The 2012 edition of International Report echoes the centrality that prevention has been gaining in recent years, the solid knowledge that has been produced on the subject, and how governments at different levels are finding that prevention is the solution to many of the challenges imposed by crime and violence.

In its seventeen years of existence, ICPC has vigorously promoted crime prevention, stating that safety is a right and an essential element to the development, health and well-being of countries, cities and communities.

By choosing to concentrate on four topics that present singular challenges for crime prevention – Human Trafficking, Informal Settlements, Post-Disaster and Post-Conflict Areas and Drug Production in Developed Countries - the 2012 International Report wishes to reaffirm crime prevention from a rights-based perspective, providing policy makers with cutting-edge interpretations, tools and solutions around these themes.

Some of the lessons learned in the 2012 edition are that crime can be tackled in multidisciplinary and very innovative ways, that international comparison and exchange not only inspires but can also help shape policy very concretely, that efficient solutions are those which reaffirm citizenship, and are both well-planned and well-targeted. The report also pinpoints areas where better connections are required and crime prevention knowledge still needs to be built.

The 2012 Report also includes the results of the first “Global Survey on Safety in Cities”, conducted by the ICPC in an effort to gather data on crime prevention programmes in cities worldwide.

Local safety has been at the core of ICPC’s mission since its creation and this global overview allows us not only to reiterate the relevance of local strategies, but provides excellent grounds for their improvement.

The International Report is the result of the work of a dedicated research team at the ICPC with contributions from the Centre’s extensive network of partners. Thus, it is a prime example of ICPC’s commitment to seek out new and better ways to promote safety worldwide.

Paula Miraglia

Director General, ICPC
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List of Acronyms

A

**AIC**: Australian Institute of Criminology
**AEDH**: Agir Ensemble pour les Droits de l’Homme (Act Together for Human Rights)
**AIDS**: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
**ATS**: Amphetamine-Type Stimulants
**AusAID**: Australian Agency for International Development

C

**CADUMS**: Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Surveys
**CBSA**: Canada Border Services Agency
**CCPCJ**: Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
**CCTV**: Closed-Circuit Television
**CDSA**: Controlled Drug and Substances Act
**CG-PRM**: Comando Geral da Policia da Republica de Moçambique (General Command of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique)
**CHS Alternativo**: Capital Humano y Social Alternativo (Alternative Human and Social Capital)
**CIA**: Central Intelligence Agency
**CICAD**: Comisión Interamericana Contra el Abuso de Drogas (Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission)
**CISC**: Criminal Intelligence Service Canada
**CNCS**: Conselho Nacional de Combate ao HIV/SIDA (National AIDS Control Council)
**CND**: Commission on Narcotic Drugs
**CNDH**: Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (National Commission on Human Rights)
**COMPACT**: European Action for Compensation for Trafficked Persons
**CONAVI**: Comisión Nacional de Vivienda (National Commission of Housing)
**CPTED**: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
**CRED**: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
**CSC**: Correctional Service Canada

E

**ECOSOC**: United Nations Economic and Social Council
**EFUS**: European Forum on Urban Safety
**EMCDDA**: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
**EM-DAT**: Emergency Events Database
**ENATW**: European Network Against Trafficking in Women
**ENPATES**: European NGOs’ Platform Against Trafficking, Exploitation, and Slavery
**EU**: European Union

F

**FBI**: Federal Bureau of Investigation
**FEMA**: Federal Emergency Management Agency
**FFSU**: Forum français pour la sécurité urbaine (French Forum for Urban Security)
**FGV**: Fundação Getulio Vargas (Getulio Vargas Foundation)
**FOMICRES**: Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reinsertion
**FRELIMO**: Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)

G

**GAATW**: Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women
**GDP**: Gross Domestic Product
**GIS**: Geographic Information System
**GIZ**: Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)
**GRETA**: Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings

H

**HEUNI**: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control
**HIV**: Human Immunodeficiency Virus
**HSRP**: Human Security Report Project

I

**IADB**: Inter-American Development Bank
**IBGE**: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)
**IBPS**: Instituto Brasileiro de Pesquisa Social (Brazilian Institute of Social Research)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICLR</td>
<td>International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy</td>
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<td>ICESI</td>
<td>Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad (Citizen’s Institute for Insecurity Research)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICPC</td>
<td>International Centre for the Prevention of Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICSDP</td>
<td>International Centre for Science in Drug Policy</td>
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<td>IDPC</td>
<td>International Drug Policy Consortium</td>
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<td>IETS</td>
<td>Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (Institute for the Study of Labour and Society)</td>
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<td>IIED</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMPACT</td>
<td>International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce</td>
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<td>INE</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute for Statistics)</td>
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<td>INHESJ</td>
<td>Institut National des Hautes Études de la Sécurité et de la Justice (National Institute for Higher Studies of Security and Justice)</td>
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<td>INFONAVIT</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional para el Fomento de la Vivienda de los Trabajadores (National Workers Housing Fund Institute)</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Instituto Pereira Passos (Pereira Passos Institute)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>ITUC</td>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>KENSUP</td>
<td>Kenya Slum Upgrading Project</td>
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<td>KFW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDMA</td>
<td>3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine (ecstasy)</td>
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**N**

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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NCETA</td>
<td>National Centre for Education and Training on Addiction</td>
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<td>NDARC</td>
<td>National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre</td>
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<td>NDRI</td>
<td>National Drug Research Institute</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Drug Strategy</td>
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<td>NDSF</td>
<td>National Drug Strategic Framework</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPB</td>
<td>National Parole Board</td>
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<td>NSDF</td>
<td>National Slum Dwellers Federation</td>
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**O**

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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONDCP</td>
<td>Office of National Drug Control Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (UN Operation in Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSISA</td>
<td>Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa</td>
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**P**

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<tr>
<td>PEV</td>
<td>Plan Estratégico de Vecindad (Strategic Neighbourhood Plan)</td>
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<td>PNP</td>
<td>Policía Nacional del Perú (Peruvian National Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRONAF</td>
<td>Programa Nacional Fronterizo (National Border Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Pharmaceutical Security Institute</td>
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**R**

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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RETA</td>
<td>Registro y Estadística del Delito de Trata de Personas y Afines (Statistics and Registration System on the Crime of Trafficking in Persons and Related Workers)</td>
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S
SALW: Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPS: South African Police Service
SAS: Small Arms Survey
SCIENCE Institute: Sociedade Científica da Escola Nacional de Ciências Estatísticas (Scientific Society of the National School of Sciences and Statistics)
SCRC: Service Canadien de Renseignements Criminels (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada)
SCIEnCE Institute: Sociedade Científica da Escola Nacional de Ciências Estatísticas (Scientific Society of the National School of Sciences and Statistics)
SCQ: Société de Criminologie de Québec (Quebec Crimonology Society)
SMME: Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprise
SPC: Standing Police Capacity
SPARC: Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres
START: Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNES: Unidad de Normalización, Evaluación y Seguimiento (Normalisation, Monitoring, and Evaluation Unit)
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UN-GIFT: United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking
UN-Habitat: United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNICRI: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPP: Unidade de Policia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Unit)
US: United States
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
USDOJ: United States Department of Justice
USIP: United States Institute of Peace
V
VPUU: Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading
WHO: World Health Organization
Message of peace and anti-violence on a restaurant notice board after three bombs exploded in the Egyptian Red Sea resort town of Dahab.
Egypt, April 25, 2006.
© David Silverman/iStockphoto
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2012 INTERNATIONAL REPORT
Community leaders’ meeting in Mangueira Favela, Rio, Brazil, July 2011.
© Secretaria de Assistência Social e Direitos Humanos
The goal of the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety is to provide a nuanced overview of crime prevention at a global level. It seeks to be a source for practitioners, decision makers, and academics for information, data, and, most importantly, ideas on the subject of crime prevention. It is tasked with raising awareness of the importance of including crime prevention as a permanent issue on the agenda for governments seeking to reduce the harm caused by crime in their constituencies. In this 2012 issue, the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) hopes to build on the work done in 2008 and 2010 to present to the reader a full view of the issues that are important in crime prevention today, as well as key developments in this vital area of governance. The International Report focuses, as it has in the past, on current issues in crime and their relationship with crime prevention. It is based on ICPC’s own framing of crime prevention and is the product of the work it has carried out. This introductory chapter seeks to address, especially for first-time readers, the frameworks in which ICPC places crime prevention as well as key concepts used throughout the Report.

A Rights-Based Approach to Crime Prevention

The work of ICPC is framed within a rights-based approach to crime prevention. Basic individual rights must inform and shape government action and policy-making, as this will help promote a desirable standard of living for all citizens, regardless of their location or other socioeconomic determinants (Johnson and Forsyth 2002). Crime prevention and community safety entail a wide range of variables that seek to promote the values of equality, education, freedom from persecution, and many other rights that belong to individuals as well as communities. Thus, crime prevention is inscribed within the framework of the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) and the UN Charter (UN 1945) as well as other works emanating from these texts. Chief among these are the UN Guidelines for Crime Prevention (UNODC and ICPC 2010) and the Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UNODC 2006a). These place human rights at the centre of actions undertaken by actors such as governments, international organisations, donors, and communities that seek to promote advancements in the living conditions of citizens worldwide—and this is also applicable to crime prevention and community safety. The protection of many of these rights brings about other goods such as security and development (DFID 2000, ODI 1999, Sen 1999, and UNDP 2000 quoted in Johnson and Forsyth 2002).

There are substantial debates as to the best way to provide and achieve healthy and safe communities, relating to security and safety, human security, and the rule of law. All of these in different ways seek to address issues that touch on crime and its effects as well as ways to prevent it. The differences between these approaches can be found both in political agendas and nested generally within each country’s legal frameworks. Safety and security have a wide range of interpretations depending on the location and the context. Indeed, at times (such as in Spanish, with seguridad), the two terms are referred to using the same word. It is important to make a distinction here between the notion of security, which we understand as a public good delivered by the state under regular circumstances, and that of safety, which we can explain as a subjective feeling of being secure as experienced by citizens; this latter concept may or may not be related to actual crime rates (in its negative connotation it has been referred to as “fear of crime”). Security is understood as a state of being free from danger, whereas safety is seen as a condition or a state of feeling protected or at low risk of harm. Meanwhile, the concept of human security has in recent times become a reference point for discussions on development and democratic advancement. Unlike national security, it is based on the individual (Human Security Report Project n.d.). Within this current of thought, we find two different currents. One supports a broad definition of human security, covering violence, poverty, environmental degradation, and other threats to human security as proposed by the 1994 UN Human Development Report (UNDP 1994). The second supports a narrow definition focused on violence as the main locus of action to achieve
human security (HSRP 2010). This newer paradigm has received increasingly wide acceptance as an important concept in violence prevention.

The rule of law is also one of the most touched on concepts in the literature on crime and democratisation. It is referred to as “a practical issue in democracy and governance promotion” (Fukuyama 2010, 33) and has been related on the economic side to enforceable property rights and credible contracts and on the socio-political side to “acceptance of the sovereignty of a pre-existing body of law representing a social consensus on rules of justice” (ibid., 35). A strong rule of law thus guarantees respect for the rules previously accepted by society, be these economic, such as contracts, or those that relate to crime and illicit activity. One of a state’s most important tasks, by nearly any definition (Baker 2002), is to provide its citizens with security for their personal integrity and their property. Some argue that once a state (through unwillingness or incapacity) fails to provide this basic service to its population it enters a crisis of legitimacy (Varese 2000). The ideal of safe and secure environments for all has yet to be realised in many parts of the world: there exist important differences in the levels to which states can provide their citizens with security and safety, as well as in the capabilities and resources available to them to achieve this goal. Often, the ability of a state to carry out this function is limited by political, economic, and other structural factors.

Developing countries in particular have faced, and still face today, many difficulties in fulfilling their ideal role as provider of security to their citizens through a strong rule of law and just, transparent institutions. Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen argues that security is an important ingredient that facilitates the achievement of the full range of human capabilities (Sen 2005). Without it, the development of human resources is stymied. Crime prevention fits perfectly within this challenge. Broadly understood, it encompasses all types of rights—from the political, social, and cultural to the economic and civil.

In 2002, the UN introduced its Crime Prevention Guidelines, a document aimed at providing decision makers and other interested parties with a solid set of principles to guide crime prevention policies. However, this is not to say that communities do not have an important role to play in the creation of a safe and secure environment. Cohesive, resilient communities have better chances of withstanding and resisting violence. Cooperation and partnerships among different social actors are of paramount importance for the achievement of safe communities. Partnerships can be horizontal and vertical and can involve a number of actors, from the private or public sector.

A rights-based approach promotes values that are intrinsic to the development of any community. It also offers an instrumental guideline for decision makers who wish to increase security in their communities. Crime prevention should ideally seek to improve and strengthen both security and safety:

“Human rights offer guidance on the delicate balance between the protection of fundamental freedoms and the protection of public health, morals and security. It sets out the broad responsibilities of the State to respect, protect and fulfil the health and wellbeing of its peoples and specific due process guarantees, such as for those suspected or accused of a criminal offence” (UNODC 2010a).

This quote sums up the cardinal logic behind a rights-based approach to crime prevention and sets out an important task for governments and other actors on two fronts. On the one hand, they must provide basic security and safety for their citizens; on the other, they must also ensure the legal framework and institutional structures are in place to guarantee everyone is treated fairly when facing the law, including those charged with committing a crime.

Key Notions in Crime Prevention

We now introduce a number of key concepts the reader will encounter throughout this Report. Most of the ideas presented and defined here are based on the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN 2002). One of ICPC’s mandates is to promote the implementation and use of the guidelines. Crime prevention includes all actions taken by the state to reduce crime, including penal measures. It is argued that policing, control, and other such actions serve as a deterrent and are therefore also viewed as preventive (e.g. Garland 2001). Analyses and reviews of penal issues have a longstanding tradition and are covered systematically by many actors, such as governments and other organisations, including universities; as such, ICPC does not centre its work on such measures, as it can contribute little to what is already a well-established field. Rather, ICPC is engaged with a broader definition of crime prevention, one which emphasises actions that may be taken before a crime occurs and/or after it takes place, for example assisting with the rehabilitation of the offender. ICPC thus understands crime prevention as actions that (UNODC and ICPC 2010):

- Promote the wellbeing of people and encourage positive behaviour through social, economic, health, and educational measures, with a particular emphasis on children youth, and women, and focus on the risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimisation.
• Change the conditions in neighbourhoods that influence offending, victimisation, and the insecurity that results from crime by building on the initiatives, expertise, and commitment of community members.
• Prevent the occurrence of crime by reducing opportunities, increasing the risk of being apprehended, and minimising benefits, including through environmental design and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual victims.
• Prevent recidivism by assisting the social reintegration of offenders and other preventive mechanisms.

As is stated in the UN guidelines, this comprises actions at the social development level (Point 1), at the local and situational (Point 2) levels, and at the individual or community levels (Points 3 and 4), both before and after a crime has been committed. It also deals not only with the perpetrators of crime, in the form of recidivism prevention, but also with their victims and the wider community in which they are inserted. Thus, we find four major types of crime prevention (ICPC 2010):

1. Developmental: An approach which includes a wide range of social policies aimed at reducing inequalities, poverty, and other socio-structural factors that facilitate crime, as well as protecting those who are most vulnerable in society. In this instance, we may also find policies aimed at strengthening the rule of law.
2. Situational: A more focused approach which includes actions aimed at reducing the opportunities and benefits of offending as well as increasing the risks of being caught. This is done primarily by environmental design.
3. Community or local: An approach that includes action which aims to change the conditions in neighbourhoods that influence crime, victimisation, and insecurity.
4. Prevention of recidivism: An approach concerned with the reintegration of offenders.

The UN Guidelines

The UN has in recent times put increasing emphasis on crime prevention and its benefits. Its guidelines provide the framework for specific actions that are effective in building safer communities and are less costly than repressive and deterrent responses (UNODC and ICPC 2010). The importance and value of crime prevention rests on the fact that, when implemented successfully, it significantly reduces the costs of the justice system as well as those of crime as a whole (Box 1.1). The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has adopted two sets of crime prevention guidelines: the 1995 Guidelines for Technical Assistance in the Field of Urban Crime Prevention (UN 1995) and the 2002 Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN 2002). Both documents stress the importance of the implementation of crime prevention alongside criminal justice reform. Other resolutions1, as well as the mandate of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), include important components of crime prevention.

The 1995 guidelines focus on urban areas and on the design and implementation of crime prevention schemes within them. The document recognises the importance of cities as centres where a large percentage of the population will live in the future and where problems of crime will be greater. It stresses the critical nature of local-level planning and design in crime prevention and community safety as well as of partnerships at all levels for their success. It also encourages actors to recognise the need for a wide-ranging policy agenda that includes developmental goals (such as education) as well as focused actions to prevent specific crimes. The guidelines also highlight the importance of human rights as well as of constant monitoring and evaluation of programmes implemented. The 2002 guidelines build on the ideas proposed by the 1995 document.

Box 1.1 The Cost of Crime is the Benefit of Prevention

The criminal justice system is a costly institution to operate and countries devote important amounts of resources to it. However, the costs of crime cannot be reduced to those of the criminal justice system alone: they are significantly larger when we take into account other factors. When lost income, social interventions, health, and other variables are factored in, crime becomes an immensely costly phenomenon. To this must be added the costs incurred by the victims of crime: lost income, health costs, and psychological damage add up. For example, in Canada, the cost of crime (which includes victim, criminal justice, and defensive measures) was measured at CA$31.4 billion in 2008 (Zhang 2009). In Northern Ireland, England, and Wales, the costs of recorded crime alone were estimated at £17 billion in 2007. The benefits of prevention result in direct savings in expenditure on the criminal justice system, making investment in prevention cost effective. The implementation of crime prevention and community safety policies would mean important savings in these areas, as it has been found that the benefits very often outweigh their costs (UNODC and ICPC 2010, Welsh and Farrington 2009).

1 See UN General Assembly Resolutions 56/261 and 2005/22 for examples of this.
The 2012 International Report

In general terms, this 2012 International Report can be approached through two different but interrelated sections. In the first section of the Report, the reader will find an overview of the situation of worldwide trends in crime. This is not meant to be an exhaustive or complete analysis of the crime situation, but is designed mainly to give the reader a contextual background against which trends and debates on crime prevention are situated. In it, the reader will find handy and interesting information on homicide trends worldwide as well as up-to-date information on some current debates on crime prevention and criminology. This section will also present a short overview of issues that will deserve further attention in the future.

The second section of the Report will deal with specific themes and their relationship with crime prevention. ICPC is committed to analysing the most important and salient topics in crime, as seen from the perspective of crime prevention. Thus, this section will present in-depth analyses of subjects in crime and what, if anything, is being done about them on the prevention front. The themes selected for this report are as follows:
- Human trafficking and exploitation.
- Informal settlements.
- Post-conflict and post-disaster areas.
- Drug production in developed countries.
- Safety in cities.

The reader will notice that there are important differences within the first four topics: two of them are actual illegal activities (human trafficking and drug production) and the other two are contexts or particular situations in which crime may arise. Conceptually, it is important to differentiate between them, as this will allow us to treat them according to their specificities. Contexts are an independent variable which may influence the characteristics of crime and thus of crime prevention, whereas crimes are a dependent variable, determined by a number of factors, of which a context may be a part. Each theme will therefore vary in the way it is analysed to make room for these important methodological differences. By introducing these two types of analysis, ICPC seeks to diversify the scope of the International Report as well as to address the current concerns of practitioners and other stakeholders. Once again, we must clarify that ICPC is not presenting an analysis of these topics per se, but rather will focus on how they relate to crime prevention and how prevention strategies can help reduce the cost and incidence of crimes and victimisation and help bring stability to certain contexts. The Report is enriched by a number of Special Contributions from experts and practitioners who bring their particular view to some of the issues raised in the Report.

Within this second section of the Report, there is also a chapter that focuses solely on the first results of the Global Survey on Safety in Cities. This survey is ICPC’s contribution to the generation of quality data on a worldwide scale. For this edition of the Report, we will present the first results of the first wave of this survey, aimed at gathering data on crime prevention programmes and initiatives at the local level. This has represented a considerable effort by ICPC to generate information to better inform analysis and decision-making processes in crime prevention.

Human Trafficking and Exploitation

Human trafficking and exploitation are crimes that affect millions of people all over the world. Trafficking of humans and slavery have in many cases become a priority for governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other actors. This trend has gathered momentum, especially after the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Aromaa 2007). Exploitation is directly linked to human trafficking and impacts millions of people through slavery, debt bondage, and other forms of bonded labour (Bales 2005). It is important to note that not all countries deal with this issue in the same way.

Crime prevention and community safety are approaches that have been used in the past to tackle human trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Awareness campaigns are common, as are community mobilisation programmes and other community-based initiatives that seek to mobilise national and local actors. The high relevance that governments and international organisations have placed on human trafficking is reflected in the widespread increase in human trafficking-specific legislation at the national level in the past five years, framed in international and national agreements and laws. The chapter on human trafficking and exploitation allows us to take a first glance at a worldwide comparison of initiatives and mechanisms concerning this phenomenon. Moreover, it allows us to look for specific action plans and to research the role that crime prevention and community safety play in both laws and action plans. The result is an analysis of national legislation and action plans worldwide. This provides the opportunity to highlight the trajectory of this particular crime while analysing the areas in which crime prevention and community safety may still be able to

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2 All these topics are explained and analysed thoroughly elsewhere. Please refer to the further reading section in the bibliography for details on works on these subjects.
contribute to tackling this illegal activity. The chapter hopes to link national-level laws to actual action plans in order to stress the need to commit to both institutional action and ground-level implementation and mobilisation. Given the transnational nature of human trafficking, combining both approaches can be especially fruitful while designing future action plans, in particular when cooperation among countries is vital. Case studies on the Ukraine and Peru illustrate two different facets of this phenomenon.

Informal Settlements

It is estimated that one-sixth of the world’s population lives in informal settlements today. This amounts to close to one billion individuals. These communities have been born out of long processes of urbanisation, especially in the developing world. Informal settlements present important challenges in terms of crime but they are also centres of community mobilisation and creative thinking, forces that can (and indeed should) be harnessed for progress. On the one hand, these settlements suffer to a greater or lesser degree from a lack of basic services and rights. Target 7d of Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 7 focuses on the improvement of living conditions for dwellers of these communities. In this sense, many urban upgrading projects have been developed and implemented in many informal settlements across the world.

The second major cause of death in slums, after illnesses such as AIDS and tuberculosis, is violence. Many individuals there are also susceptible to vulnerabilities that emanate from their socioeconomic position and that place them at higher risk of being both victims and offenders. These vulnerabilities include lack of education, low social mobility, and low access to public services. This underscores the importance of introducing crime prevention measures into upgrading projects as well as of recognising the diversity and possibility of these communities. It becomes vital to address this issue from the perspective of both crime prevention and community safety, given the large number of people living in informal settlements as well as the conditions of violence and crime to which many of these communities are subject. Community safety approaches have contributed immensely to improving quality of life in many informal settlements, and it is important to continue this trend. Thus, addressing this subject in the International Report provides a forum for further analysis, debate, and generation of ideas.

Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Areas

The UN and other international organisations have established many programmes and strategies around the world to assist in post-conflict peace building. However, despite great efforts, many post-conflict countries are still plagued by weak domestic governance and high crime and violence rates. When talking about peace building, emergency relief is the first aspect that comes to mind. In order to successfully establish a peaceful environment, however, emergency relief is not sufficient. Security and law and order are also key players in developing and maintaining political and economic institutions. Meanwhile, conflict and natural disasters have led to important international reflection on the need for swift and effective interventions as well as to generate collective responses to these major challenges. International organisations such as the UN and donor governments through national agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have in the past decade or so designed a number of protocols for action in situations of crisis after a conflict or disaster. In the post-conflict dimension, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) are one of the main components of the process of rebuilding institutions and healing societies after conflict. In the wake of a disaster, we find interventions that cover the immediate humanitarian response as well as long-term reconstruction efforts. All of these measures require the effective mobilisation of a number of actors at the national and international level.

Crime prevention and community safety are not found on the agendas or in the protocols of post-disaster and post-conflict interventions, even though they are an integral part of a comprehensive strategy for providing security. Developing a security structure can help commence disarmament, attract investors, maintain government support, and halt the informal security system. By emphasising the importance of crime prevention and identifying current strategies, a holistic approach can be utilised once countries have reached an armistice, leading to a more sustainable peace. A similar situation applies to post-disaster scenarios. A natural disaster may harm already weak states or weaken stronger ones, opening the door to crime and violence as social relations strain and services falter. This chapter looks at international intervention protocols and case studies in an effort to propose ways in which crime prevention may be

Box 1.2 MDG 7 and Informal Settlements

MDG 7 refers to ensuring environmental sustainability worldwide and proposes to introduce principles of sustainable development into national and international policy. Target 7d aims to “Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020”.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE 2012 INTERNATIONAL REPORT
used to make these more efficient and conducive to peaceful futures by effectively mobilising actors at the local and international level.

**Drug Production in Developed Countries**

Western countries have been emerging as leading producers and exporters of illicit drugs worldwide, namely, cannabis and synthetic drugs such as ecstasy and amphetamines. UNODC has highlighted this trend in its biannual reports since 2007. There are a number of possible consequences of this trend. First, the presence of drugs in a community (whether for production or for consumption) can have a negative impact on the population. This may come in the form of crime related to the production of drugs, such as the presence of gangs, as well as through health factors derived from local consumption. Second, this activity also opens the door to the insertion into the community of larger organised crime groups seeking to profit from the drug market. Thus, identifying at-risk populations and implementing early interventions to prevent the insertion of drug production into a community can have positive effects. On the other hand, there are also high costs associated with the presence of drugs in a community in the arena of public health.

Drug production may be local, serving only local markets when it is low. However, as production increases and a surplus is achieved, this crime may become part of transnational networks of drug trafficking, extending its impact beyond the local community. The transnational drug trade fuels large networks of illegal activity in production, transit, and consumer countries, and is also connected to other types of crime such as human trafficking, extortion, and corruption. All of this can seriously harm social cohesion within communities and lead to low levels of trust, high crime rates, and a decline in the quality of life. Thus, local drug production has highly harmful potential for communities at home and abroad. It is important for developed nations, and the international community, to address this issue both locally and internationally, focusing on its impact on the communities it affects. This chapter develops these issues and focuses on how community safety is affected by this illegal activity and how stakeholders, communities, and other actors can prevent it.

**Safety in Cities: ICPC’s Global Survey of 2011**

This chapter presents the results of the very first Global Survey on Safety in Cities. An ICPC initiative to gather and generate vital information regarding crime prevention at the city level, the survey seeks to be part of a large base of knowledge and an effort to generate solid and detailed information on actual prevention programmes worldwide. The chapter analyses issues such as the prevalence of crime prevention programmes at the city level, the budgets for these programmes, whether or not these are evaluated, and who finances them, as well as giving specific details about the programmes themselves, such as which types of crimes they tackle. Information is also included about issues of importance in cities such as drugs, gangs, and armed violence. The survey is a significant step within longstanding efforts to support crime prevention with solid and reliable data. Overall, this chapter offers a detailed glimpse of the possibilities and potential of a worldwide crime prevention database.

**Conclusions**

The International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety 2012 addresses topics that have an impact on the lives of millions of people worldwide from ICPC’s particular perspective. It uses a wealth of methodologies, such as content analysis of laws, survey design, and implementation and other qualitative methods, to analyse illegal activities and the context in which they occur, as well as the role crime prevention and community safety play within its topics. It highlights the importance of concerted community-level action and government-led institutional change. It also provides detailed accounts of practices and places of opportunity where crime prevention and community safety can have a positive impact in terms of reducing crime rates and victimisation and making local communities more cohesive and safe.
Bubble-wrapped pills are scattered across the crude table in a busy market beside crumpled boxes of lubricant, paracetamol and anti-fungal powder.

Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 16, 2011.

©Poindexter Sama/IPS
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CRIME OVERVIEW AND TRENDS TO WATCH
Commuters at rush hour at a metro station in Tokyo, Japan, August 4, 2004.
© Chris Westphal
Introduction

ICPC has selected indicators such as homicide and prison populations to provide a context for the rest of the International Report. We rely in this chapter on a number of important efforts to collect international statistics on crime, particularly UN Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS) as well as the 2011 Global Study on Homicide (UNODC 2011a). As pointed out in the UN-CTS, up-to-date international data on crime are difficult to produce. International agencies rely on national governments to report data, which they then process. Thus, the data present the same potential problems that all national-level data do (Box 2.1). While efforts to provide up-to-date international crime information are ongoing, systematic data gathering outside the developed world is often difficult. Aside from the technical challenges, some socio-political contexts may make it more difficult for authorities to collect and assess crime data, for example countries coming out of conflict or those whose governments do not wish to report their data for political reasons.

Crime, Coming up or Going down?

While in general crime in developed countries, specifically the United States (US) and Canada, and to a much lesser extent the European Union (EU), has seen a general steady reduction in the past ten years3 (Dills, Miron, and Summers 2008), some areas of the world have seen an increase in the levels of violence and crime they experience. The US is a very interesting case. Despite predictions of an important rise in crime in the 1990s, overall crime rates have fallen consistently, regardless of geographical or socioeconomic considerations (Florida 2011, Levitt, 2004). Contrary to what most experts predicted, the crime wave of the 1990s and 2000s never reached the dimensions expected. Substantial research has attempted to explain this phenomenon and answers have been varied (Box 2.2). Meanwhile, the rest of the developed world, namely, the EU, has seen a drop in some selected crimes only, such as homicide. The experience of the US remains the most radical and, even now, puzzling. Indeed, while the US saw a decrease across all types of crime in the 1990s, the EU saw an increase in many types of illicit acts, especially violent crime, which saw an 11% increase in the same period (Levitt 2004). Unfortunately, decreases in crime of this magnitude have happened in only a minority of countries.

Box 2.1 Reporting Crime Internationally: Core Issues

- Variations in the way data are collected among countries may yield problematic figures (UNODC 2011b).
- Non-reported crimes, the “dark figure,” result in underestimated crime rates. There are a number of statistical tools to tackle this issue and estimate “real” crime rates (McDonald 2002).
- Errors may be accumulated during information collection by police and civilian organisations.
- Lack of government infrastructure and technical capacity may prevent effective data gathering.

Box 2.2 Declining Crime Rates in the US: Why the “Crime Epidemic” Never Materialised

From Levitt (2004):
- Enlargement of police forces.
- Increase in prison populations.
- Slowing down of crack epidemic.

From Florida (2011) and Sampson (2006):
- Increase in ethnic diversity in cities.
- Social development in cities.

Most of these explanations are the source of heated debates and are by no means conclusive, methodological challenges remain, and new research is always ongoing.

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3 Except for a few countries in Eastern Europe that have seen slight increases, the general tendency is still downwards, according to UNODC (2010b).
Crime rates in other parts of the world, especially Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Harrendorf, Markku, and Malby 2010), continue to rise or remain stable at the national level. The Caribbean and Central America are particularly noteworthy, as they have seen important increases in homicide rates. A mixture of factors has triggered skyrocketing violence rates in these countries, meaning they now have some of the highest homicide rates in the world. Institutional deficiencies, an increased presence of organised crime groups, and structural inequalities have helped fuel this situation (Box 2.3).

The Independence of Perceptions

Perceptions of insecurity (understood as the subjective impression of being safe or vulnerable) remain generally high, even in those countries that have seen a reduction in crime rates (Cordner 2010). This phenomenon has been explained by a number of factors. People’s perception of urban decay or of the general state of their physical surroundings has been found to have an effect on feelings of safety. Individuals who perceive their surroundings as decaying are more likely to feel unsafe (Skogan 1986). People’s knowledge regarding actual crime rates, communicated through-out community networks, has also been found to have an effect on perceptions of crime (ibid.). Levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy and the ability of a community to resolve its internal conflicts are important factors explaining a community’s proclivity to feelings of insecurity. Having open channels of peaceful conflict resolution at the community level provides security and a feeling of safety. Perceptions of insecurity may be related to people’s individual perceptions of risk and their capacity to deal with said risk. The influence of the media in shaping perceptions of crime has also been debated intensively for the past two decades. One argument is that the media (print, television, and, more recently, the internet) fuel negative perceptions of crime, also known as “fear of crime,” mainly because of their mostly economic interest. This causes an increase in the fear of crime (Eschholz 1998). Another perception is that the media’s effect on fear of crime is effective only in conjunction with other government-led policies — such as incarceration — which have fuelled this fear over time, creating a circle of higher fear and harsher policies (Callanan 2005, Lee 2007). This leads to important reflections on the impact of crime — and perceptions of crime — on policy. It can be argued that crime always has an impact on policy, but the direction and quality of policy responses do not rely only on crime rates. Fear of crime can be as important in determining policy choices as crime itself. By the same token, governments take into account other political and economic factors in their crime policies.

Homicide Trends around the World

Data on homicide are more readily available and easier to gather than that on other crimes, which is why it remains a good indicator of levels of crime and violence. This is evidenced in the publication by UNODC in 2011 of the Global Study on Homicide, as an important effort to provide an in-depth account of homicide internationally. Map 1.1 presents homicide rates on a global scale. As we can see, the highest rates are clustered in South and Central America and Africa, particularly its sub-Saharan region.

Europe (thirty-five countries) has seen a continuous decrease in homicides that continues to this day. Asia and Oceania (twenty-five countries) have also seen a small decrease in their homicide rates, with the same trend to be found in Canada and the US (Harrendorf, Markku, and Malby 2010). As mentioned before, Central America and the Caribbean have seen a significant increase in their murder rates. Table 2.1 presents the ten countries with the highest murder rate in the world according to the Global Study on Homicide (UNODC 2011a). Out of the ten countries presented, only one (Colombia) is not in the Central America and Caribbean region, although it borders it.

In recent years, violence in these countries has reached very high levels. Even while homicides in North and South America as a region remain stable or have decreased, Central America has seen an increase of close to 100%, such as in the case of Honduras (UNODC

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Box 2.3 Fear of Crime:
A Short History of the Concept

Fear of crime did not enter the vocabulary of academics or policymakers until the 1960s, when concern about urban disorder was driving research in the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. To the general question asked (Why is there such a difference between levels of fear and the reality of crime?) in time were added questions relating to gender and minorities as well as concerns of a qualitative nature. As time progressed, interest in the field moved into policy circles. Today, much debate remains on the nature of fear of crime and its relationship to political and socioeconomic variables as well as actual crime rates (Farrall and Lee 2008).

4 Other crimes also serve as indicators of trends in crime, such as robbery, theft, and assault. For these particular crimes, we are able to provide only lagged data. In much the same way as homicide, these crimes have in general seen a decrease in developed countries as well as an increase in less developed regions of the world.
CHAPTER 2 CRIME OVERVIEW AND TRENDS TO WATCH

Table 2.1 Highest Homicide Rates in the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>HOMICIDE X 100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNODC (2011a).

The Importance of Intra-National Differences

As data collection improves, the importance of analysing the regional or sub-national level has gained prominence in studies on crime (UNODC 2011a). Countries tend to present important variations in homicide rates when data are analysed at the state or municipal level. For example, in Mexico, the northern state of Chihuahua—which has significant organised crime presence—had a murder rate of more than sixty homicides per 100,000 people in 2010. On the other hand, the southern state of Campeche had a homicide rate of less than five per 100,000 people. At an even more micro level, only three precincts out of a total of fifty-eight in the city of Cape Town, South Africa,
Explaining Central America’s Rising Violence: Gangs and State Responses

Since the late 1990s, Central American countries, most notably Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, have experienced an important increase in violence and homicides. The main explanations for this lies in five factors (SAS 2010, UNODC 2011a, World Bank 2011):

1. An increase in gang and drug trafficking presence, fuelled by a steady influx of deported gang members from the US.
2. Changes in the flow of drugs, specifically cocaine transported to the US and other destinations.
3. Structural disadvantages (poverty, marginalisation) for youth in these countries.
4. Heavy-handed government responses that have entrenched gang identities and created a mystique that gangs profit from.
5. Availability of firearms.

This situation serves to highlight the potential benefit of implementing prevention programmes as opposed to or in conjunction with repressive government initiatives (See ICPC 2011).


The 1990s and early 2000s saw a worldwide growth in prison populations. There has been heavy investment all over the world in building prisons. Incarceration rates skyrocketed by up to 40% in some developed countries during the 1990s (Tkachuk and Walmsley 2001) as a result of a trend that began in some places as early as the 1960s. Today, an estimated 9.8 million people are incarcerated around the world. Three countries account for almost half of this number: the US with 2.3 million, China with 1.57 million, and Russia with 0.89 million (Walmsley 2011). The argument in favour of imprisonment as a response to crime is generally that it serves as an effective deterrent for both current and future criminals. The increase in prison populations is part of the argument that imprisonment reduces crime both through containment of criminal elements in society and as a deterrent for future criminals.

Research in the US, one of the earliest adopters of large-scale incarceration, has shown that, while a growth in prison population is indeed correlated with decreases in crime (Levitt 2004), the information available and the complexity of the causes of crime mean it is impossible to make very certain claims of actual causality. Meanwhile, it has been found that, as prison populations increase, the relative impact or benefit of even further increases is diminished (Blumstein and Walman 2000). Yet another point for reflection in the assumption that imprisonment reduces crime is that there seems to be a circular relationship between these two factors: in other words,
there is some evidence that crime rates affect rates of imprisonment as much as rates of imprisonment affect crime rates. This produces a “chicken and egg” scenario when it comes to arguing for the infallibility of prisons.

Thus, the argument for more prisons remains uncertain. What we do know is that, at least in the specific case of the US, increasing prison populations seems to have, at best, a partial relationship with declining crime rates. Without the massive investments in prisons, the country’s crime rates would have dropped importantly anyway (although maybe marginally not as much), mainly through socioeconomic improvements and changes in demographic factors (Blumstein and Walmann 2000). To conclude, while prisons are indeed necessary to contain certain criminals, the evidence supporting their cost effectiveness as deterrents is questionable. Rights advancement and socioeconomic development are at least just as important, if not more so, in preventing future crimes and also in lowering overall crime rates. There exist many options and alternatives to incarceration as a response with positive effects. Non-custodial measures can be implemented successfully in some cases (UNODC 2006b). Restorative processes, community service, mediations, and arbitrations are all strategies that can be implemented and, when successful, can have a positive impact on recidivism prevention. These approaches also include communities in the decision-making process and the treatment of the offender, giving them the opportunity to become more cohesive and better prepared to deal with future threats.

The Challenge of Global Data Production

Useful, homogenous data are vital to successful crime prevention policy implementation. This can apply to both crimes themselves as well as the other socioeconomic factors that define communities. The large number of international actors involved in certain crimes, such as human trafficking, makes cooperation and exchange of information a challenge. The example of human trafficking is a good case in point. Many authors have pointed to the need to generate uniform definitions and systematic data-gathering systems that are easily shared across states (Savona and Stefanizzi 2007). It is important task for any government and any other actor interested in improving levels of safety in their communities to make efforts to gather systematic information in order to make good policy decisions. This is not to say that qualitative information and knowledge are not important, but in an increasingly globalised world it is useful to have homogenous data to allow for better cooperation, partnerships, and collective international action.

Sharing of information is vital to the success of prevention programmes and community safety initiatives. Information provides decision makers and communities with the knowledge they need to make informed decisions regarding policy and programmes. Information allows for deep knowledge of a situation and its causes and consequences. In terms of crime prevention, shared information allows for “policy makers and practitioners to tailor interventions to the problems they confront [...] finding a balance between the need for short-term and longer-term outcomes, as well as protecting human rights” (UNODC and ICPC 2010, 17).

Two Trends to Watch in the Future: Counterfeit Drugs and Transport Crime

Counterfeit Drugs: A Hidden Killer

Counterfeiting in medications has seen an important increase in the past decade, although it has existed for a long time (Bate 2008). In 1992, the World Health Organization (WHO) held the first International Conference on Counterfeit Medicines. On this occasion, the agency and participants agreed on the following definition:

“A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include products with the right ingredients or with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient (inadequate quantities of) active ingredient(s) or with fake packaging” (WHO 2006).

Box 2.6 Some Examples of Data Gathering

- Since 2007, ICPC and its partners have hosted a series of International Conferences of Crime Observatories, with the aim of promoting exchange and discussion on topics related to data gathering, research, and sharing of information at the international level.
- The Small Arms Survey (SAS) has been actively promoting the generation and exchange of data on arms and armed violence through its flagship publication of the same name as well as other venues and forums.
This definition is however subject to controversy—counterfeiting is traditionally an economic crime, concerning rights of intellectual property. In this definition, counterfeit medicine is considered a deliberate attack on health.

Obtaining accurate data is difficult, but the figures available to WHO and UNODC are alarming: in markets in Africa, Asia, and South America, it is estimated that up to 30% of pharmaceuticals are false (UNODC 2011b). Moreover, UNODC argues that the market for counterfeit drugs is worth US$1.6 billion annually just in Asia and Africa. And richer countries are no exception: while counterfeit drugs are less prevalent here they are nonetheless to be found. Purchases of fake drugs made through the internet are very common: it is estimated that over 50% of medicines purchased online are fake (Fauran 2011). The US Center for Medicine in the Public Interest estimates the global market for counterfeit drugs at US$75 billion for 2010—an increase of 90% in five years (ibid.). For 2010, the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) has identified 2,054 cases of counterfeit drugs, half of which involved at least 1,000 units (PSI 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,412</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,123</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counterfeit medicines are of all types. Rich countries have traditionally been buyers of comfort products (such as slimming treatments and treatment against erectile dysfunction). As for poorer countries—especially in Africa and Southeast Asia—many products are potentially counterfeit. According to WHO, antibiotics and other antiprotozoals such as treatments against malaria are among the most counterfeited (WHO 2010a). It is estimated that every year 700,000 deaths can be attributed to the counterfeiting of tuberculosis and malaria drugs alone (Harris, Stevens, and Morris 2009).

The market for counterfeit drugs is increasingly linked to organised crime, which supports their manufacture, trafficking, and distribution (CCPCJ 2011, UNODC 2010b). Traffickers engage in corruption against authorities to facilitate trade (Bate 2008), given the low risk this presents for criminals compared with other crimes. Weak supervisory and regulatory gaps or deficiencies exacerbate the problem (WHO 2010b).

WHO Member States met in Rome in February 2006 and created a special international body to participate in the fight against counterfeit drugs: the International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT). This includes the various actors involved in tackling counterfeit medicines, including national regulatory agencies, Interpol, and representatives of pharmaceutical companies, and five working groups have been established to improve efficiency. Thus, IMPACT is involved in preventive measures such as the design of campaigns to raise awareness of the dangers of counterfeit medicines, the development of national legal frameworks to criminalise this activity, and the establishment of national systems to improve control of the drug chain. IMPACT is also involved in promoting international collaboration among law enforcement agencies (customs, police) against counterfeit medicines. Prevention is heavily involved in all these processes, through awareness campaigns as well as production control. States can implement control structures in the production chain to minimise the entry of counterfeits into the legitimate market. Patients/consumers of products purchased on the internet must be sensitive to the fact that these products can be counterfeit, and therefore dangerous to their health. New technologies are also considered part of the solution. Aside from the IMPACT Working Group on Technology, manufacturers seek to use technology to limit counterfeiting and prevent it from entering markets. This includes a system that is growing in Africa and some Asian countries—as well as the US—whereby the customer can verify the authenticity of the product using their mobile phone. A unique code is printed on the box which the client sends to an international database. If the drug is authentic, an SMS is sent to verify the product is safe for consumption (Harris, Stevens, and Morris 2009). This and other prevention policies have the potential for greater impact in reducing the harm of counterfeit medications.
Crime in Public Transport

In an increasingly urban world, public transport is a more ecological and economical mode of transport. However, the daily influx of thousands or even millions of people also attracts crime. This has led authorities in many cities to take steps to limit the risks for passengers and staff. These measures are all the more necessary to tackle the sense of insecurity—even unfounded—that is a major influence on quality of life: fear of crime can sometimes become a barrier to the use of public transport (Graham, Delbosc, and Mahmoud 2010). While the overall rate of victimisation of men in transport is higher (Smith 2008), women as a group are more sensitive to the security—or insecurity—that prevails in the areas of public transport. They tend to avoid using this type of transport, or use it only at certain times, which limits their freedom of movement. Several countries have established systems in transport to prevent the victimisation of women, particularly in relation to sexual assault. Many cities now have subway cars or buses exclusively for women, notably Mexico City and Tokyo.

In Mexico City, the Passenger Transport Network (Red de Transporte de Pasajeros) in January 2008 established a bus service geared exclusively towards women, called the Athenea Programme (Programa Atenea). The service operates from 6:00 to 21:00 and carries an average of six million women per year. In addition to this, 58% of metro cars are allocated exclusively to women during peak morning and evening hours. Brazil and India also use this practice. There is little feedback as of today on whether these strategies have improved the safety of women. However, there is evidence that they do have a positive effect on the feeling of safety of women users. A large majority of Japanese women (90%) have reported being satisfied with such a system (Tsunozaki 2009).

The prevention of crime in public spaces such as public transport areas also involves work on the physical environment or situational crime prevention (also known as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design or CPTED). This implies that security issues must be taken into account when thinking about creating the space for transport or its renovation. CPTED seems simpler to implement in fixed areas, although this method of prevention is used in transport vehicles as well. For example, several cities have implemented measures using this type of prevention, including indenting the walls of docks and a preference for easy-to-clean surfaces to discourage graffiti, creating a relaxing environment and light that casts no shadows, or relocating merchants in key locations to occupy vacant space.

Another commonly used, and controversial, method of prevention in transportation is the use of video surveillance (closed-circuit television, CCTV). Studies of US public transportation agencies shows that CCTV is present in up to 80% of buses and 90% of bus stations. However, the majority of women do not feel safer with CCTV and would prefer an increase in security personnel in stations (Loukaitou-Sideris and Fink 2009). Yet other systems have been implemented to secure passengers and staff, such as the installation of metal detectors in the West Midlands in England to prevent attacks with knives on trains. A “radio alarm” system installed next to the driver was considered the most effective way to prevent the commission of crimes on buses by 80% of operators surveyed (Bonfanti and Wagenknecht 2010).

Prevention of crime on public transport also involves the humanisation (or re-humanisation) of spaces of transit. Staff may attend awareness training in the management of conflict situations. Prevention also involves education, and advertising campaigns are conducted in some states for the users. At the same time, advertising campaigns are regularly introduced to fight against attacks, mainly those against women and sexual attacks. This is to remind potential aggressors that harassment is a crime and victims that they must report such behaviour if they are victims or witnesses while on public transport.

Box 2.7 Île-de-France: Crime Prevention in Public Transport

The Île-de-France region of France is a heavily populated region that contains the city of Paris and other important districts. With over 11 million inhabitants, it concentrates 60% of transport crime in France. Of this, 50% are thefts, 20% violent robberies, and the remainder mostly crimes such as drug or arms possession. Around 12 million trips are made on public transport a day. The government has implemented a number of measures to tackle this issue (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport, and Housing n.d.):

- Positioning 1,250 police officers on the public network trained in prevention.
- Awareness campaigns aimed at youth and other potential victims of mobile phone theft.
- Specialised undercover agents in the public transport network who are trained to tackle violent theft.
- Sophisticated CCTV networks installed in key stations such as the Châtelet–Les Halles underground station, the largest such station in the world.
Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to present the reader with an account of current debates and trends in crime as well as their relationship with and impact on crime prevention and community safety. First, it discussed the most recent trends in crime at the international level as well as regional differences, such as the reduction in crime rates in some developed countries compared with the rapid increase in other regions. It also mentioned the importance of perceptions in affecting the design of prevention policies and ideas. Second, the chapter discussed current trends in homicide. Central America and the Caribbean stand out as areas where homicide has increased substantially over the past five years. This section highlighted the need for sub-national analysis and its benefits in prevention policy design. Third, the chapter addressed the topic of prisons, a controversial issue that has been on the agenda of many governments in recent years. While there is evidence that imprisonment is correlated with a reduction in crime rates, it is not clear whether this is a causal relationship or not. This section provided a number of alternatives to incarceration that may be considered to avoid large-scale prisoner releases resulting from overcrowding, as demonstrated by the California case. Fourth, the chapter addressed the need for more and better shared data and information to inform prevention policy design as well as community safety programmes. Lastly, the chapter presented two important trends for the near future. Counterfeit medications affect the lives of millions every year and prevention has an important role to play in tackling this. Security in public transport is an area in which crime prevention has made demonstrable advances and as such deserves being highlighted.
3
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND EXPLOITATION
Girls from a go-go bar waiting for customers on Walking Street in Pattaya, Thailand, February 20, 2012. © Dmitriy Berkut/iStockphoto
Human Trafficking and Exploitation

Introduction

In the past ten years, human trafficking has become one of the most salient crimes on the international stage. The rise of “modern slavery” (US Department of State 2010, 7) in recent years has resulted in the production of large amounts of information regarding this particular illicit activity. We know more about this phenomenon now than at any other point in the past. However, important debates remain on the concept, its definition, and how to tackle it. In addition, human trafficking is also part of a larger and more widespread phenomenon: exploitation. In order to understand human trafficking, we must also understand that, today, millions of people are forced to work in conditions that go from the exploitative to outright slavery. These victims are present in many industries, from mineral extraction in Africa to sex work in Turkey, from agriculture in North America to household labour in Latin America. The phenomenon feeds in large part off human trafficking as a source of labourers. As such, the two topics cannot be dissociated. From the perspective of crime prevention, it is important to approach them both in a holistic manner, using community-based approaches to prevent victimisation as well as broader crime prevention strategies. While, for the sake of clarity, we focus here on human trafficking, it is important to keep in mind the broader issue of exploitation within which this is situated. According to a report by the UN-affiliated European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI) (Jokinen and Viuhko 2008), trafficking, forced labour, and exploitation form a complex continuum of coercion, with clear-cut forced labour cases at one end of the spectrum and more subtle forms of exploitation at the other. In order to prevent these crimes effectively, they must be understood as a part of a whole system of illegality.

International organisations, academics, and other actors have yet to agree on an overarching definition of human trafficking (Savona and Stefanizzi 2007). It is sometimes amalgamated with human smuggling, even though these two illegal activities have important differences. In the same vein, there is still a problem with the gathering of information on human trafficking and smuggling. No universal format exists for gathering data on these issues and the challenges to achieving this now are such that it is not unreasonable to think that, for the near future, data on human trafficking and smuggling will be deficient at the best of times. The different legal status afforded these matters in different countries creates important roadblocks to the standardisation of measurements (Aromaa 2007, Aronowitz 2009). The US Department of State (2010) estimates that over twelve million people worldwide have been victims of trafficking and slavery and now find themselves in positions of sexual exploitation, debt bondage, and other forms of enslavement. As the issue gathers momentum in the international arena, more powerful tools and efforts are being made to standardise information. The UN focus on human trafficking has grown significantly since the launch in 2007 of UN.GIFT.

The factors at play in the process of human trafficking and its related crimes are many. Poverty is not sufficient to trigger a flow of trafficked humans; other push factors must be present, such as a desire to emigrate as a consequence of “inadequate employment opportunities” (Aronowitz 2009, 11). Receiving countries and regions must also have a series of pull factors that make them attractive to traffickers and

Box 3.1 Challenges to Human Trafficking Data Gathering (Bales 2005):
- No standard definition.
- Its covert nature makes it hard to access victims/perpetrators.
- Social stigma prevents victims from coming forward.
- Intimidation of victims is also common.
- Transnational nature makes coordinated data collecting complicated.

5 In 2009, UNODC published its Global Report on Trafficking in Persons: Human Trafficking, a Crime that Shames Us All (UNODC 2009a), resulting from work done by the UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT). This volume is one of the most comprehensive efforts to assess the state of human trafficking globally. A year later, the US Department of State published the tenth edition of its Trafficking in Persons Report.
victims alike, such as “ease of travel […] demand for migrant workers in destination […] and established migration routes” (ibid., 12).

Human trafficking and smuggling⁶ are complex activities, with many actors and countries involved in what is now a fully globalised market. Trafficking may not even necessarily be international: it may remain within the borders of a country, adding yet another dimension to the issue. The general agreement on the importance of human trafficking is not without controversy. There are those who argue that, by putting so much added emphasis on the trafficking aspect of this crime, the international community is jeopardising the future chances of millions of people who are in conditions of slavery but are not necessarily victims of trafficking. These analysts argue that trafficking should be seen almost as an externality (albeit a very serious one) to slavery⁷. This view, they argue, would help decision makers address both slavery and trafficking more effectively, thus having greater impact (Hathaway 2008). This chapter of the International Report gives the reader an overview of these issues as well as a general idea of trends and behaviours in human trafficking and, most importantly, analyse them from the particular perspective of crime prevention and community safety, two approaches that have proven to work in tackling this crime.

**Defining Trafficking, Exploitation, and Smuggling**

As we refer to trafficking, exploitation, and smuggling in this section, it is useful to define them all from the outset. Table 3.1 presents the most comprehensive definitions available. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (also known as the Palermo Protocol and part of a series of protocols to address human smuggling and firearms trafficking) provides a framework for the analysis and gathering of information regarding these issues. The Protocol is itself a considerable step forward in the standardisation of a workable definition. Nevertheless, some common disagreements regarding human trafficking and smuggling are worth mentioning. These emanate from an understanding of the context in which the crime takes place and can be summarised thus:

- **Consent:** Victims of trafficking have not previously agreed to be trafficked or transported, whereas persons who have been smuggled normally have agreed to be moved from one place to another. The debate on consent is ongoing, and some argue that, even if consent is explicit, the factors that bring the decision about mean the decision is not a free one and thus consent is meaningless. The key here lies in the practical difficulty in differentiating between coercion and consent. Many countries push for a definition of consent whereby, should any of the elements of trafficking be used (coercion, threat, etc.), all and any consent issues are nullified (Bales 2005).

- **Profits:** Profits from smuggling tend to be localised and in the form of a one-off—or limited amounts of—payment, whereas in trafficking the victim continues to “pay” through exploitation for a longer period of time. It is possible too that in many cases the smuggled person is a victim of trafficking.

- **Movement:** It is argued that, unlike in migration, in smuggling the victim is free to move once the smuggling is accomplished. Smuggling is also always international and involves border crossing, whereas trafficking may be internal. However, there are many cases of smuggled persons becoming victims of exploitation once the smuggling has ended.

Trafficking normally entails a protracted process. Bales (2005) describes it in eight steps, which we summarise here. It begins with a fundamental vulnerability of the potential victim, also known as push factors. Vulnerabilities include the desire for a better life or the need to escape oppression or poverty. Interestingly, it seems that it is not the poorest of the poor who are trafficked, nor the most disadvantaged (Bales 2005, 141); it is actually young, healthy, and relatively educated people who become victims, as very poor, sick, or otherwise incapacitated people cannot be fully exploited for profit. Indeed, research in West Africa shows that children trafficked into domestic servitude come from families of average wealth and not from the poorest villages (Kielland and Sanogo 2002).

The second step in the process is the recruiting stage. At this point, those in a vulnerable situation may be contacted by a trafficker, smuggler, or middleman. It is vital here to mention the central role that family and members of the community play in the recruitment stage. Many examples abound of this, from villages and towns all over the world. Members of the intimate circle of the victim are key to sustaining cycles of trafficking and exploitation. In some cases, trafficked persons return to their communities and themselves become recruiters or spokespersons for the opportunities and wealth that lie abroad. In other cases, young people may be made offers of legitimate jobs elsewhere by so-called agencies that claim to have contacts that can get them well-paid work. These
Table 3.1 Working Definitions of Trafficking, Smuggling, and Exploitation

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<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>ORGANISATION/DOCUMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>HUMAN TRAFFICKING</td>
<td>The recruitment, transportation, harbouring, or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs.</td>
<td>Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (also known as the Palermo Protocol), 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLOITATION, FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOUR</td>
<td>All work or service which is extracted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.</td>
<td>International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 29, 1930.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMUGGLING</td>
<td>The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national.</td>
<td>UNODC Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.</td>
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advertise openly on the web or local newspapers. A situation of high unemployment makes this attractive to young people. Some may know they could be going into prostitution but may not be informed of the constraints to their liberty and finances that will be forced on them.

The third step is the removal stage, in which the victim either is forcibly removed from his/her community or agrees to follow the recruiter. This is where the consent debate is located. This is where control over the situation normally passes from the victim to the trafficker.

Then comes the transportation of the victim. This stage can involve numerous means of transport and may also take a long period of time. This is also the riskiest stage for the trafficker, as he/she is always on the move and at risk of being caught. Many actors are involved here, from corrupt officials who allow the trafficking to happen to escorts and “protectors” of the victim, as well as minders, exploiters, smugglers, and pimps. In this stage, smuggling and trafficking may be combined into a single activity.

Next is the stage where the trafficker takes control of the victim. Under duress or threat, the victim is forced to give up their documents to the trafficker, thus giving the latter more power over them. The trafficker also develops a relationship of dependence with the victim. At this stage, the victim is completely controlled by the trafficker and his/her associates. This stage is particularly pernicious for children, who are completely under the control of the trafficker/smuggler as soon as they leave their family. Some key factors that allow this to happen are poverty of the victim, lack of awareness of their rights, isolation, and other dependencies (Jokinen, Ollus, and Aromaa 2011).

The sixth stage is the arrival at the destination. It is during this stage that the victim may finally realise what has happened when the extent of the scam becomes evident. Here, many victims are told they have incurred substantial debts along the way and their documents may be confiscated (if they have not already been taken). The full extent of the predicament for the victim becomes clear in this stage.

The seventh stage is that of exploitation proper. In this stage, the victim is forced to engage in a number of exploitative situations, normally under duress or threat (as the Palermo Protocol definition states) and in sub-standard living conditions. People in this stage may be forced to work in the sex industry, domestic service, agricultural work, factories, workshops, and mining, among others. They are subject to constant psychological manipulation and are often the victims of violence and deprivation at many levels.

The first seven stages may repeat themselves as the victim is moved around and resold by their traffickers.
The last stage is one of resolution. There are no numbers to give us an idea of how many people die in situations as described here, but it is safe to assume they are not few. Victims may also be discarded once their useful life has been spent. Illness (such as HIV), ageing, and other such factors may lead to them being discarded. Victims may also escape and then face many other problems, such as being treated as illegal immigrants, abuse by authorities and members of the community, and stigmatisation owing to their previous occupation. Here, an entire different and very difficult process begins, one which may also be very traumatising for the victim. Rehabilitation of victims is an important challenge, and one which has been tackled with varying degrees of success. Many organisations attempt to deal with this problem, although they find their work impaired by social stigma, victims’ own fears, and lack of funding. Programmes are also in place in certain areas to prevent re-trafficking, an issue that has gained currency of late.

Crime prevention and community safety programmes can be implemented successfully, particularly at the vulnerability, recruitment, and re-trafficking stages. Awareness raising and strengthening communities’ social ties and social and economic capital can have positive effects.

**Push and Pull Factors**

A myriad of reasons make people want to leave their homes, their families, and their known environments to look for better opportunities. These may reflect international or national situations. Variables that make people leave are normally referred to as “push factors,” and the factors that attract people to certain areas or countries are labelled “pull factors.” They may be economic, environmental, political, religious, or of any other kind that influences the decision-making process of an individual. Regional inequality deserves a special mention because this factor is key to understanding migration, smuggling, and trafficking flows. Beyond issues of safety which make people move, many leave their places of dwelling when they perceive opportunities in other places that they do not have. Table 3.2 summarises push and pull factors.

A common problem facing those making the decision to be smuggled, or who are deceived into trafficking, is the belief that better opportunities lie elsewhere. This belief is unfortunately many times a fabrication by traffickers: better conditions are not necessarily present in other places.

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<tr>
<th><strong>PUSH FACTORS</strong></th>
<th><strong>PULL FACTORS</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of employment</td>
<td>Economic disparity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>Better quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>Opportunity to enter (corruption in immigration or legal loopholes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
<td>Porous borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persecution, war, unrest</td>
<td>Penalties for illegal immigration not a deterrent</td>
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<td>Political instability</td>
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**Trends in Human Trafficking and Exploitation**

The hope of a better life has always been an important driver behind people migrating. This faith in a better future is a noble aspiration that drives millions of people to move, alone or with their family, looking for better opportunities. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that the total number of international migrants has increased over the past ten years from an estimated 150 million in 2000 to 214 million today (IOM 2010). In other words, about 3% of the world population lives outside their country of birth. This is not counting the number of internal migrants, which UNDP estimates at 740 million (UNDP 2009). About one-third of the migrant flow from all developing countries is in the age range of twelve to twenty-four (World Bank 2006). Migration also has an important economic impact. According to the World Bank, worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded US$440 billion in 2010, of which developing countries received US$325 billion (*ibid.*).

Trafficking is nested within these massive flows of people. Around 12.3 million people today are victims of exploitation and forced labour. Of these, 2.4 million are trafficking victims. Every year, criminal networks of many shapes and sizes recruit and transport millions of people into slavery and exploitation of different kinds. The flows of trafficking are generally from poorer to wealthier nations, but there is enormous variation in these flows and in the destinations. For example, in 2010, at least 32,000 illegal immigrants are known to have arrived from Somalia into Yemen in the Horn of Africa region aboard smuggling boats. They were fleeing conflict, drought, and poverty to enter countries like Oman, Saudi Arabia, and others.
in the region in search of jobs. In Latin America, ILO (2005) reports that close to 250,000 of the 1.3 million people engaged in forced labour in the region are trafficking victims. The US Department of State (2010) estimates that close to a million children are forced to work as domestic servants in the region, and that many have been trafficked from their homes. Maps 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the flows we have described.

As we see in Map 3.1, the highest proportion of trafficking victims comes from Eastern and Central Europe, Russia, China, and parts of Southeast Asia. This is followed by Latin America, South and Central Asia, and parts of Africa. Very few or none at all come from Western Europe, North America, and Australia. As with all data on trafficking, this needs to be interpreted more as an illustration of trends than as real figures, as they represent only the information available. Much information on regions of Africa as well as parts of Asia is missing, for example. It must also be kept in mind that many migration and trafficking flows are not international, and sometimes trafficking occurs within a country’s borders, for example from rural areas to cities.

In Map 3.2, we can see that North America, specifically the US, and some countries in Europe (Italy and Germany) are key destinations for trafficking victims. China, India, and Pakistan are also countries with a high influx of victims. It is interesting to note that many countries which feature high as countries of origin are also destination countries for many. This is the case for Mexico, Russia, and China, for example. Mexico serves as a source, destination, and transit country, making the implementation of prevention strategies a complex task. Individuals from Central and South America pass through Mexico on their way to the US, and many eventually end up staying as they fail to get through. Many become victims of trafficking along the way and are also victimised by organised crime. This is exemplified by the gruesome massacre by drug cartels of seventy-two illegal immigrants (fifty-eight men and fourteen women) in northern Mexico in August 2010. It is now a somewhat common practice for such illicit groups to kidnap large numbers of illegal immigrants and either demand ransoms from their families or force them to work for them in the drug trade as assassins or drug mules. This is illustrative of the risks that smuggling or trafficking victims are exposed to as they are moved around. Meanwhile, the border crossings between Guatemala and Mexico have recently become more problematic, with many women being forced into prostitution and also a heavy presence of organised crime. Indeed, the National Commission for Human Rights in Mexico estimates that in 2009 alone up to 10,000 illegal immigrants were kidnapped by organised crime groups (CNDH 2009). This leads to further exploitation and death to people already victimised. The same document estimates the profits from this at around US$25 million. This is not a localised phenomenon: it has also been witnessed in other areas of the world.
Figure 3.1 gives a breakdown of the main economic areas into which people are trafficked each year. A majority of those victimised are exploited in the sex industry. Although most of the victims of the sex trade are women, it is also important to note that many are men, especially boys. Apart from the sex trade, children are also trafficked into other forms of exploitation. UNICEF notes that up to 300,000 children are trafficked to serve in armed conflicts worldwide (Shelley 2010). Even so, economic exploitation (factory work, agriculture, etc.) still composes a significant share of the total, at 32%. Figure 3.2 shows the gender and age group of trafficking victims. It is important to note that the vast majority of trafficking victims are women (66%), with girls and men in close second place.

**Who are the Traffickers?**

Human trafficking is perpetrated by a vast variety of actors, depending on the region of the world. In some cases, traffickers are opportunistic, seizing a chance to make a profit trafficking people one day and doing something else, such as running guns, another. Trafficking in humans is also a profitable business...
for more established organised crime groups and terrorist and other such organisations. As mentioned before, Mexican and other Latin American drug cartels benefit from this alongside their other illegal activities, especially at a time when the war on drugs is high on the political agenda and organised crime groups are being forced to diversify their business; Asia also has a heavy presence of organised crime groups that dedicate themselves almost exclusively to human trafficking, as do some Eastern European countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and others (Shelley 2010).

The routes these groups use are as varied as the nature and source of their victims: UNODC has stressed the truly global scope of this illicit activity (UNODC 2010). Traffickers and smugglers exploit already existing criminal structures (such as those used by the drug trade) and corruption to move people from one place to another. During this process, they build large networks of support along the way. Moving humans across continents is not an easy task, as they are much more difficult to hide and control than drugs or other material goods. Traffickers need safe houses, enforcers, protectors, and pimps along the way. This points to extensive and complex networks of professional criminals. However, evidence exists that not all traffickers are members of well-organised cartel-like structures. Some operate in a smaller and harder-to-monitor cell structure.

Tools for Preventing Trafficking in People and Exploitation

For the analytical part of this chapter, ICPC endeavoured to assess the gaps existing between what seems to be an explosion in the notoriety of human trafficking and exploitation and the reality of actual national action plans (NAPs). For this purpose, ICPC identified, for every country in the world (193 countries), not only national trafficking laws but also whether or not actual NAPs were devised as a result of the publication of general laws. The analysis had a special focus on action plans that encourage or contain prevention components. It is recognised that many local efforts abound, and municipalities, cities, and other sub-national entities continue to innovate on ways to tackle human trafficking. The focus was maintained on national-level plans, both for analytical feasibility and also to highlight the need for central governments to recognise and act on this issue. As other reports highlight, many countries had a special focus on action plans that encourage or contain prevention components. It is recognised that many local efforts abound, and municipalities, cities, and other sub-national entities continue to innovate on ways to tackle human trafficking. The focus was maintained on national-level plans, both for analytical feasibility and also to highlight the need for central governments to recognise and act on this issue. As other reports highlight, many countries have adopted human trafficking as an integral part of their agendas, creating national laws to typify the crime as well as joining international efforts such as the UN’s treaties and initiatives. This analysis will allow the reader to locate where action needs to be taken as well as the importance of the inclusion of prevention and community initiatives in any NAP.

National Laws

By national laws, we refer to constitutional, penal, or administrative laws which include human trafficking provisions at the national level. One of the first things that is noticeable is that a high number of countries have national laws that confront human trafficking. Out of 193 countries reviewed, 140 have some form of national legislation that addresses this issue. This is indeed an important and very visual step, as it gives us an idea of how recognised this problem has become. Figure 3.3 shows the timeframe of the appearances of these laws. It is important to stress that the decade of the 2000s saw an important increase, as the issue received more and more international coverage.
As we can see, in the period between 2002 and 2005 alone, seventy-three countries passed some form of national law. By 2011, many more had done likewise. Today, around 73% of the world’s countries have some form of legislation that specifically tackles this issue. This is a huge step forward from even ten years ago, when not even 10% of countries had this kind of legislation.

A natural question that arises relates to where these laws are situated. Are they enshrined in the Constitution? Are they operational laws within administrative or penal codes? Inserting any new provision in the Constitution of a country immediately makes it acquire the highest level of precedence. Figure 3.4 shows us the level at which these laws are inserted within the juridical structure. As we can see, close to 60% of all countries (a total of 193) have introduced their human trafficking laws into their penal code. A minority have them within the administrative realm (2%) and another small percentage (4%) have included them in their Constitution. This structure makes sense because it is the penal code—and the institutions that operate under it—that are traditionally equipped to tackle this issue. Indeed, it could be said that it is unnecessary to insert such a provision into the Constitution, given that most of these already have human rights provisions within them and it would be normal to assume that in many cases human trafficking would come under the umbrella of human rights protections. Thus, it is sensible to keep human trafficking laws at the penal level. Making them an administrative issue certainly does not reflect the seriousness of the problem.

It is also important to stress that, from the prevention perspective, inserting all legislation into the penal code means this issue is dealt with mostly by the criminal justice system. While this is necessary, it is vital to address the issue of trafficking and exploitation from outside the criminal justice system as well. Human trafficking and exploitation are issues that, because of their complex nature, may in some cases be woven into the social fabric of a country or community (as may be the case for debt bondage in parts of India, a country with an estimated eighteen million people living in slavery, many of whom have been trafficked (Bales 2005)). This can be tackled through developmental prevention programmes that address social issues such as discrimination and exploitative practices.

While it is clear that men are also victims of trafficking, it is women and children who are the most vulnerable and the most likely to suffer at the hands of traffickers. This is reflected in the number of national laws with special provisions for women or children or even laws that work only for women or children. A total of 45% of countries reviewed have specific legislation on child trafficking. In the case of women, the results are not as salient: only about 20% of countries have specifically tailored laws that address trafficking in women.
Prevention in National Laws

When it comes to explicit mentions of prevention in national laws, the findings are not encouraging. Of all the countries reviewed, only 22% have national laws that mention or address the need to involve prevention in the fight against trafficking. Almost three-quarters of them do not have any prevention provisions. Out of those that have a national law, close to 70% do not mention prevention. This underscores the need to address this issue as a social problem as opposed to a notion of criminal justice alone. Figure 3.5 shows the types of prevention found in national laws.

Prevention with regard to women- and children-specific laws is included in 16.4% of cases of pieces of national legislation which include a component or a specific law on children and women.

National Action Plans

With regard to NAPs, analysis reveals many interesting findings. It is important to note that 41.5% of countries have a NAP to tackle human trafficking. Table 3.3 provides a breakdown of this number by region.

As we can see, Western and Central Europe have the highest concentration of countries with a NAP, with just over 80%. One thing that jumps out is North America, a region that includes Canada, Mexico, and the US. While national laws exist in all three countries, as in the case of Canada, whose latest amendment in 2005 enacted broader coverage for trafficking crimes within the criminal code, their action plans tend to be decentralised to the state/provincial level with the cooperation of the federal government. Thus, they have no general national-level action plan. This does not mean action is not being taken, but rather that it is being taken at a different level. In the case of Mexico, legislation is in place and a NAP has been

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Table 3.3 Countries with National Action Plans by Region, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% WITH NAP</th>
<th>REGIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81.08%</td>
<td>WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.33%</td>
<td>EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.56%</td>
<td>SOUTH AMERICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>EAST AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.36%</td>
<td>SOUTHERN AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>SOUTH AND SOUTH-WEST ASIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00%</td>
<td>MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>NORTH AMERICA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

designed but has yet to be implemented. South and Southwest Asia show the lowest percentages in terms of NAPs. It is interesting that Central America and the Caribbean have a high percentage of countries with NAPs (close to 67% already have a plan in place). This is an encouraging signal from a region that is an important source of both smuggled and trafficked migrants. Other regions hover between 60% and 45%.

Analysing NAPs in detail also allows us to learn who is funding these initiatives. The international community is heavily involved, especially in certain regions, but more and more governments are now taking strides to tackle trafficking. Figure 3.6 presents this data.

As we can see, international organisations are heavily involved in the funding of national programmes to combat trafficking, accounting for 33% of all NAPs. This highlights the vital role of the international community in tackling this issue. Governments also remain central actors, of course. Government commitment is fundamental when it comes to the long-term viability of a NAP, as is the mobilisation of community and other local-level actors towards the prevention of trafficking. Meanwhile, funding sources are multi-sectoral: many actors are involved in financing NAPs and ultimately this is good for the victims of this crime.

Figure 3.6 serves to highlight the importance of partnerships in the fight against trafficking and exploitation. ICPC data gathered for the International Report provides us with information on whether partnerships are an active ingredient in NAPs. Of all eighty countries that openly report a NAP, forty-three provided information on their partners. Over 50% of NAPs have one or more partners. Table 3.4 breaks down these data by type of partner.

Figure 3.7 shows the specific groups or criminal activities targeted by the NAPs researched. They cover areas such as sex and labour trafficking as well as groups like women, children, men, and illegal migrants. We see that NAPs do cover most vulnerable populations; it is to be hoped that this trend will continue as NAPs become more widespread.

As far as prevention is concerned, we see an encouraging pattern: many NAPs do include prevention components (see table 3.5). Out of eighty NAPs found, close to 60% offer some form of social/community prevention strategy. It is also very encouraging that development is recognised as a source of prevention of human trafficking in close to 48% of NAPs. Situational prevention is found in 36% of NAPs. This underscores the fact that most NAPs now have at least one component of prevention inserted into their design. This does not mean that more cannot be done to further develop prevention in these strategies or that governments cannot do more to insert prevention

Table 3.4  Partnerships in NAPs, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% OF COUNTRIES WITH A NAP (N=80)</th>
<th>PARTNER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63.75% LOCAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.25% INTERNATIONAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.50% PRIVATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total adds up to more than 100% since many NAPs have more than one partner.

Table 3.5 Type of Prevention in NAPs, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF COUNTRIES (N=80)</th>
<th>PREVENTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57.50%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.50%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.25%</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.75%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.50%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total adds up to more than 100% since many NAPs have more than one partner.

Strategies into their action plans, but it is certainly a step in the right direction. This is further illustrated by our two case studies, Ukraine and Peru, two countries that have taken important steps to tackle human trafficking.

Conclusions

Important advances have been made, especially in the past ten years, in fighting and preventing human trafficking and exploitation. However, significant challenges remain and must be tackled in the effort to continue to address these issues which affect millions of people all over the world. It is very important to situate the debate on human trafficking within a broader context of exploitation and, indeed, slavery. Human trafficking is often the channel through which people end up in exploitative situations such as bonded labour, prostitution, domestic work, and other forms of unpaid and exploitative work. International attention has been poured, and rightfully so, into human trafficking, but states and other entities must address with the same impetus the issue of modern slavery and exploitation. Tackling exploitation and slavery may be the best way to prevent human trafficking.

Laws must be translated into plans of action which include not just the criminal justice system as a channel to address these issues but also other actors within the state as well as civil society. It is very important to address the socio-cultural issues that may make human trafficking and exploitation a possibility. Discrimination and prejudice against women at all levels must be eliminated, as well as culturally embedded practices that allow, for example, debt bondage to persist. Changes at this level of the social structure may be the best long-term prevention strategy. This is a major task and entails massive cultural changes which must be reinforced by laws that are effective and that prevent these crimes from happening. Social and developmental prevention is key in the fight against trafficking and exploitation, and this must be reflected not just in national laws but also in action plans implemented at ground level to attack these crimes and to prevent them from happening again.
Background

Situated in Eastern Europe, Ukraine has a population of 46.2 million and is considered a multiparty republic with a parliamentary–presidential system of government. In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine declared independence. Despite its new autonomy, the country faced an unstable political situation and a weak economy, with a strengthening shadow economy. Ukraine’s formal economy was further destabilized by the global financial crisis, and recently received approval for International Monetary Fund (IMF) emergency financing, leading to major cuts in an already deprived public service system. Unemployment is a major issue. The results of a 2002 household survey indicated that the real Ukrainian jobless level stood at 9.8% (UNICEF et al. 2005). According to various studies, the deterioration of the economy was in part responsible for its criminalization and the expansion of organized criminal networks, such as those dealing in pornography and prostitution for international consumption (Hughes and Denisova 2002). Meanwhile, although Ukraine has experienced economic expansion since 2004, legal and illegal migration of Ukrainians continues to represent a popular means of income, and thus an ongoing challenge.

Ukraine and Human Trafficking

Many reports have noted that the impact of the global crisis in Ukraine has particularly affected women, leading to their increased migration and consequently making them more vulnerable to trafficking networks (Gerasymenko 2011, Hughes and Denisova 2002, ILO 2008). IOM concludes that 40% of women in Ukraine are at risk of becoming victims of trafficking, mainly because of their interest in emigrating or seeking employment abroad. Studies also show that gender inequality and lack of jobs and decent income are major push factors. Women suffer wage discrimination and have a strong desire to leave crises at home. Furthermore, there is evidence of widespread domestic violence in Ukraine (Rudd 2001): 33% of women in a national sample had suffered from psychological or verbal abuse at the hands of their husbands, friends, or neighbours; 12% had been subjected to sexual abuse; and 5% had suffered physical abuse from their husbands. Another 10% stated that their rights and freedoms had been infringed on by the state.

IOM has found that 117,000 Ukrainians each year become victims of human trafficking. They are most often sold into forced labour on farms, prostitution, begging, and various forms of crime. Most victims are women and children between the ages of 17 and 25 (IOM 2006). Ukrainian victims are trafficked to Aruba, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK, the United Arab Emirates, and the US (Hughes and Denisova 2002).
CHAPTER 3 | HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND EXPLOITATION

The Growing “Second-Wave Phenomenon”

Ukrainian women seem to be the most vulnerable and overrepresented as victims of trafficking. Over the past few years, the phenomenon of “second-wave” female victims has been increasing—and this is in fact the most common method of trafficking women in Ukraine. In this situation, trafficked women return home to recruit other women (a friend or acquaintance), because once they have been trafficked into the sex industry they have few options. A woman must pay her “debt” to the traffickers, and one of the few means of escaping the situation is to move from being victim to being perpetrator. According to one report, 70% of pimps in Ukraine are second-wave women (Levchenko 1999).

Ukraine’s Groundbreaking Strides to Prevent Human Trafficking

Ukraine was one of the first European countries to criminalise trafficking in human beings. Forced labour is prohibited in the Constitution, and in September 2001 the country adopted the new Criminal Code, including Article 149, which is a new provision on human trafficking (UNICRI 2006). This provision came into effect in 2002 and makes trafficking in human beings an indictable criminal offence, punishable by three to eight years of imprisonment. It defines the crime of trafficking as the sale or any other form of paid transfer of a person, or any other illegal transaction with respect to a person, involving the crossing of Ukrainian borders (ibid.). Various purposes are mentioned: sexual exploitation, commercial pornography, involvement in criminal activities, debt bondage, and adoption for commercial purposes (ibid.). The provision also covers children. At around the same time, the government set up two separate anti-trafficking councils: the National Coordination Council for the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings (in 1999) and the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Group (in 2001), as a means of reinforcing the provision and expanding its efforts. Groups of police officers were trained to become “counter-trafficking police officers” so they could work throughout Ukraine to implement the new provision.

Another interesting initiative entailed the establishment of the Comprehensive Programme for Combating Trafficking in Persons for 2002–2005. This was developed by NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, and government officials and created specific mandates for each ministry and attempted to strengthen the efforts of the government’s anti-trafficking councils. It reflects promising work between civil society and
The government is also engaging in other promising initiatives, including collaborating with foreign funders to develop a secondary school class on the prevention of human trafficking. This initiative comprises a series of facilitated workshops to help teachers discuss trafficking issues with children. In conjunction with this, NGOs carried out prevention campaigns with support from local authorities. In addition, counter-trafficking training sessions were put in place for Ukrainian troops prior to their deployment in international peacekeeping duties; these trainings are now mandatory for Ukrainian peacekeepers. Another collaborative initiative was the implementation of a pilot programme by the government of Ukraine and IOM in 2010 to prevent child sex tourism, which included the distribution of anti-trafficking posters and information cards (US Department of State 2011a).

### International and National Prevention Programmes in Ukraine

Given the importance of high unemployment and poor economic opportunities in Ukraine to trafficking and migration, there have been several promising practices by international organisations to mediate this situation and offer long-term structure and capacity building. Prevention plays a key role in anti-trafficking practices in Ukraine. Most programmes focus on assisting women and reducing their vulnerability as well as increasing public awareness.

#### La Strada Ukraine

The International Women’s Rights Center “La Strada Ukraine” was established in 1998. La Strada is the main organisation in Ukraine working on trafficking. It works closely with local NGOs, civil society, national government departments in Ukraine and abroad, and international organisations such as ILO, IOM, UNODC, UNDP, and UNICEF. La Strada engages in educational campaigns and gives lectures on trafficking and prevention strategies around the country, especially for teachers, caregivers, and parents. It recently published a manual entitled “Prevention of Trafficking in Children and Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children” for new educators, future nurses, and young people living in orphanages. More recently, La Strada set up an information consultation database to provide reliable information on legal job opportunities abroad, trustworthy job agencies, and information materials. It also runs the national hotline service in close cooperation with the Ukrainian State Committee for Family and Youth Affairs to provide information and support for migrating Ukrainians and in identifying potential victims.
UNDP

UNDP has initiated several human trafficking prevention projects in Ukraine, based on providing economic and equal opportunities. One example is the three-year Vocational Training Project, which offered market-driven job skills training for working and unemployed women. This played a major role in the establishment of the Law on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Men and Women in 2005. At this time, the government also ratified its Decree on Adoption for State Programme of Ensuring Gender Equality in Ukrainian Society for 2006–2010. In 2008, UNDP set up the Equal Opportunities and Women’s Rights in Ukraine Programme. This offers training for national and regional state officials working on gender policy, assists in developing gender-oriented statistics, and monitors Ukrainian legislative acts to ensure conformity with the law. It was also instrumental in the development of the National Gender Advisory/Resource Centre, a teacher training methodology on gender standards, and a handbook on overcoming gender stereotypes.

ILO

ILO has been very active in Ukraine on the topic of human trafficking. The sub-regional Prevention and Reintegration Programme to Combat Trafficking of Children for Labour and Sexual Exploitation provided key information on existing legislation and actions addressing child trafficking and entailed the implementation of a comprehensive prevention and reintegration programme concerning child trafficking. From 2006 to 2008, ILO conducted the Elimination of Human Trafficking from Moldova and Ukraine Project. This initiative addressed the lack of reliable information on working conditions abroad, which can exacerbate the vulnerability of migrants to trafficking networks. It implemented labour market-based measures, such as enhancing labour market information systems in the Public Employment Service, training labour inspectors and other government authorities to better monitor private employment agencies, improving vocational training curricula and promoting entrepreneurship among victims to prevent further trafficking, and supporting data gathering on irregular migration.

IOM

IOM has set up countless programmes in Ukraine to address trafficking in human beings. Through a network of over seventy-five NGOs, IOM coordinates a wide variety of prevention activities, including information campaigns, public service announcements, telephone help-lines, teachers’ manuals for use in schools, and trainings for journalists, among others. IOM also launched a nationwide trafficking prevention campaign, funded by the EU, after the results of a national survey showed that a vast majority of Ukrainians have an inaccurate understanding of trafficking. IOM has also provided training to consular officials on anti-trafficking issues.

Challenges

Ukraine is no stranger to national and regional programmes focusing on prevention of trafficking and building awareness, whether these are supported and run by the Ukrainian government, NGOs, or international institutions. These programmes provide important prevention, rehabilitation, and capacity-building services to victims and potential victims, and have had strong policy implications.

Despite achievements, though, challenges remain. Systemic problems within the state system (such as lack of resources, gender inequality, and deficient economic opportunities) seem to be playing a part in slowing the progressive measures taken over the years. Experts have suggested that more prevention strategies are needed in terms of education about trafficking, as well as institutional change (Gerasymenko 2011, Hughes and Denisova 2002, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights 2000, UNICEF et al. 2005). There is also a concern that ongoing capacity building is needed, and that budgetary priorities are affecting project results, with trafficking policies continuing to suffer from underfunding.

Internal State Problems

Corruption in the judiciary and police is regarded as a major restriction to the government’s ability to combat trafficking (Gerasymenko 2011). NGOs assert that police and border guards often take bribes to ignore trafficking and that judges accept bribes in return for lighter sentences (ibid.). The low number of prosecutions of officials for trafficking-related corruption raises questions about the government’s willingness to address the problem of official complicity in human trafficking. Concurrently, victims tend to have a general lack of trust in law enforcement agencies and the courts, experience stigmatisation, and are concerned about weak witness protection programmes and reintegration services. The result has been that many victims are discouraged from testifying in court.
Lack of Centralisation of Statistical Information on Trafficking

There is no single system of statistical information on human trafficking in Ukraine. Statistics on criminal cases related to trafficking are kept by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine; data on assistance provided to victims of trafficking by the State Service for Family, Child, and Youth Affairs; and data on providing assistance to child victims of human trafficking by the Service for Child Affairs (Gerasymenko 2011). The non-governmental sector has largely taken over this role; for example, IOM in Ukraine collects regular statistical information on assisted victims. However, coordination and standardisation of information remains a major challenge.

Trafficking Legislation

There is much interest in and controversy over the effectiveness and implementation of the government’s anti-trafficking legislation. There is considerable concern that the current Criminal Code prohibits international trafficking and related crimes but does not proscribe internal trafficking (UNICEF et al. 2005). Other problems relate to the low efficiency of the judiciary, resulting in inefficient trials, and limited financial assistance from the government for trafficking prevention activities and victim assistance. There is also much debate on the next steps in relation to the National Plan on Combating Human Trafficking, which expired in mid-2010, and changes with the new government, such as which agency has the primary responsibility for anti-trafficking efforts and whether that entity will receive sufficient resources and political support to carry out trafficking prevention (US Department of State 2011a).

Changing Trends in Trafficking

There have been many changes over the years in the nature and number of persons trafficked in Ukraine, and thus alternative approaches and legislation are required. On one hand, the second-wave phenomenon has grown. On the other, starting from 2008, the number of persons trafficked into labour exploitation has been exceeding the number of sexually exploited victims of trafficking. Correspondingly, there has been an increase in the number of males among victims and the basic risk group has gone from being young women to being people of all ages (Gerasymenko 2011).
Established methods from around the world exemplify the effective creation of a system of incentives and sanctions to transform institutions. Such cases emphasise the importance of developing institutions that build democracy and uphold human rights and individual liberties. These examples need to be presented and discussed at the national level in order to sensitise on the importance of organisational change and to showcase actual examples and processes.

International cooperation and exchange is crucial to preventing transnational human trafficking. Although Ukraine has already engaged in some exchange with countries noted as trafficking transit and destination states, this activity should be maintained on a regular basis in order to enhance Ukraine’s anti-trafficking activities as well as to spread awareness across borders. Ukraine could also hold exchanges with countries that have adopted a national crime prevention strategy in order to build knowledge on how such a strategy can address the broader socio-economic issues that directly or indirectly perpetuate trafficking in persons.
Background

Peru is a democratic republic with a multiparty system (US Department of State 2009). It is the fifth most populous country in Latin America, and has a population of approximately 29.5 million (CHS Alternativo n.d.). The country has a market-oriented economy, and its main economic activities include banking, retail services, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and fishing. The official spoken language is Spanish, yet the country’s population is highly diverse, including Amerindians, Europeans, Africans, and Asians.

Peru’s history has been marked by instability, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. This was mainly a result of border disputes, economic mismanagement and hardship, and natural disasters. The country is now relatively stable, yet large segments of the population suffer from low socioeconomic development and poor living standards. The country’s poverty rate stands at 54% and unemployment and underemployment reach 56% (US Department of State 2009).

Human Trafficking in Peru

It has been estimated that 75% of young people between 15 and 29 years of age in Peru are willing to emigrate for better opportunities (Stone 2011). Sources suggest that, on the one hand, poor social conditions and lack of economic opportunities have increased the vulnerability of the population to human trafficking, especially youth (ibid.). On the other, growing government attention to the drug trade in the region in recent years has put pressure on drug gangs to find alternative sources of profit (ibid.).

Human trafficking is the third largest grossing sector of organised crime in Peru, reflecting similar rates worldwide (IOM 2007). Peru is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked mainly for the purposes of forced labour and commercial sexual exploitation (US Department of State 2011b). Most of the human trafficking in Peru centres around sexual exploitation, and many victims are women and girls from impoverished rural regions of the Amazon (Figure 3.12) (ibid.). It has also been noted that indigenous persons are particularly vulnerable.

While it appears that the majority of trafficking occurs within the country, the exact magnitude of human trafficking in Peru is not known, as official

Box 3.3 The Face of Human Trafficking in Peru (Red Peruana contra la Pornografía Infantil n.d.)

Anyone can become a victim of human trafficking. However, 80% of those affected are women and children. Particularly threatened are women in poor regions with limited education and work opportunities, refugees, and orphans and street children.

In general, girls are captured in the provinces and taken to the brothels of the capital. There are no exact figures, but the Peruvian organisation Capital Humano y Social Alternativo (CHS Alternativo) reported (January 2011) that police investigated 341 cases of people trafficking, involving some 841 victims. Around 60% were female and 45% were minors; 70% of victims were sexually exploited.

Figure 3.12 Number of Cases per Year in Peru, 2004–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

numbers are not reliable. Madre de Dios province as well as the cities of Cuzco and Lima are identified as some of the main destinations for sex trafficking victims (CHS Alternativo n.d.). ILO and IOM estimate that, in 2005, 33,000 people were working as forced labourers in Peru, most of them from minority ethnic groups in the Amazon region (Stone 2011).

Reporting of this type of crime is extremely low in Peru. Some sources suggest this owes to the associated stigmatisation and to fear of threats made by traffickers (Stone 2011). In addition, lack of trust in the police and victim protection services, as well as weak institutional capacity to prosecute traffickers, has dissuaded most victims from taking action (CHS Alternativo n.d.).

**Peru’s Efforts to Tackle Trafficking**

Peru has ratified most international treaties on human rights. In terms of human trafficking, in 2002 the government signed the Optional Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Following this, in 2006 Peru ratified the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which pays special attention to the issue of human trafficking.

The government has also taken other important steps to address human trafficking across the country. Some efforts include the creation of a Permanent Multisectoral Group against Trafficking in Persons in 2004. This is composed of different ministries, judicial organs, and civil society, including international organisations. This coordinated approach aims to facilitate information flows, improve efficiency across local and national initiatives, and devise central specialised approaches to prevent and reduce the crime. The group recently began publishing annual reports on government efforts. In 2006, as part of a collaborative effort between the Multisectoral Group and the Peruvian National Police (Policía Nacional del Perú, PNP), a reporting system that collects data on human trafficking incidents, offenders, and victims, was set up: the Statistics and Registration System on the Crime of Trafficking in Persons and Related Workers (Sistema de Registro y Estadística del Delito de Trata de Personas y Afines, RETA).

Shortly after the establishment of RETA-PNP, the Ministry of Interior implemented a free and confidential hotline for victims of trafficking to provide and receive information. The Inter-American Development
Box 3.5 Peru as a Child Sex Tourism Destination (US Department of Labor 2006)

Some areas of Peru (Lima, Cusco, and Iquitos) are known as child sex tourism destinations. Children are usually taken from remote areas where poverty is high and are especially vulnerable. The Committee on the Rights of the Child reports that there are as many as 500,000 child victims of sexual exploitation and violence in the country. Peruvian laws prohibit this crime, and authorities have reportedly arrested tourists for paedophilia. In order to prevent child exploitation, the government has provided training to 610 officials and tourism service providers on child sex tourism, conducted a public awareness campaign on the issue, and promoted codes of conduct for tour service providers. Businesses nationwide have signed a code of conduct agreement. The government has provided Peruvian peacekeepers with human rights training, including human trafficking awareness, prior to their deployment abroad on international peacekeeping missions. In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Tourism launched a national campaign for the protection of children and adolescents from sexual exploitation in tourism and travel. Several international institutions are working with the government to prevent and reduce child sexual exploitation.

Bank (IADB) assisted in promoting this by launching a regional information campaign in Peru called Llama y Vive (“Call and Live”). The hotline also transfers complaints to the anti-trafficking unit within the PNP. It has received more than 10,000 calls and referred seventy allegations to the police for investigation (IOM 2007). In 2010, the hotline received thirty-one reports of trafficking (US Department of State 2011b). In terms of prevention, it has shown good results, as it is increasingly being used on a daily basis, plays a role in helping the police uncover new cases, and has created a system of surveillance among the population (ibid.).

Legislation

In 2007, Peru adapted its legislation to the Palermo Protocol, and in 2008 the government enacted Law 28950 against Trafficking in Persons and Human Smuggling. This changed the Penal Code to list human trafficking as a crime against personal liberty. The legislation prohibits all forms of trafficking in persons, prescribing penalties of eight to twenty-five years’ imprisonment depending on the circumstances (IOM 2007). It also outlines the responsibility of different government bodies working on human trafficking issues, and provides specific actions to be taken in prevention as well as in victim protection and assistance and prosecution. The law ensured brings the portfolio of domestic human trafficking under the Ministry of the Interior and the PNP, with Foreign Affairs and Immigration responsible for cases of international trafficking.

Regional and National Plans

Following the enactment of Law 28950, there have been innovative measures in Peru to prevent human trafficking and improve judicial processes (IOM 2011b). In 2007, as requested by the Peruvian government, IOM drafted a National Plan of Action on Human Trafficking (2007–2013). This is based on ten objectives, and includes an implementation and monitoring template with tools so it can be used easily to develop effective public policy (Stone 2011). The objectives include increased awareness on human trafficking, capacity building for law enforcement officials, systematisation of data, and provision of shelters for victims (IOM 2007). The government finally approved a National Plan against Trafficking in Persons (2011–2016) on October 19, 2011 (Radio Nacional 2011). This will hopefully become an important public policy instrument to strengthen existing anti-trafficking efforts, judicial measures, and the protection of victims, as well as to advance prevention. The plan will not be implemented until 2013, as the national budget, approved in August 2011, does not allocate any funding to it.

Modelled on the draft national plan, the Amazonian region of Madre de Dios in September 2010 approved a Regional Plan of Action against Trafficking with technical cooperation from IOM. This is essentially a pilot project that aims to be replicated throughout Peru.

National Campaign

In 2011, the national government, in partnership with civil society, launched the Campaign against Human Trafficking. This is national in its scope and is multifaceted. It involves training agents in the tourism industry on sexual exploitation, as well as
**Box 3.7 National Plan against Trafficking in Persons (2011–2016) (Government of Peru 2011)**

**Prevention**
- Stimulate knowledge on human trafficking.
- Inform and educate the population about the problem.
- Create preventive surveillance.

**Prosecution**
- Guarantee the application of Law 28950.
- Training of professionals connected with prosecution.
- Register and consolidate victim reports and trial hearings on human trafficking (RETA-PNP).
- Protection of victim and witness privacy.

**Protection and assistance**
- Assist victims, facilitating recovery and reinsertion, by creating a protocol.
- Help victims of international human trafficking in other countries, by providing courses for and building capacity of Peruvian workers abroad through consulates and embassies. The plan prescribes that the government collaborate with other countries on human trafficking. It also outlines a data system, which would record cases of Peruvian victims in other countries.

Promoting the use of the media to spread awareness and inform the population on the issue, prevention methods, risks, and available services. The campaign has strengthened collaboration between the government and NGOs in Peru, mainly in terms of victim protection and assistance. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Women and Social Development have also been involved in mobilising the population on human trafficking. They have also set up educational campaigns in schools to educate youth across the country on prevention.

**Ongoing Challenges and the Way Forward**

Over the years, Peru has engaged in tremendous efforts to prevent and address human trafficking nationwide. There has also been interest in developing international cooperation on cross-border issues. Talks between Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and international experts, mediated by IOM, on migration issues, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling have recently been set in motion. At the same time, it has been argued that the government’s attempts have not been satisfactory (IOM 2011b, US Department of State 2011b).

Peru faces ongoing challenges that demand, in part, capacity building, strengthening existing legislation and initiatives, extensive victim support, further engaging civil society to ensure a participatory approach, and focusing more on prevention. One of

**Box 3.8 Methods of Capturing Victims (CHS Alternativo n.d.)**

- Employment agencies: One of the main methods used in capturing victims is through false employment offers. Once the person is captured, the victim is forced to perform some sort of work to pay off a “debt.”
- Family relation/acquaintance: In many cases of forced child labour, family members or an acquaintance will either directly sell the child or provide untrue promises of education.
- Seduction: Many victims are deceived by partners using the same methods as employment agencies and family members.
- Internet: Traffickers use internet sites to lure victims under false pretences such as offers of marriage, employment, or adoption.

**Box 3.9 The Challenges (US Department of State 2011b)**

- Weak and inadequate implementation of Law 28950.
- Public policy too focused on sexual exploitation; should also address high incidence of forced labour.
- Not enough attention to poor and remote areas of the country, where child trafficking is common.
- Victim participation in the investigation or prosecution of traffickers limited.
- Lack of assistance for victims in terms of information on their rights, protection of privacy during trial, and access to official shelters, a referral system for treatment, reintegration programmes, and psychological help.
- Poor social investment from the state to improve resources for victims.
- RETA-PNP not being actualised: there have been cases in the media not recorded in the system.
- Corruption among the police and authorities interfering with the arrest of traffickers.
- Low institutional capacity in the criminal justice system.
- Absence of prevention practices and socio-economic development initiatives.
the major issues is that there is a strong discrepancy between state-led efforts (legislation, campaigns, etc.) and outcomes.

Safety is an important element in a country’s development and stability. While Peru’s efforts have a strong prevention focus, poor institutional capacity and abuses of power and human rights are increasing insecurity. Institutional capacity building may thus be a good starting point to address this, to advance a prevention agenda as a means of strengthening Peru’s anti-trafficking plans.

As noted, internal problems of corruption in the police, law enforcement, and the judiciary are undermining anti-trafficking activities (IOM 2007). In this case, training can be provided for staff working in public safety and the criminal justice system on the processes involved in complying with legislation and minimum standards for trafficking crimes; ensuring victim privacy; and improving systematic mechanisms to address not only sexual exploitation but also the high incidence of forced labour. These individuals would require an information session on avoiding corruption and the consequences involved in engaging in related activities. The government’s specialised anti-trafficking units would need similar training, as well as instruction on how to better identify and process cases of trafficking and secure methods for victim protection.

Data collection on trafficking is an important prevention tool for understanding trends and characteristics, locating “hotspots,” and monitoring and improving interventions’ impacts. The government has already set up a data collection system (RETA–PNP) but there is concern that this is not being used adequately. One suggestion would be to train PNP and RETA–PNP staff on enhancing their use of the system. The PNP could also put in place a system of incentives.

Lack of victim services and participation, and of appropriate measures to protect privacy, reduces a victim’s interest in providing information to the authorities and testifying in court. This in turn affects efforts to prevent ongoing trafficking activities. Therefore, more attention could be given to identifying the specific needs of victims and their families, securing victims’ rights throughout the processes, and providing reintegration programmes. This type of programme can incorporate training on skills development to improve access to economic opportunities, and thus reduce future vulnerability to trafficking. Reintegration is also crucial to prevent the “second-wave” phenomenon whereby victims become traffickers.

Spreading awareness and building knowledge on human trafficking are imperative. Peru has focused its attention on this through its national campaign, and several international organisations have been active in promoting education. These efforts should be reinforced, and it seems that the recently approved National Plan could fulfil this role. This proposes educational campaigns in schools as a means of targeting one of the most vulnerable populations to trafficking: young people. On the international scene, awareness raising in schools is an essential component in prevention and long-term institutional change (UN-Habitat 2007b).

Another important element in preventing human trafficking in Peru lies in strengthening cooperation with other countries. Peru has been active on this level, yet formal action has not been taken and cooperation agreements have not yet been signed. Exchanging knowledge and practices has been useful for countries like Ukraine and has encouraged long-term policies.

Peru has designed a variety of interventions and frameworks, but overcoming the challenges of human trafficking also requires an organisational change that supports transparent and accountable justice and public safety systems and democratic principles, as well as promoting the right to security and safety. The newly adopted National Plan against Trafficking in Persons (2011–2016) appears to be very well positioned not only to deal with the challenges but also to engage a conceptual (until resources are secured) prevention approach in order to strengthen capacity building and advance necessary institutional changes.

### Table 3.6 Complaints per Year in the RETA–PNP System, 2004–2011 (Number of Cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>5</td>
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Source: RETA–PNP (n.d.).
Preface

In Europe, the phenomenon of human trafficking has been addressed primarily by non-profit organisations. As has often happened—and still does—in social work, these have put in place anticipatory plans of action which have gradually involved public institutions (local authorities, regions, and ministries).

Many non-profit organisations have been working on countering the phenomenon of trafficking in Europe since the beginning of the 1990s, starting with work on the ground (street work, reception, intakes, and reintegration through social work with trafficking victims, etc.). They have primarily addressed the issue of sexual exploitation, followed by labour exploitation and other forms of trafficking such as begging, sale of organs, etc.). National legislation and public initiatives came much later (such as Italy’s Law 228 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings in 2003).

The Role of NGOs in the Implementation of Human Trafficking Policies and Practices

European NGOs have played a key role in developing policies and practices on awareness raising, identification, care, and social inclusion of trafficked persons. Over the past decade, they have developed a wide range of practices which are constantly updated to meet:

- The continually evolving process of recruitment and exploitation.
- The different needs of trafficking victims.
- The various forms of trafficking and exploitation identified.

NGOs have developed specific methodologies and professional profiles, which in some cases have become models used by national institutions to define anti-trafficking programmes, national anti-trafficking plans, or national systems of referral.

In recent years, the presence of NGOs on national, European, and international working groups has increased significantly (e.g. the Commission Expert Group, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) Council of Europe Expert Group, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Expert Group, etc.). This has in turn influenced the supranational organisations (the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the most recent EU Directive on Human Trafficking), whereby victim support measures are provided in line with the work of NGOs.

In recent years, NGOs have concentrated on:

- The development of training modules for actors who come into contact with alleged victims (especially the police and magistrates). Interestingly, a multi-disciplinary approach has been adopted, which has enabled NGOs to train institutional actors.
- The definition of common standards for the collection of data on victims and traffickers.
- The definition of direct and indirect indicators for the identification of alleged victims.
- Guidelines for developing national and transnational systems of referral.
- Access to restorative justice and reparation (a recent issue).
- Other forms of labour exploitation and child trafficking. This issue has been central for quite a while, but NGOs are now picking up the pace.
- Child trafficking, an issue in which a great deal more time and resources must be invested in order to create significant and effective interventions.

The Italian Example

Italy provides a strong example of the role of NGOs in social protection for trafficking victims, having been able to bring into the public eye the centrality of the situation of victims of slavery and its consequent implementation of the so-called social route rather than the judicial route alone for victims of trafficking (that is, giving victims of trafficking a residence permit on humanitarian grounds in Italy without them
having to denounce their exploiters, which was and still is a sine qua non in obtaining a residence permit in other European countries).

Results seen in Italy between 2000 and 2010 (approximately 15,000 victims of trafficking included in social protection programmes, with high social inclusion outcomes) demonstrate the skill and expertise employed by non-profit organisations in the implementation of interventions for victims of trafficking.

The Geography and Network Strategies of NGOs on Trafficking in Europe

The geography of NGOs in Europe in relation to the issue of human trafficking is very diverse, as are their roots and approaches. The origins of non-profit organisations working on human trafficking can be traced back to a variety of movements, which include feminist, religious (Catholic and Protestant), secular (social commitment), and grassroots organisations (committees of prostitutes and transsexuals). These different origins often determine different methods of social intervention for victims of trafficking, putting the emphasis on certain approaches that are key to the vision of the respective organisation (e.g. a focus on the rights of trafficking victims, on their redemption, on gender, on peer education, etc.).

There is a strong presence of such organisations in the Western Mediterranean (particularly France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), a significant presence in Northern Europe (Belgium, Germany, Holland, and the UK), and a steady increase and interest in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia).

It is also important to highlight the bargaining strength of non-profit organisations in relation to the construction of European and national policies on trafficking in human beings. We believe there are A-list and B-list NGOs in terms of ability to lobby and thus influence the policies of the European Commission and the ministries that deal with the issue at a national level. Obviously, if the value of NGOs is to be acknowledged, it is very important to include small non-profit organisations within the NGO network (present in all twenty-seven countries of the EU) which, through timely, efficient, and caring interventions in a particular area, provide basic services for victims of trafficking and offer them a future. The structuring of a strong and cohesive European network thus comes to the forefront: creating a network of NGOs working on trafficking that are in a position to intervene in a timely manner on issues of trafficking and influence the agenda of the European Commission on this critical issue.

Currently, some networks deal with trafficking in Europe: the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) is a worldwide network but has a European section; La Strada International is present in some European countries, especially in Eastern Europe; the European Network Against Trafficking in Women (ENATW) works on sexual exploitation and is present in at least ten European countries. However, a strategy involving a network of NGOs from all twenty-seven European countries on combating trafficking in human beings must be envisaged. This European network needs to channel the efforts of the major NGOs working on trafficking in Europe (LEFO in Austria, ALC in France, Associazione On the Road in Italy, ACCEM in Spain, La Strada International, etc.). Often, the desire for leadership within individual organisations stands in the way of the construction of a common European network that addresses trafficking in persons. Thus, certain European projects (funded through the European Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme, the Daphne Programme, and the EuropeAid Programme) that have aimed to implement structured networks on trafficking are proving most interesting (e.g. the European Action for Compensation for Trafficked Persons (COMPACT) project coordinated by La Strada Poland and the E-Notes and the European NGOs’ Platform Against Trafficking, Exploitation, and Slavery (ENPATES) Projects Coordinated by the Associazione On the Road).

A Critical Situation

The critical situation the work of European NGOs is highlighting through interventions with victims of trafficking includes the following:

- **Subjection and distancing by public institutions.** Frequently unclear policies by central and local governments on trafficking; lack of national action plans in several EU countries (which also regulate the relationship between the public and private sectors); difficulties in application, by the judicial system and law enforcement, of regulations implemented for victims of trafficking; disbursement of funds to NGOs that increasingly resides with ministries, rendering relationships between non-profit organisations and public bodies more and more complex.

- **Lack of use of assessment tools and feedback by NGOs.** Very often, NGOs have a difficult relationship with quantitative assessment markers that can qualify their work and also with communications tools that can highlight their achievements in social work for the victims of trafficking.

- **Difficulties in connecting non-profit and international organisations dealing with trafficking in Europe** (with particular reference to bodies such as UNICEF, IOM, OSCE, etc.), with the latter stronger and in possession of greater advocacy and lobbying
skills but not involved in fieldwork (which continues to be the specialty of non-profit organisations). It is necessary to harmonise these two worlds to avoid the risk that, in the construction of a European agenda on issues of trafficking, the focus falls solely on specialised high-profile themes, forgetting the practical needs of those who work daily in the field.

- **Finally, hugely problematic funding for NGOs working on trafficking.** Almost all NGOs operate with minimal contributions from public institutions which do not take into account the investments NGOs make in the field to provide services that are often very complex (from street work to the setting up of offices, the implementation of social protection programmes, and interventions by social workers). Many NGOs are able to survive under the few community programmes proposed by the European Commission, which still invests very little in human trafficking intervention. Despite the many documents and directives issued in recognition of a truly dramatic phenomenon, the financial choices made do not favour those who work to reduce the phenomenon of trafficking in Europe, which are primarily non-profit organisations.
Canada recently completed a national consultation on progress achieved to date in preventing human trafficking and potential plans for the future. Sponsored by Public Safety Canada, this was organised by the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (Vancouver) and ICPC (Montreal). The exercise included consultations at the provincial and national levels, as well as a meeting of international experts in Montreal in March 2011 (ICCLR 2011). The main purpose of the exercise was to identify some of the lessons learnt thus far and to delineate the elements of a renewed human trafficking prevention strategy for Canada. Canada already has accumulated a considerable amount of experience in the general field of crime prevention.

Efforts to stop human trafficking activities, convict and punish human traffickers, and protect victims must continue. However, there is a consensus among Canadian stakeholders that there is also a need for a comprehensive and more effective national strategy to prevent human trafficking in the first place. Canada, like other States Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, is required to take appropriate measures to prevent human trafficking. Unfortunately, it seems that very few of the existing prevention activities in Canada and elsewhere have had much of an impact on the incidence of human trafficking. To date, the majority of these activities have focused on public education and awareness raising among justice officials and potential victims. The impact of these activities and programmes not only is hard to measure but, on the whole, also seems be quite modest. Experts are talking about the need for a “second generation” of prevention strategies.

Several factors can make it difficult to devise effective human trafficking prevention strategies. These include limited knowledge on the problem of trafficking and the forms it takes in communities, the very small number of cases that have come to the attention of the authorities, and the persistent confusion there is about what human trafficking is and how it can be distinguished from human smuggling, illegal immigration, and various other forms of human exploitation. Added to these problems are the facts that trafficking patterns and methods change frequently and adapt themselves so as to defeat efforts to combat these criminal activities. Finally, human trafficking activities appear far more often to be displaced by interventions than actually prevented.

For many of the stakeholders consulted, there is much to learn from the success of some of our general crime prevention strategies and from our many years of experience in preventing various other forms of crime, including organisation crime. The 2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN 2002a), for example, apply to the prevention of trafficking in persons. These guidelines call for prevention strategies that are sustainable and accountable in producing results. At this point, the evidence of results in the prevention of human trafficking is unfortunately quite limited.

At a normative level, the UN Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Trafficking (UN 2002b) remind us that our prevention strategies should not be harmful to anyone. One of these principles is that our prevention strategies should not have an adverse impact on the rights and dignity of persons, in particular of those who have been trafficked and of migrants, internally displaced persons, refugees, and asylum seekers.

During the consultation, experts deplored the fact that many of our existing prevention activities risk increasing rather than reducing the vulnerability of potential victims. It is clear that we must refine our prevention tools and that, in so doing, we must take care not to increase the vulnerabilities of various groups at risk (Dandurand and Chin 2011).
In particular, we must focus on measures that will reduce the invisibility of the exploitation that results from human trafficking (OSCE 2010).

We also heard that, when it comes to prevention, it is almost meaningless to try to distinguish between human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. Preventing the latter can certainly help prevent the former, as long as it is not done at the expenses of migrants. Furthermore, we need to remember that people who are “smuggled” into a country are often simply people who have not yet realised that they are about to be exploited and victimised and effectively become victims of human trafficking.

At the international level, comprehensive prevention strategies and action plans have been formulated and adopted (see OSCE 2003, UNODC 2009b). These need to be translated into relevant national and local strategies. At a minimum, comprehensive national or local human trafficking prevention strategies should include the following main dimensions:

- **A social development** dimension addressing some of the root causes of the problem (e.g. through measures to alleviate poverty, promote gender equality, children’s rights, immigration, etc.).

- **A situational prevention** dimension, including targeted efforts to prevent the recruitment of victims and the smuggling of migrants; victim protection measures to prevent re-trafficking of victims; labour regulation and control to address the problem of unprotected, informal, and often illegal labour (balancing the demand for inexpensive labour with possibilities for regular migration); or addressing various situational factors posing a high risk of exploitation (e.g. unregulated or unprotected markets; sex trade).

- **A market control** dimension to reduce the demand for products and services produced as a result of the exploitation of victims of human trafficking (e.g. efforts to mobilise private industry to ensure slave labour is not used in any part of the supply chain for their products; public awareness campaigns; etc.).

- **An offender-based** dimension targeting offenders involved in organised crime and, in particular, those involved in any of the various aspects of human trafficking, and aiming to prevent recidivism.

- **A victimological** (or victim-based) dimension focused on reducing the vulnerability of various groups of potential victims of human trafficking, both at home and abroad, and preventing re-trafficking.

An essential part of such a prevention strategy, in addition to measures to prevent certain vulnerable individuals from becoming victims of trafficking, therefore consists of a variety of measures to discourage the demand for goods and services acquired through the exploitation of others. This includes measures aimed at situations or factors which pose a high risk of exploitation and measures to reduce the vulnerability of certain groups, particularly migrant workers (David 2010). For example, research clearly demonstrates there are real connections and overlaps between exploitative labour conditions and trafficking for forced labour (Jokinen, Olius, and Aromaa 2011).

Prevention strategies need to address the market factors that facilitate trafficking. The business side of human trafficking must be addressed (Aronowitz, Theuermann, and Tyurykanova 2010). To do so, however, strategies must be based on far more information than is currently available in most countries. Reliable and up-to-date empirical information is generally unavailable on patterns of trafficking, groups at risk, the *modus operandi*, recruitment methods and practices, seasonal factors, or the market demand factors that fuel exploitation and trafficking.

Understanding the role of organised crime in human trafficking is another prerequisite to the development of a good prevention strategy. The key factor that defines organised crime involvement in human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants is profit. Many different types of criminal involvement play a role. The patterns of organised crime involvement are not only varied and numerous, but also change constantly (Vermeulen, van Damme, and de Bondt 2010). All this makes good intelligence on organised crime activities a necessity in prevention planning.

Our national prevention strategies must not ignore the frequent transnational nature of the problem. A comprehensive strategy must give particular attention to specific efforts to address and reduce the vulnerabilities of potential victims of trafficking at home and abroad. The latter requires a form of
A primary emphasis of a victim-based prevention approach must be on protecting people from various forms of criminal exploitation. To do so, one must avoid any measure that may make such exploitation invisible or hard to detect. Targeting potential exploitation requires an understanding of the vulnerabilities correlated with human trafficking and various forms of associated exploitation.

Prevention activities should avoid focusing too narrowly on human trafficking activities, but must build on existing protection systems. Rich countries like Canada can count on various laws and systems designed to protect the very same people who are vulnerable to human trafficking and other forms of criminal exploitation (child protection systems; immigrant assistance and protection systems; refugee protection systems; systems for the protection of workers, including foreign workers, etc.). These systems must be reinforced and mobilised and they must become fully engaged in the prevention of human trafficking. In this context, in a country like Canada, there is no real need to develop parallel prevention and protection systems to address different forms of human trafficking.

The national consultation also emphasised that a number of important lessons can be drawn from decades of experience in crime prevention and used to inform our efforts to prevent human trafficking. These include:

- The best way to implement national strategies is at the local level, where they can be adapted to the local context and the particular manifestations of the crime problem.
- Prevention strategies should be developed with the assistance of victims (“survivors”) and be genuinely attentive to the needs/circumstances of victims and potential victims.
- Preventive actions must take the local context into account: context-specific interventions are the most likely to succeed in reducing incidence.

- For effective context-specific prevention measures to be developed and properly implemented, it is essential to have access to good data on the problem and solid intelligence about crime patterns.
- There is a need to ensure that all prevention activities are rights based and avoid creating “collateral damage” or having an adverse impact on the rights and dignity of the persons they are meant to protect.
- Crime displacement is a frequent outcome of prevention measures and should be avoided as much as possible.
- Some strategies can be self-defeating (e.g. by making exploitation invisible or pushing some illegal activities underground, creating new opportunities—illegal markets—for organised crime, etc.) and should therefore be carefully avoided.
- Real progress is possible only if we evaluate the impact of different prevention activities and learn from experience.

Keeping these important points in mind, it may be useful to identify some of the key strategies that might constitute a workable framework for human trafficking prevention. The expert group consultation (ICCLR 2011) mentioned above produced the following list:

- Target exploitation, the crux of the crime.
- Focus on trafficking for both sexual and labour purposes.
- Focus on domestic as well as international trafficking.
- Focus on both supply and demand.
- Develop national leadership to ensure a comprehensive prevention framework.
- Build on existing structures as far as possible.
- Develop partnerships and coordination mechanisms.
- Develop a good evidence base and build on existing data and sources.
- Monitor and evaluate initiatives.
- Build capacity and community resilience.

This is probably as good a starting point as any.
Active boxes as part of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading programme.
Cape Town, South Africa. September 2011.
© Paula Miraglia/ICPC
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
Introduction

Slums, shanty towns, favelas, ciudades miseria, ciudades perdidas. These are all names given the world over to communities which have developed based on informal use of land and have been established in certain urban areas of most large cities, especially in the developing world. The diversity of the histories and narratives of these spaces defies definition and has been the source of much discussion among governments, academics, and other actors. Even so, a few characteristics unite these settlements. First, these communities have a vibrant and active life. Most of them are self-constructed: community members have on many occasions built their physical space with their own hands from what used to be the barren hinterlands of the city. They are also the site of struggles and mobilisations to acquire rights and services which most of the rest of the citizenry may take for granted. These communities are self-reliant and young, with enormous potential to contribute to the national economy and society into which they are inserted, if only their needs and rights are fully recognised and provided for.

Second, many of these settlements have serious security and crime problems; on occasion, they have become the strongholds of gangs and more sophisticated organised crime structures (UN-Habitat 2007a). In many of these areas, the state, criminal elements, and civil society live and interact side-by-side on a daily basis (Arias 2007). Indeed, some make the mistake of thinking these are lawless areas with no state presence, or even places where criminals rule and establish their law unchallenged. The reality is much more complex. The impressive growth of these settlements, especially in the past decade, has put them at the forefront of discussions among many actors regarding how best to deal with their particular problems. These areas house hundreds of millions of people worldwide. According to UN-Habitat (2005), over one billion people now live in what they call “urban slums”9. This amounts to up to one in every seven human beings living in an informal settlement or slum today. This underscores the importance of addressing the issues that arise in these areas, chief among them public and community safety.

The enormous diversity and wealth of experiences of these communities all over the world is difficult to convey in a single chapter. However, we believe it is of paramount importance for the millions of people who often find themselves in a situation of vulnerability to try to assess, describe, and portray the crime prevention efforts made in these communities. This is the main goal of this chapter of the International Report.

A Slum or an Informal Settlement?

There is an ongoing debate as to how to actually define an “informal settlement.” UN-Habitat uses the word “slum” for such areas, meaning “a wide range of low-income settlements and/or poor human living conditions” (UN-Habitat 2003). This may apply to legal or illegal communities, and both UN-Habitat and the MDGs recognise this. These may be new communities built from the ground up or older declining communities that are falling into disrepair as a result of economic and social conditions. This difference

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9 As we discuss later on in the chapter, ICPC prefers to refer to these areas as “informal settlements,” as the word “slum” sometimes has negative connotations.
Box 4.1 Land Rights: The Struggle to Make the Informal Formal

Many informal settlements started as self-constructed living spaces on land that was not originally the property of the settlers. Strictly speaking, these communities started out as illegal spaces. Communities arrived in urban centres and were unable to find or afford formal housing, so resorted to occupying unused land in the outskirts, land deemed by local governments not worthy of development. As migration to cities grew, informal settlements also became larger and larger. With time, settlers began challenging the state and demanding recognition of their rights as owners of the land. Many of the most powerful urban social movements worldwide were born of this.

is important to explore. An older community that is decaying or that has decayed over time may not have any informality about it. For the purposes of this Report, we focus on informal settlements and not so much on older, decaying urban neighbourhoods. Taking into account a number of available definitions, we propose to use the following: an informal settlement is a community or groups of communities that have formed mostly around large urban centres in the developing world and that have some or all of the following characteristics:

- **Inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure.** Lack of basic services is many times inherent to informal settlements, in many cases because of either their informal/illegal status or lack of government attention to their historic needs.

- **Poor structural quality of housing.** In many cases, these communities are self-constructed. Their inhabitants, with whatever materials and skills are available, build them with their own hands, in many cases on land that is risk prone, for example to landslides or floods. This results in poor quality building.

- **Overcrowding.** Rapid growth and limited resources and space lead to situations of overcrowding.

- **Insecure residential status.** This factor is key to understanding the workings and dynamics of informal settlements. Land rights are at the base of many of the struggles these settlements have faced historically, as Box 4.1 explains. It is important to stress that, even though legal titles to much of the land in these settlements are non-existent, local dwellers do indeed have a strong feeling of ownership of their land and homes. Rental and sale markets are always active in these areas (UN-Habitat 2003).

Even if we can use a working definition of informal settlements, problems abound, as many authors and organisations have recognised, regarding how to identify and define these communities. For both methodological and even political reasons, it is hard to identify all such communities. For example, many of them may after a period of time acquire land rights through mobilisation. The fact that these rights are now recognised, as happens in many older informal settlements, does not mean that many of the activities of the community and its development are not still shrouded in informality. This is why in the definition proposed above we stress that all the characteristics that make up an informal settlement are not final or definitive.

### Background, Diversity, and Debates in Informal Settlements

The second half of the twentieth century saw a massive increase in the rate of urbanisation the world over (Black and Henderson 1999, UN-Habitat 2003). The evolution of many economies from rural, commodity-based ones to service-oriented, tertiary sector ones meant work opportunities became widespread in urban centres. The higher concentration of people in these areas also meant...
that information—and skills—became more easily transmitted in close neighbourhoods (also referred to as knowledge spillovers), and this made the labour market more dynamic, leading to even more growth (Black and Henderson 1999). In the latter part of the twentieth century, this process accelerated. Millions of people left the countryside and moved into the city in search of better jobs, services, and general living standards. Thus, cities grew rapidly. Often, the influx of people was more than the social safety nets in place were able to handle. As cities saw their populations grow, they began to have trouble providing the newcomers with basic goods and services. It is also important to underscore that, in many cases, those who migrated to the cities were also people at an economic disadvantage who were unable to purchase land or property on arrival.

As millions of migrants kept moving into the cities, new settlements began to appear. For example, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, *favelas* grew at a rate of 35% in the period 1980–1991, whereas the urban population grew at only 8% (UN-Habitat 2008). Figure 4.2 shows this growth for the African region. While some new immigrants managed to locate themselves within established cities, these were a minority; in most cases, these new members of the city were forced by their socioeconomic situation to locate themselves in the periphery, in the city’s hinterlands (Holston 2008).

This limited their access to public goods and services and even meant little state protection was granted to them, as they often had no legal tenure status. These were the first informal settlements. Mostly self-constructed on land that was neglected or unused by the city, whole communities sprang up, seemingly out of nowhere. Families established themselves there and large communities, which benefited from information imported by those who were there first, formed longstanding new urban areas. After the first waves of rural–urban migration, networks were established that facilitated the migration of further members of the rural community. These “knowledge spillovers” helped in the formation of these settlements as they grew. This resulted in very diverse communities, with formal sector workers, informal sector workers, professionals, and criminal elements all interacting and living in close quarters.

**Disenfranchisement, Citizenship and Crime in Informal Settlements**

As informal settlements developed all over the world, it became clear that these communities presented specific problems and issues that made them different from other areas of the city. The fact that they often had grown out of an illegal scenario meant their dwellers had little incentive to demand rights
directly from the state (although this changed with time). It also meant that, because these communities were made up of already poor and somewhat disenfranchised individuals inserted into highly unequal societies, the social system in place continued to deny them the full benefits of belonging to the nation (Holston 2008). Because the countries where informal settlements developed were already countries with a discriminatory social system, these communities had historically been marginalised and denied access to basic public services such as health and public safety. Indeed, they have had to acquire these rights through mobilisation, as Box 4.2 shows. Given their lack of access to citizenship rights, informal settlements have been spaces where crime can, and has, developed. Organised crime has inserted itself into many of these communities and violence presents important challenges. The informality that characterises these communities and that at times is a strength is also exploited by gangs and other criminals who use it to acquire a foothold and to operate with high degrees of impunity.

Informal settlements have for a long time now been associated with crime and violence and have in many cases been bestowed with a negative reputation. In fact, this is far from the truth. Dwellers in informal settlements are most times victims of crime (organised or not) and not perpetrators (UN-Habitat 2003). While crime rates in many of these communities are indeed high, crimes are normally perpetrated by a small group of people. Unfortunately, given the precarious situation of the community, the effects become amplified. Lack of services and urban infrastructure, along with poverty, makes the populations of these communities especially susceptible to issues regarding safety and security. This is not to say that these are areas of crime, rather that they are more sensible to it. There is no universal truth in the claim that informal settlements are unsafe places or places where crime is prevalent. Property crime is a direct result of both poverty and inequality as well as of a weak rule of law; violence against women is related to the status of women in general in such societies as well as a longstanding dynamic of discrimination that goes beyond informal settlements and is in many cases institutionalised.

As is the case in most developing nations, victimisation is a common occurrence. Surveys reveal that up to 60% of the urban population in developing nations have at some point been victims of crime (UN-Habitat 2003). Mexico City accounts for roughly 50% of the country’s crimes (ICESI 2011). In some African nations, this figure rises to close to 70% (UN-Habitat 2003). This tells us that crime is indeed concentrated in urban areas, and it is safe to say that informal settlements take part in this trend by concentrating an important number of crimes. However, the image of the perpetually violent settlement is not always warranted, and indeed harms the chances of these communities developing, because it stigmatises those who live in them. Author David Sims makes such an argument for Cairo (2010) when he argues that the city itself is not a chaotic, messy city, as it has been sometimes portrayed. He argues that, although shrouded in informality, the city mostly functions and functions well. The same can be said of settlements in São Paulo, Brazil, where crime has consistently decreased recently. Thus, for all their problems with crime, informal settlements and indeed all cities in the global south are also full of potential and, most importantly, millions of people willing to work their way out of poverty and violence. Safety in these communities is inextricably linked to development as the best form of prevention. It must be linked with urban development and upgrading as well as access to services and education in order to generate safer and healthier communities with higher social cohesion.

**Keeping Informal Settlements Safe: A Wealth of Experience and the Need for Holistic Approaches**

Safety is a key issue in informal settlements, and one that has demanded a great deal of focus from a series of actors such as policymakers, community members, and other stakeholders. All over the world, a huge variety of actions, policies, and programmes have been put into place to combat the situation of insecurity in informal settlements. These have been now

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**Box 4.2 What Determines Crime in Informal Settlements?**

A number of factors make crime in informal settlements a problem (Arias 2004, Holston 2008, UN-Habitat 2003). These include:

- High population density.
- High unemployment.
- Family problems.
- Economic and social exclusion.
- Discrimination by the rest of society.
- Lack of access to rights otherwise accessible to others.
- Weak rule of law.

10 UN-Habitat (2003) states that the majority of slum dwellers earn their living in the informal economy.

11 This has been explained as owing in part to a more peaceful monopoly: the First Commando of the Capital, a criminal group, now controls large parts of the city’s criminal activities, which means that crime rates, especially murder rates, have descended as competition for criminal markets has decreased.
implemented for at least two decades in some places, with mixed results. Ideas aimed at making these communities safer include upgrading programmes, poverty reduction programmes, innovative police strategies, community mobilisation, land tenure movements and programmes, access to services such as sanitation and health care, participatory programmes, social capital building, and reduction of risk factors, among many others. Most programmes attempt to make communities safer through development strategies such as the ones mentioned above, made in conjunction with police interventions (much like the one developed in Rio, as shown in the case study). What follows are some examples of attempts made to better the quality of life in these types of settlements as well as the challenges they have faced.

**Nairobi, Kenya**

It is estimated that up to three million people live in informal settlements in Nairobi. In terms of socio-economic composition, there is large-scale poverty compounded by ethnic tensions and serious violence problems. In 2002, in the midst of national elections, there was a moment of optimism, as authorities proposed several programmes of upgrading in Nairobi’s informal settlements; services and infrastructure were also mentioned, as well as poverty alleviation, to improve the quality of life in these communities. Private investment was also to be encouraged and, most importantly, land tenure programmes were to be initiated. Unfortunately, hopes were short-lived, since funding problems (an issue arising in many other places) meant these projects did not leave the ground. Lack of coordination among actors such as government and NGOs also hampered their chances of success, as did a lack of community participation. In the midst of this, in 2003, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP) was launched by the government and UN-Habitat’s Cities Alliance. Its task was to liaise with and coordinate the relevant agencies to design possible upgrading programmes. It was also to map out the needs and socioeconomic characteristics of the areas under its jurisdiction. To date, few recommendations made by KENSUP have been heeded, and an environment of distrust prevails, making it very difficult to generate partnerships to improve the life and security of informal settlements’ dwellers.

**Caracas, Venezuela**

The barrios of Caracas started their growth as far back as the 1930s, and this did not abate until the 1990s. By now, close to 50% of Venezuela’s population lives in such areas. While many of them started as informal, their changing nature means a large number may not be considered as such anymore. However, it is important to think back to their origins in order to understand the challenges they face today. Thus, these communities in Caracas show great variance—from organised grids to very high density dwellings where millions live outside most government action. An early programme of relocation of such communities to high-rise buildings proved very controversial, going against people’s sense of property and ownership of the land on which they lived. Violence ensued and the project was dropped. As a response to this, the National Housing Council and the Institution for Community Development developed an upgrading programme which sought to address the needs of the community through interaction and networking. Recognising the spatial needs of the population as well as their interpretations of their space proved to be important. A more respectful and inclusive form of development has had better results with both community members and authorities.

**Cape Town, South Africa**

Cape Town’s informal settlements are some of the most notorious in the country and present issues that have been challenging to tackle. In 2004, the government presented Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Sustainable Development of Human Settlements, a large-scale project to manage and improve human settlements and address the problems of insecurity and underdevelopment facing communities. These included issues related to the delivery of basic services such as drainage, sanitation, roads, and other upgrades. In Crossroads township, social protest over service delivery in 2004 brought a large-scale infrastructure/housing project, part of the Breaking New Ground Project, to a halt for many years. Protests over these issues, often resulting in violence, became more widespread, with institutional shortcomings said to be responsible (Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006). Crime is also reported to be one of the main hindrances to the development of the area and national plans (ibid.). Since then, headway has been made in Cape Town and in South Africa in general.
Box 4.3 Federations of the Urban Poor Making a Difference around the World
(Garau, Sclar, and Carolini 2005)

In Cambodia, the Solidarity for the Urban Poor Federation is active in half the informal settlements in Phnom Penh and in ten other urban centres through community-based savings and credit schemes. It has helped poor communities pool their resources and work out solutions to problems of land security, housing, toilets, basic services, and access to credit. Federation groups are implementing many pilot projects and are involved in an ambitious programme in Phnom Penh launched by the prime minister to upgrade a hundred slums a year over five years.

In India, the Alliance of the National Slum Dwellers Federation and Manila Milan (savings and credit groups formed by women slum and pavement dwellers) has more than 750,000 member households. With the support of a local NGO (the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres), it works in more than fifty cities. In Mumbai, more than ninety housing projects have been built or are underway, providing houses to more than 35,000 households. More than 20,000 of these households had lived beside the railway tracks. The project has demonstrated the potential for community-managed relocation. Smaller-scale new housing and upgrading programmes are underway in many other urban centres. The Alliance has also designed, built, and manages about 500 toilet blocks, which serve hundreds of thousands of slum households in Pune and Mumbai. It is developing comparable programmes in several other cities.

The Kenyan Urban Poor Federation has more than 25,000 members and savings groups in nine different urban or peri-urban areas. Working with a local NGO (Pamoja Trust), it is involved in several upgrading schemes. It is also working with railway authorities to develop an alternative to mass eviction for people settled close to railway tracks. It is drawing on the experience of federations in India in community-managed resettlement.

The Shack Dwellers Federation in Namibia has 10,000 member households in 197 savings groups. Most live in informal settlements or backyard shacks. The Federation is supported by a local NGO (the Namibia Housing Action Group). By 2002, thirty-one savings schemes had acquired land for infrastructure and housing development. The Federation’s national loan fund, composed of member savings and funding from the Namibian government and external donors, offers members loans for infrastructure, housing, and income generation. The loans are available once the member secures land.

The Homeless People’s Federation in the Philippines has 39,000 members and housing projects underway in many cities. With support from a local NGO (VMSMI), it mobilises communities, encourages savings-based financial strategies, and engages with government. The Federation prioritises settlements in high-risk areas (on dumpsites and river banks, along railway tracks, on land subject to flooding, on land under bridges, in areas at risk of eviction) and works with their inhabitants to build the financial and technical capacity to identify needs and prepare plans for upgrading or resettlement.

In Thailand, the government set up the Urban Community Development Office to support community-based organisations with loans, small grants, and technical support in 1992. The Office also supports community-based organisations in forming networks to work together and collectively negotiate with city or provincial authorities. By 2000, 950 community savings groups were active in fifty-three of Thailand’s seventy-five provinces. In 2000, the Office was merged with the Rural Development Fund to form the Community Organisations Development Institute, which supports networks of community-based organisations that work with local governments in implementing an ambitious national programme for secure tenure and slum upgrading.

The Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation has 45,000 member households in 1,600 community-based housing savings schemes in twenty-seven different local authority areas. Most live in holding camps, squatter settlements, backyard shacks, or hostels, or as lodgers. The Federation supports daily savings and a loan fund that supports land purchase, housing, infrastructure, emergency loans, and income generation. Supported by a small local NGO (Dialogue on Shelter), it is working with local authorities to produce housing and infrastructure at much reduced unit costs.
Conclusions

Perhaps more than in many other instances, safety in informal settlements is linked closely with development. High levels of crime in these areas are linked to their tenuous legal structure as well as their often hesitant insertion into the formal economy. Overcrowding, remoteness, and lack of the most basic services make dwellers almost second-class citizens in that they are denied access to the most basic of citizenship rights. Ownership and land rights are key in formalising these communities and opening up opportunities for their improvement. Crime has made a home here, and in many cases has made such communities notorious worldwide. However, crime does not define informal settlements: a huge diversity of people and networks means these spaces are full of possibilities for the future. Pointed government action in conjunction with local communities as well as other actors is important in continuing in the quest to make these communities safer. The case study presented below shows some level of success in crime prevention through well-thought-out interventions and, while there is always room for improvement in terms of community participation, cleaner finances, and other factors, it is encouraging to see a process of empowerment and fights for citizenship rights which started in some cases decades ago flourish and develop into advantages for some of the most neglected people in the world. Crime prevention allows for the nurturing of other important rights, such as freedom to move and work and freedom from harm. As these communities become safer, so does the rest of the country or city, through both changed perceptions and actual crime rate reductions. If one conceives of the city as an interconnected organism, it is important to keep our attention on these communities because whatever happens here will affect the living standards of the rest of the citizenry.
### Background

Rio de Janeiro is the capital city of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is the second largest city in the country and has a population of 6.3 million people (IBGE 2006). The city is one of the main financial and cultural centres in Brazil and has the second largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the country (third largest in the world in 2008), estimated at R$243 billion (approximately US$201 billion) (ibid.).

Although Rio de Janeiro is a prosperous city, lack of safety is a major problem. In 2006, 2,273 people were killed there, setting the murder rate at 37.7 out of every 100,000 people (Ministry of Health, Brazil 2006). Firearms are the most common weapon used in homicide. From 1978 to 2000, 49,900 people were killed in Rio by firearms—more than in many countries facing civil war (ibid.). Most of the violence is in the favelas\(^{12}\), where one-fifth of the population lives. These areas are usually unplanned and illegal settlements, marked by extreme poverty, absence of service provision, unemployment, and high rates of violence. This environment, combined with years of government neglect, has fostered the growth of drug trafficking networks. Warring gangs are the main cause of heightened levels of violence in these areas.

### The UPP

In order to address and deal with the high rates of violence, the state of Rio de Janeiro developed the Pacifying Police Unit (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP) project, to gain control over favelas dominated by drug trafficking networks. The first stage was implemented in Santa Marta in December 2008, and the project currently runs in seventeen communities around the city. The UPP’s main objective is to eradicate the drug trade through a complex police operation. The process starts with the development of a strategic plan by the Department of the Secretary of Public Safety. Research is conducted to assess the crime rates and degree of trafficking in the area. The police and a special unit enter the community, who are notified prior to the intervention. In most cases, there has been no armed conflict. Once the trafficking factions evacuate the area, a police base is installed in order to begin a process of “pacification.”

The UPP is based on the idea of community policing. One main objective is to build relations between the community and the police, preventing future incidents of criminality and instilling social stability. However, building trust in the police is hard to achieve given negative stereotypes of the police services and issues of corruption and police brutality. Police officers involved in the project are usually new to the police force and receive special training on prevention and working with the community. According to recent statistics, residents in project-based favelas have noticed the difference, and 60% claim that they have gained trust in the police. In areas without the UPP, only 30% of community members claimed to have some degree of trust in the police (IBPS 2010).

The project had been considered a success for the most part. Between 2009 and 2010, the rate of homicides in the state fell by 21%, marking the largest drop since 1991 (Moreira 2011). In April 2011, the murder rate in the state of Rio de Janeiro was lower

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\(^{12}\) Favela is used in Brazil to describe settlements or shacks lying on the outskirts of a city. They can be considered low-class settlements and are associated with various types of settlements, from shacks to permanent structures, with limited access to water, electricity, sanitation, and other basic services and infrastructure.

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### Educational Attainment of Favela Residents (FGV 2010)

A 2010 study reveals that:
- The average number of years of completed schooling for residents living in the favelas is 6.38.
- The rate of residents with a university degree is 2.57%.
- 31% of youth said they had dropped out of school to work, and 39% did not have an interest.
Urban upgrading is broadly defined as physical, social, economic, organisational, and environmental development undertaken cooperatively among citizens, community groups, businesses, and local authorities to ensure sustained improvements in the quality of life for residents. Upgrading of informal settlements is an integrated component of investing in citizens. Residents of a city have a fundamental right to environmental health and basic living conditions. As such, cities must ensure the citizenship rights of the urban poor.

Fostering inclusion. Upgrading addresses serious problems affecting residents, including illegality, exclusion, precariousness, and barriers to services, credit, land, and social protection for vulnerable populations such as women and children.

Promoting economic development. Upgrading releases the vast untapped resources of residents who have skills and a huge desire to be a more productive part of the economy but are held back by their status and marginality.

Addressing overall city issues. It deals with city issues by containing environmental degradation, improving sanitation, lowering violence, and attracting investment.

Improving quality of life. It elevates the quality of life of the upgraded communities and the city as a whole, providing more citizenship, political voice, representation, improved living conditions, and increased safety and security.

Providing shelter for the poor. It is the most effective way to provide shelter to the urban poor at a very large scale and at the lowest cost.

The UPP Social

The UPP and UPP Social are envisioned to be a model for public safety, providing security and development opportunities as a means of preventing crime and violence. The UPP Social was created as a complementary programme to the UPP. It was first set up in September 2010 in the favela Cidade de Deus (City of God), marked by public consultations held to gather the demands of the residents. The pacification process sets the stage for the UPP Social, which promotes social development, citizenship building, integration into the city and transformation of the informal/formal divide, and equal access to services and goods. At this stage, the government provides urban upgrading, such as sanitation facilities, electricity, and waste collection. The programme is based on promising practices like those in the city of Medellín, Colombia, which have managed to revitalise degraded areas and prevent criminality to ensure socioeconomic development.

The Pereira Passos Institute (Instituto Pereira Passos, IPP), a body within Rio de Janeiro city administration services, coordinates the programme. Its function is strategic planning and developing policies in the favelas. Related challenges consist of managing coordination across three levels of government (municipality, state, and national), organisations, civil society, and the private sector.

Box 4.5 Urban Upgrading (Cities Alliance n.d.)

Urban upgrading is broadly defined as physical, social, economic, organisational, and environmental development undertaken cooperatively among citizens, community groups, businesses, and local authorities to ensure sustained improvements in the quality of life for residents. Upgrading of informal settlements is an integrated component of investing in citizens. Residents of a city have a fundamental right to environmental health and basic living conditions. As such, cities must ensure the citizenship rights of the urban poor.

Upgrading of informal settlements benefits a city by:

- Fostering inclusion. Upgrading addresses serious problems affecting residents, including illegality, exclusion, precariousness, and barriers to services, credit, land, and social protection for vulnerable populations such as women and children.
- Promoting economic development. Upgrading releases the vast untapped resources of residents who have skills and a huge desire to be a more productive part of the economy but are held back by their status and marginality.
- Addressing overall city issues. It deals with city issues by containing environmental degradation, improving sanitation, lowering violence, and attracting investment.
- Improving quality of life. It elevates the quality of life of the upgraded communities and the city as a whole, providing more citizenship, political voice, representation, improved living conditions, and increased safety and security.
- Providing shelter for the poor. It is the most effective way to provide shelter to the urban poor at a very large scale and at the lowest cost.
The UPP Social has been implemented in fourteen out of the seventeen “pacified” communities (those that have undergone the UPP process). By the end of 2011, the UPP Social was to have been set up in all the seventeen communities, in accordance with a cooperation agreement with UN-Habitat.

A main focus of the programme is urban upgrading, which involves improving infrastructure, building and land use regulation, and the construction of public spaces. The revitalisation of squares, parks, fields, and common areas is also carried out. The programme’s vision is based on the integration of the favelas into “formal” society but also the provision of physical, environmental, and socioeconomic improvements. This process is occurring at different levels. For example, in one affected favela, residents were illegally accessing satellite television as there were no other services available in the area. The UPP Social coordinated meetings between the users and a company, with the outcome of a special package of channels for the community at a cheaper price. The same situation occurred with access to electricity.

The UPP Social does not entail a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Each intervention is supposed to be tailored to the community and developed based on the needs of the residents through public consultations, by engaging community members in the upgrading process. The consultations result in the creation of a “map of pacification,” which outlines the community’s demands (for necessary services, etc.), existing projects, infrastructure, borders of informal areas, etc. This map provides a detailed guideline for intervention and is followed by the elaboration of the Plan of Integrated Policies, which focuses on developing methods to guarantee residents will obtain equal access to services and rights.

**The UPP Social: Building Safer Cities**

The concept of the UPP Social is based on reintegrating communities into the city and creating a safe and stable environment that can facilitate development and improved quality of life. In this way, the programme is part of a global interest in building safer cities. Growing urban areas are putting pressure on governments to expand and diversify services and public goods. Inability to meet these demands has in part led to the growth of urban informal settlements (UNECE 2009). These areas are often viewed as hubs of crime and violence that foster gangs and terrorist groups and as a burden on government. However, residents tend to have higher rates of victimisation, and the scale of violence in many low-income informal settlements means it has become “routinised” or “normalised” in daily life (Esser 2004, Moser 2004; Rodgers 2004). Yet, residents are often vulnerable to discrimination and isolation, and risk losing their

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**Figure 4.4 Who Communities without UPP Resort to, Rio de Janeiro**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The residents’ association</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The traffickers</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The militia</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBPS (2010).

**Figure 4.5 Who Communities with UPP Resort to, Rio de Janeiro**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Police/UPP</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The residents’ association</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The traffickers and the police</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The residents’ association</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The traffickers</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBPS (2010).
homes; economic opportunities can be limited and there are severe health and safety hazards; and they can also be places of activity, organised networks, and committees, as well as intricate large-scale informal markets. Poor infrastructure, lack of government control, and lack of access to opportunities, services, and law enforcement are usually deemed situational opportunities for violence and illegal activities.

In an effort to address growing “informal” areas, as well as the high rates of crime and violence within their borders, many cities including Rio de Janeiro, are applying prevention practices through the lens of urban upgrading projects with socioeconomic elements. This is part of a macro approach whereby integrating informal areas into the formal environment aims to secure access to rights and equal opportunities, and therefore ensure development.

**Results and Challenges**

The short-term results of the UPP and UPP Social show a positive impact on safety. After the UPP pacification process, the majority of respondents in the affected communities claimed the state had successfully gained control (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). In addition, there were increased perceptions of safety compared with a year before intervention (Figures 4.3 and 4.6).

At the same time, the programme faces several obstacles. In the case of the UPP and UPP Social, local organisations have reported complaints by residents that the initiative is not effective and is only fuelling political support (Direitos Humanos 2011). There has been concern that the transformation process is too slow and service provision is not taking place. Lack of community participation has been an issue in certain areas, with residents stating that their opinions have not been taken in consideration. In addition, there has been an inadequate focus on youth: residents see young people as the most vulnerable to victimisation and engaging in criminality. Moreover, systemic problems within the state system (lack of resources and corruption) have been identified as a reason behind ineffectiveness in the programme.

**Policing**

Despite efforts to reduce repressive methods in policing, cases of police brutality in the *favelas* have been reported. In the areas of intervention, residents felt police officers were not attempting to strengthen relations with the community but rather were highly combative. The UPP Social team has intervened in several cases to enhance dialogue, but even this process has been unsatisfactory for many residents, who assert that meetings are not genuine and local leaders are excluded from the process (Rio on Watch 2011).

**Urban Upgrading**

The major issue in the process of physical upgrading is that construction plans have not received consent from the community, and thus residents’ demands are not represented (Rio on Watch 2011). Moreover, residents claim the upgrading processes are the result of the upcoming World Cup and Olympic Games, which will take place in the city. One major controversy was the construction of a cable car in the Morro da Providência area, which had seen upgrading processes: residents and local stakeholders were not consulted and no dialogue was initiated between the state and citizens.

**Youth**

Youth represent the largest proportion of *favela* residents. Research for the Scientific Society of the National School of Sciences and Statistics (the SCIENCE Institute, Sociedade Científica da Escola Nacional de Ciências Estatísticas) in 2000 revealed that children and young people (up to twenty-four years old) comprise 50.1% of the *favela* population (IETS 2001). Lack of educational and economic
opportunities and poor social conditions increase their vulnerability to criminality. Young people in these areas are often involved in the drug trade.

It has been argued that the UPP removes the only main source of income (the drug trade) for many young people in the favelas. As such, the UPP Social has developed programmes to reduce social marginalisation and economic inequality among youth. These include vocational training and the building of partnerships with the private sector to enhance employment opportunities. Cultural and social activities are also provided, such as music and dance classes.

Internal State Problems

Corruption at various institutional levels, including in the police, is regarded as a major barrier to the government’s ability to prevent crime and violence (Perlman 2007). Police bribing and lack of enforcement related to trafficking-related crimes raises questions about the government’s willingness to address the problem (O Globo 2007). One study shows that, in 2007, one policeman every twenty-five hours was arrested in Rio de Janeiro for improper conduct or had committed a crime under the Military Penal Code (ibid.).

The UPP Social has attempted to prevent future such cases by providing specialised training and engaging new police officers, although this issue may require broader institutional change.

Box 4.6 Other UPP Social Activities for Young People in the Favelas (Moreira 2011)

- In the southern part of Rio de Janeiro, youth receive professional courses on tourism and entrepreneurship.
- In Morro da Providência, free English courses are provided.
- The UPP Social is also supporting a network of youth agencies, sponsored by Petrobras, a Brazilian oil company. This assists young people to get involved in different activities. For example, in Morro da Providência, four teenagers set up a local newspaper. In Cidade de Deus, youth established a clothes manufacturing business.

The Bigger Picture

As highlighted, the UPP Social faces several challenges, which appear to be based on weak institutional capacity, inadequate access to services, lack of social programmes for youth at risk, and the need for a participatory approach in planning.

Systematic Problems

As outlined above, police brutality and corruption are major concerns of community members. In addressing these issues, it is necessary to take into consideration the role of lack of resources (inability to enhance the salaries of public officials, law enforcement, and the judiciary to reduce bribing, etc.), as well as repressive institutional approaches to crime. Prevention policies can help in devising strategies for governance structures that advance democratic principles and human rights. On another level, prevention measures such as training to improve capacity could secure organisational change. Such training would target the police, as well as individuals working in public safety and the criminal justice system, and cover appropriate procedures for arrest and judicial processes. Compliance with the law should be stressed. At the same time, incentives for law-abiding and non-repressive behaviour need to be integrated into the governance framework. Moreover, considering the complex social issues affecting these communities, the police and judges require sensitisation and information on alternatives to incarceration, especially for youth at risk. Judicial discretion would allow for this flexibility, and should be promoted over mandatory minimum sentences.
Youth and Social Development

The UPP Social provides various initiatives for young people, but poor socioeconomic conditions continue to affect those living in the favelas. As such, the UPP Social needs to expand its services—which may be difficult with minimal resources. International or private sector support could be accessed to fill the gap, as well as partnering with existing projects of local organisations. In Minas Gerais, coordination between local projects—centres for drug addicts and prevention programmes (educational programmes, workshops for skills development, cultural activities)—has been promising. The UPP Social could initiate an action plan for coordination efforts with different stakeholders, which could improve service provision. For example, partnerships with the private sector have allowed for urban upgrading projects, such as Sistema FIRJAN, an organisation unifying the interests of affiliated business associations to develop the state of Rio de Janeiro, which is building a health care centre in one of the favelas of Pavão/Pavãozinho. The company Metrô Rio is investing US$200,000 in Babilônia favela community centre and park. Coca Cola and Souza Cruz are supporting the construction of the UPP Social’s head office in favela Cidade de Deus (O Globo 2010b).

The focus on youth also needs to be comprehensive, in that public policy at the national level must address the ongoing struggles young people are facing (including drug addiction and involvement in criminal activities) and recognise the links to social marginalisation and economic inequality. This can be addressed within the context of advancing public safety under a broader strategy of prioritising social investment in education and employment. It could also focus on improving access to social services and public goods for those living in informal settlements. This would provide an opportunity to exchange on and debate the effectiveness of urban upgrading initiatives, and if and how the city could integrate residents from informal settlements. Issues of equality in terms of access to rights, services, and employment would also need to be reviewed. It is evident that these are current challenges within the UPP Social, and so further discussion and analysis could provide key information for similar initiatives in different cities.

Participatory Approach

The involvement of the community and local leadership is important in developing effective prevention strategies and building safer communities (UN-Habitat 2007b). To ensure a participatory approach in the UPP Social, community stakeholders could be invited to engage in all processes of the programme. This has been done in similar violence prevention urban upgrading programmes, such as the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme in South Africa (VPUU n.d.). While the UPP Social does conduct an initial public consultation, ongoing consultation and more concrete participation by the community on how to prevent violence are needed. One option could be to set up a platform for dialogue among key actors as a way of ensuring inclusion and defragmenting responsibilities and policy responses to these areas. According to the prevention literature, community input, combined with capacity building for project and skills development and municipal management, is crucial to sustainability (ibid.). Plans to ensure socioeconomic development should be based on inclusive action arising out of a shared vision of safety (ibid.).

Overall, an integrated approach with community participation brings lasting solutions. However, this must feed back into building better, more democratic institutions, as people at local and community levels where actions make a difference are, in most cases, entirely deprived of control over decision-making processes and resources. This represents a governance deficit that must be addressed through serious and sustained efforts (Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006): creating real participation within the realm of good governance.

Urban Upgrading: The Future of Crime Prevention?

Rapid urbanisation, urban poverty, and the growth of informal settlements have refocused attention on planning. Expanding informal areas, identified as spaces with poor infrastructure, lack of government control, high poverty and unemployment, and inadequate access to services and law enforcement, have been associated with situational opportunities for violence and illegal activities (Cities Alliance n.d., UN-Habitat 2007b). The result has been the emergence of safety initiatives based on urban upgrading schemes, involving multi-sector stakeholders.
Experts have recorded major barriers to this type of approach, including insufficient financial and human resources; burdensome regulations; lack of participation by residents; unclear administrative procedures and unrealistic standards; misunderstandings of the deeper causes underlying the formation of informal settlements (e.g. social inequality and marginalisation); and limited application of policy (WHO 2008). The focus on safety in this approach can often become superficial as larger problems, such as weak state capacity, repressive institutional policies, and socioeconomic disparities, if not addressed, can undermine these initiatives. In this case, prevention, in its broadest sense, needs to be built into policy and governance structures.

If urban upgrading strategies are to be continued in years to come, planners and local authorities need to start thinking about crime prevention in relation to programme design; communities should be able to express their own views and implement ideas on preventing crime and violence; the right to security and safety should be integrated into broader community agendas and link with service delivery, management of services, and overall community development; city strategies need to acknowledge social mechanisms, dynamics, and knowledge that communities deploy already; and, if internal problems of corruption by state officials and local authorities are undermining strategies, institutional change should be the first priority.

“This is not simply an ‘urban planning problem,’ but a rather more complex and intractable phenomenon which, unless rapidly and efficiently addressed, may threaten the long-term sustainability of urban communities” (Bjoern 2007).
Ciudad Juarez is located on the northern border of the state of Chihuahua in Mexico. It is the most populated area in the state and the fifth most populated city in the country. From the 1950s, the city showed accelerated demographic growth, mostly as a result of the implementation of national economic policies in the region.

In the past four years, abandoned housing, rising urban poverty, economic crisis, unemployment, the instability of the manufacturing industry, and the geographic dispersion of new communities lacking in public and social spaces as well as recreational and cultural infrastructure have been some of the causes of violence and low economic competitiveness in the city. In addition, other cultural aspects based on consumerism and individualism complicate processes of community integration and social participation and impede the achievement of long-term changes in the local quality of life.

Criminal acts have occurred and indeed have been tolerated in the city as “acceptable levels” of violence and insecurity. They have presented themselves mainly in the periphery and are carried out mostly with impunity, with the law not applied in an efficient and honest manner. Since 2008, the incidence of violent acts and high levels of social decay showcase both social decadence and a lack of political will to tackle it (Cornejo 2011).

During the past decade, urban growth in Ciudad Juarez has been related to the expanding and speculative development of new habitation areas; this growth has been fuelled through publicly funded credit schemes from the National Workers Housing Fund Institute (Instituto Nacional para el Fomento de la Vivienda de los Trabajadores, INFONAVIT), which gives credit and subsidies (of up to 45%) to families living on less than four minimum wages. This is evidenced by the fact that up to 65.8% of public funds has been designated to build new housing and only 34.2% has been used for improvements to already existing units (CONAVI 2007). These new urban developments are located in the city’s periphery, where developers benefit from the construction but the needs of future residents are not met.

The community of Riberas del Bravo is located to the northeast of the city in a former agricultural region called Valle de Juarez, adjacent to the Bravo River, which constitutes the border between the US and Mexico. It is a semi-rural area incorporated into urban development plans in 1993 given the potential to access water. From 2001, a state programme has been in place which promotes “economic” housing by assigning projects to private developers through INFONAVIT financing. On offer are 11,500 homes, built in nine phases.

At the beginning of 2011, the Riberas del Bravo community experienced one of Mexico’s highest crime problems and was stigmatised as the “most violent” in the country. INFONAVIT was concerned because of the outright abandonment of over 3,000 homes by their inhabitants.

1 Leticia Peña Barrera obtained her doctorate in architecture from the University of Colima. She is currently researching the evaluation of habitability, by analysing social issues including violence, overcrowding, and psychological and socio-spatial factors in low-income housing. She has been a professor and researcher full time at the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juarez since 1983.


3 Several authors note that the inhabitants have lived in situations of violence for over twenty years, reflecting different causes of social, economic and political relations with diverse dynamics.

4 This reflects expansive and dispersed growth in the past three decades, which, in parallel with population growth and the incorporation of land into the urban area, soared by an average of 300 hectares per year in the period from 1960 to 1990 and 1,037 hectares per year from 1995 to 2000, then coming down to 423.35 hectares.

5 The development obtained the national housing production award from INFONAVIT in 2007; the government of the state of Chihuahua proposed reducing the deficit of 46,000 homes in Ciudad Juarez, building more than 100,000 houses.

6 Affordable housing is part of a massive housing policy, with minimum space of 34m² or 42m², for one or two bedrooms, respectively, a bathroom, and a space for a kitchen, dining room, and/or living room (large enough for all three activities at once).
owners. This organisation and a private entity called the Normalisation, Monitoring, and Evaluation Unit (Unidad de Normalización, Evaluación y Seguimiento, UNES) began a Strategic Neighbourhood Plan (Plan Estratégico de Vecindad, PEV), which involved the municipal government and the local community (UNES 2011). The programme was called the Rescue of Riberas del Bravo. These actors implemented a methodology called social construction of habitats—a methodology which may be applied in other contexts in the country—which works to improve the quality of life of the community by bringing in a participatory planning instrument which aids in fulfilling the organisational potential of the community. In a period of three months, UNES and a local partner applied this methodology, which included a diagnostic, popular consultation, and follow-up for the rest of the year7.

The diagnostic phase of the project consisted of the application and analysis of 600 surveys of residents of the first seven phases of the development. The results evidenced not just the main issues in the community but also how local populations visualised ways to solve them. The popular consultation consisted of five workshops which aimed to build what was called a “collective imaginarius” and a list of issues of priority for those in attendance. These were brought under the broad strategic themes of social development and physical/environmental development. In the follow-up stage, neighbourhood committees were established to apply tools of prevention and conflict mediation based on a coexistence manual. This was finalised with the final delivery of the project in an act with the mayor in July 2011.

**Perception of Their Environment among Inhabitants of Riberas del Bravo**

“Do you like living in Riberas?” asked a foreign visitor to one of the community’s leaders. She responded, “Yes, well, where else can I go? My father tells me in Veracruz the situation is the same, at least I have a house here.” Out of 600 families surveyed, 125 stated their desire to move elsewhere. Both men and women responded that they had accepted living in a remote area with basic services, even though it was far from the benefits of urban development. This brings about residential segregation through differentiation (Alegría 2009)8. Beyond the bullets and the crime registered every day, life can be comfortable in the community: families live close together, with good neighbours and are grounded in home ownership; however, there is insecurity, public goods go undelivered, and there is a lack of government mediation between developers and the community to improve quality of life.

Violence in the border region is a very complex issue, expressed through exclusion, informality, and poverty, as a result of many factors (Sanchez 2011)9. Important in these are the size of houses, a lack of infrastructure, pollution of canals and drainage, insufficient places in primary and secondary schools, absence of social, cultural, and sports programmes, and the non-existence of a municipal plan for the development of such areas10. There is overcrowding in 32.5% of houses: in some cases, up to thirteen people reside in one house. Only 19% have access to a computer; of these, only 14% have access to the internet. Some of the main problems identified by the community relate to insecurity, abandoned houses, and foul-smelling sewers.

Areas of conflict identified include the water/sewer canals, public spaces with poor lighting, and abandoned homes, as these serve as places where robbery, theft, and drug sales happen. They are also meeting points for gangs. Only 16% of those surveyed participate in community activities; of these, 78% participate in religious activities and 14% in sports. Pets such as dogs (found in 59% of homes) serve a protective function but also have an impact on public health, cleanliness of urban spaces, and in noise terms. Most families in the community are young: 44% are younger than seventeen years and have needs in terms of access to education and social, cultural, and sports programs. Note that 96% of the families surveyed mentioned that their quality of life has improved from crime.

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7 Coordination on the field was carried out by the civic association People in Favour of People, under Dr. Leticia Peña Barrera with a methodology from UNES with advice from Dr. Carlos Mario Yory. Segregated specifically from urban advantage, and for people who live outside the economic and social sector, as a result of a lack of supply of local housing.

8 Segregated specifically from urban advantage, and for people who live outside the economic and social sector, as a result of a lack of supply of local housing.

9 Crime-related violence, according to Nashieli Ramirez, director of the human rights organisation Ririki Social Intervention, hides other day-to-day factors present in “economic development, urbanisation and the conformation of families” (Mayorga 2011).

10 Molina Ruiz says tolerance of corrupt practices at the border has led to collusion between citizens and authorities, with partners thriving at the same time, and sustains a social trend of benefiting from crime.
activities. Having said this, neighbourhood relations are amicable and collective: 48% interact regularly with at least five other people; the rest with six, ten, and even twenty neighbours.

Places deemed agreeable are parks, pools, sports courts, schools, and churches; places where “seconds” are sold are adequate for recreation, walking, shopping, and sports11.

A total of 40% of those surveyed consider it fundamental to improve the community by participating in sports, religious, and social activities; 44% in environmental committees, 19% in safety, 13% in recreational events, and 10% in matters of social interaction and dissemination. A tendency towards self-management was also observed: 50% solve their problems individually, 17% do so with their neighbours, and 16% through government agencies. It is evident that the lack of a sustainable policy of social development can lead to abandonment, deterioration, and violence in the community.

**Strategic Topics**

The PEV identified the need to promote action that allows every individual to live without fear and with their basic needs met, along two strategic axes: social development and physical/environmental development. The lines of action defined for social development are safety, coexistence, health, education, work and income improvement, and attention to vulnerable groups. Projects prioritised include community centres, conflict resolution, high schools, technical schools, sports grounds and competitions, sex education workshops, neighbourhood watches, patrols, immediate attention centres, and schools for parents, among others. The lines of action for physical/environmental development focus on housing, infrastructure, and public space. Priority projects include urban upgrading, cleaning of abandoned homes, business and micro projects, reforestation, water/sewer treatment, supermarkets, and environmental campaigns, among others.

Among some of the recent achievements are the establishment of neighbourhood committees, the negotiation of projects with the municipal government, the creation of “eco clubs” made up of young people, and a public library in two abandoned homes donated by INFONAVIT and another in an old police building. By building consensus and prioritising areas of common interest, the community assumes its role in managing priority actions with a five-year agenda.

**Conclusions**

The objective of the PEV is to promote associative schemes and the strengthening of social networks, which are considered the basis for the improvement of the community and the reinforcement of social ties among residents, who can then act concertedly to solve their problems and fulfil their own needs. The urban deficiencies of the neighbourhood reflect the lack of social development policies as well as of attention paid to speculative urban growth as opposed to the needs of the population. Most strategic projects given priority can be managed with the communities’ own resources and do not require large investments, but rather actions that coordinate collaboration and services for the population. Other projects must be integrated into the planning of the municipal government, paying special attention to infrastructure with public or private support. In this sense, the citizens of Riberas del Bravo have built a collective imaginarium to respond to their problems in a self-managed way and transform their community into a “territory of peace.”

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11 These are informal retail sites where it is possible to buy all kinds of used products from the US.
Arms are destroyed by fire during the “Flame of Peace” ceremony to signify the beginning of the country’s disarmament and reconciliation process in Bouake, Côte d’Ivoire, July 30, 2007. © UN Photo/Basile Zoma
5

POST-CONFLICT AND POST-DISASTER AREAS
Aerial assessment on Talca and Concepción after an 8.8 magnitude earthquake struck the region on February 28, 2010. Chile, March 2, 2010. © IFRC (p-CHL0023)
Introduction

The aftermath of conflict or natural disasters is probably one of the most testing times for any country, region, or community. Post-conflict scenarios present enormous challenges, state institutions may be weak or non-existent, violence may still be present beneath the surface, and the general population may be beset by a number of issues, such as poverty and lack of access to basic services. Security is the basis of success in any post-conflict scenario. As noted by Salomons (2005, 19), “Security—that is freedom from violence and coercion—is the one absolute prerequisite to any effective recovery process after the intensity of armed conflict subsides. Without the prospect of security there is no hope; without hope there is no commitment to a common future.”

The risk of returning conflict or violence is latent in the time following armed conflict. A number of actors, such as militias, armed civilians, the remains of military units, and many other actors who remain capable of violence, must be demobilised as soon as possible to avert possible further violence. Security for all is the only solid basis on which new democratic institutions can be formed and cooperation among actors can ensue. In the case of a natural disaster such as an earthquake, tsunami, or hurricane, the situation is somewhat different, but security remains a top priority. A disaster of large proportions may leave a state in a situation of special fragility. Poor service delivery and weakened institutions may give rise to violence and crime. This is especially true of states which, prior to the disaster, were already in a situation of fragility. Thus, ensuring security becomes important in the immediate aftermath and in the process of reconstruction and restoring the livelihoods of those affected by the disaster.

This chapter of the International Report seeks to analyse how crime prevention may be integrated successfully into both post-conflict and post-disaster areas as a positive way to respond to the very delicate situations these contexts present. To date, there has been very little focus on this matter, and most work and ideas proposed here are first reflections on these issues. The chapter begins by looking at the nature of post-conflict and post-disaster interventions and the protocols of intervention of international organisations. From there, it builds an argument for the inclusion of crime prevention in said interventions as a means to further secure long-lasting peace and democracy. The chapter contains two case studies. One looks at the process of pacification and disarmament in Mozambique and the other at developments in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. The universe of post-conflict interventions is complex, and a very rich literature exists. For the purposes of this chapter, we focus on DDR processes and how crime prevention and community safety may be inserted into these to strengthen peace building, reduce violence, and foster social inclusion. In the case of post-disaster areas, we focus on reconstruction efforts and how integrating crime prevention into these processes is beneficial for the communities involved.

Post-Conflict Threats to Security and Safety

Establishing a secure environment for the reconstruction of a state’s institutions is the first step in post-conflict scenarios. DDR of combatants is normally the first process involved after the decision has been made politically by all parties that conflict must end (Muggah 2009). Indeed, DDR must not be confused with, or used to replace, the political decision to begin a peace process. DDR is a relatively new idea, although post-conflict interventions were

Box 5.1 What Is a Post-Conflict Scenario?

Post-conflict scenarios are defined as “situations in which violent conflict has formally ceased. Such situations are commonly marked by a peace agreement and/or intervention by a third party under a UN or other internationally recognized mandate. Using the term post-conflict does not mean all violent conflict has ended however, although conflict may have officially ceased some level of violent conflict may well persist” (Rausch and Banar 2006, 5). Conflict may be among nations, or internal.
Box 5.2  UN Definitions (UN n.d.)

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

Putting in place before. Some of the first interventions took place in the late 1970s and 1980s. During and after the final days of the Cold War, the UN began to devise new programmes for interventions, launching its first sanctioned peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989 (ibid.). Since then, DDR has become a staple of post-conflict scenarios and is deployed as part of peacekeeping in many countries and regions. Figure 5.1 shows the number of peacekeeping missions sanctioned by the UN: note not all peacekeeping processes have UN involvement, for example the process in Colombia during the 1990s (ibid.).

DDR can be, and often is, a protracted, difficult process. Warring parties and their guns must be neutralised for the conflict to end properly. However, the process cannot focus only on soldiers, their families, and their guns. Most times, it is the majority of the population—the non-combatants—who bear the brunt of the hostilities as refugees, displaced people, and victims who have lost their livelihoods through the conflict (Salomons 2005). Thus, the process of pacification and DDR specifically becomes extremely delicate and expensive, as those in charge must balance the needs of the peace process and the combatants with those not directly involved in the fighting (ibid.). Post-conflict scenarios can affect millions of people at the same time who may have different needs. Combatants, war criminals, victims, and general populations may require action at the same time from authorities that are weakened or an international community that has limited resources. At times, resource allocation in these situations has been a source of debate. But these are not the only challenges. Crime itself is present in post-conflict areas. It may have been born out of the conflict itself—as gun trafficking networks, for example—and then remain after the conflict and engage in other illegal activities, or may have been there before the conflict and survived through it. In any case, criminal groups are a challenge to peace processes and DDR through corruption or their links to the political establishment (Ashdown 2006). Other forms of crime also flourish in post-conflict scenarios; studies show that, in some African countries, many crimes arise in the aftermath of conflict. These include armed robbery, child prostitution, and drug dealing (Baker 2009). This was also the case after the Haiti earthquake of 2010 (ICPC unpublished research 2010). In this context, DDR processes have to recognise and deal with a large number of actors and issues in the process of building lasting peace and laying the foundations for democratic development and the advancement of people’s rights.

Building effective governance is one of the most important issues in post-conflict intervention and the basis of successful DDR. During DDR processes, the foundations of future governance structures may be laid. As peacekeeping forces strive to keep a minimum of security, the state must take strong steps towards solid forms of governance and institutions in order to maintain and finalise the DDR process. The case of Sierra Leone is a good example. UN peacekeepers in
Box 5.3 The Challenges of DDR

As conflicts change in nature and evolve, new challenges arise for DDR processes. These need to be met creatively. Some new challenges include (Guéhenno, in Muggah 2009):
- Generating evidence from DDR processes.
- International organised crime.
- Internal conflicts.
- Localised violence in today’s mega cities.

Sierra Leone had to work to keep security as the country’s civil war came to an end, but at the same time the government had to build its capacity, quickly, to keep the momentum going (Browne 2008). This means building a solid justice system and a trustworthy security apparatus that is able to stand on its own after the initial process is finalised and can carry out the remainder of the transition. This includes the design of crime prevention strategies as a means to tackle potential criminal threats, especially at the community level. Research by the International Crisis Group (ICG) finds that, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the government had to strengthen its capacity not only to pursue disarmament but also to demobilise and reintegrate fighters, repatriate refugees, protect civil rights, and prevent criminal capture of the economy (ICG 2004).

Concurrent to processes of DDR, and as an integral part of them, institutions need to be rebuilt, local governance must be developed, and a strong rule of law must be established (Junne and Verkoren 2005) as quickly as possible to avert both a return of violence and failure of the DDR process. Crime prevention in post-conflict areas can be seen in its broadest interpretations, encompassing the rule of law as well as community-level programmes to prevent violence and crime from resurfacing.

Post-Disaster and Security

Natural disasters are a common occurrence and they affect millions of people worldwide each year. Only in 2010, 385 catalogued natural disasters “killed more than 297,000 people worldwide, affected over 217 million others and caused US$123.9 billion of economic damage” (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 1). The 2010 earthquake in Chile alone caused over US$30 billion in damage (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). The same report states that the annual average of worldwide disasters for the period 2000–2009 is 387, which makes 2010 a close to average year (ibid.). Table 5.1 provides a recount of the ten deadliest natural disasters in 2010 according to the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) (see Box 5.4). These events, not unlike post-conflict scenarios, present important challenges for the international community and local governments with regard to crime.

A natural disaster can weaken government structures severely and render the government unable to provide basic public services to the population. In these cases, a rapid response is necessary, as this may mean the difference between life and death for many of the victims of the disaster. Sanitation, rescue services, and food and water supplies may all suffer from damage during a disaster, and this may leave citizens in a state of high vulnerability. The poor tend to bear the brunt of the costs of natural disasters, as their pre-existing vulnerability to disease and low levels of safety are exacerbated. In this case, the general state of the government’s institutions can have a strong impact on the aftermath of a disaster.

### Table 5.1 Top 10 Most Important Disasters by Number of Fatalities, 2010 Type of Disaster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISASTER</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>DEATHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>222,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat wave</td>
<td>June-August</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>55,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash flood</td>
<td>July-August</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement wet</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>May-August</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold wave</td>
<td>July-December</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass movement wet</td>
<td>Feb.-March</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Guha-Sapir et al. (2011).

Box 5.4 EM-DAT: Keeping Track of Natural Disasters (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011)

Since 1988, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has kept—funded by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance—a database of natural disasters that goes back to 1900. It collects data from UN sources as well as other agencies, governments, and organisations and records core data such as country, type and sub-type of disasters, date, number of mortal victims, and number of affected victims, among others.
in terms of rescue and first aid, and ensuring a safe environment comes as one of the first needs to tackle right after the event to prevent looting and other crimes, as well as to protect aid and emergency workers in the process of reconstruction. Evidence from the Hurricane Katrina aftermath shows burglary rates skyrocketed by just over 400% in the months after the disaster; looting also became a problem in the days following as local police became focused on rescue operations as opposed to controlling crime and keeping communities safe.

As mentioned for post-conflict relief, modern large cities are especially vulnerable to disasters and the crime that may result from them. Overcrowded cities tend to show issues that may become more severe after a disaster, such as crime, youth delinquency, and other social factors that harm social cohesion (Pelling 2003). Thus, special provisions must be made in order to tackle the urban aspect of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction to take these issues into account. The impact of disasters may be divided into systemic, those that are the product of pre-existing conditions such as poverty and economic hardship, and direct, caused by the event itself, such as damage to infrastructure.

Including Crime Prevention in Post-Disaster and Post-Conflict Interventions

Stronger, more solid governments may be able to deal better with a disaster of large magnitude. Having said this, a strong government is no guarantee of an efficient, solid response, as evidenced by the poor reactions of all levels of government in the US to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Box 5.5). However, it is telling that similar events (earthquakes) in both Chile and Haiti resulted in very different death rates\(^{14}\) and other longer-term effects, such as those related to displaced people and health hazards. Overcrowding, poor building infrastructure and regulation, and a slow local response, all factors present in Haiti but less so in Chile, had an influence on the death toll. Fragile states are less able to respond to the needs of their citizens when they are in the utmost need.

Crime and violence increases are always a risk after a natural disaster happens, especially if this happens in a state which suffers from particular fragilities prior to the event. Depending on the severity of the disaster, basic services such as water supply may be interrupted, communications damaged, and communities isolated. There is a need for immediate response in terms of rescue and first aid, and ensuring a safe

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\(^{14}\) This has been observed by Guha-Sapir \textit{et al.} (2011) as well as by ICPC during fieldwork in Haiti and through information provided by the Chilean government, a member of ICPC.
Canada’s Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) has revealed that, while their programmes for post-conflict intervention are certainly significant and strong and have channelled substantial resources into countries suffering from conflict, crime prevention is not addressed. Emergency relief, whether because of conflict or disaster, must heavily prioritise scarce resources to cover for the immediate needs—such as water—of sometimes millions of people.

The focus on urgent relief, while evidently and incontrovertibly necessary, could benefit from what could be a positive ingredient in any reconstruction effort. On the one hand, if we understand security as much more than low crime rates—rather as a perception of subjective safety—there is much to be done when intervening in a post-conflict scenario while in the process of establishing safety on the ground. There is a need not only to prevent crimes from happening but also to make people feel as secure as possible in their communities. In a context were fear of violence is high, the redesign or reinforcement of governance structures may benefit heavily from community safety principles tied to development. On the other hand, interventions in post-disaster contexts present important opportunities to build better spaces, cities, and communities from the ground up. We now develop ways in which crime prevention could be inserted into disaster/conflict interventions to the benefit of post-conflict and post-disaster programmes.

**Developmental Crime Prevention**

A key ingredient at this level of crime prevention is governance. In a post-conflict scenario, it is possible to “start from scratch” in terms of designing and engineering government institutions such as police forces and the courts, or even entire governments and regimes. An institutional design that is based on human rights and recognises the need for the protection of the most vulnerable members of society will undoubtedly lead to better crime prevention. DDR is the first step in this direction and can be viewed as a form of prevention, in that it removes firearms from general circulation and allows for the reinsertion into institutionalised life of those involved in the conflict. The role of reintegration is important because it contributes to reducing the possibility of future offending by former fighters.

Actors must work together to ensure safety not only in the transition period but also by redefining the roles of government institutions in peace and development or the reinforcement of a democratic culture. It is very important to stress a long-term vision that moves beyond the DDR process and ensures security is provided as a public good beyond the disarmament process. This is because we know through research that, after conflict, violence may become internalised as a means of conflict resolution in populations that have experienced violence for a substantial amount of time. Violence remains high as well because of ongoing social issues such as discrimination and poverty manifesting themselves as social and economic violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2001).

This brings us to the long-term investments that need to be made in order to change the weave of society into one that uses institutional channels to resolve issues. Education and a solid presence of the state as a channel of dispute resolution are important to achieve to change this in the aftermath of a conflict, and the momentum of DDR processes may well be used to continue on this path. Investment in community-level social institutions (Moser and McIlwaine 2001) is also very important for any new institutional setting. This means harnessing the potential for positive social capital generation at the community level in terms of family relations and community cohesion. Strengthening and building a strong rule of law is very important to secure future security and safety. Robert Muggah (2009) argues it is not wise to view DDR as an isolated process; rather, it should be seen as a holistic approach to building a safe environment for everyone, and this includes future planning on crime prevention. Building trust in government institutions is very important at this time. Trust is difficult to generate, especially when there is a history of distrust in others or in government, as is the case in many post-conflict (especially of the internal kind) contexts. Practitioners and those involved in the process need to make extreme efforts to make sure justice is always the primordial motivation in order to gain the trust of the population.

In terms of post-disaster recovery and intervention, the possibility of institutional reform depends on the magnitude of the disaster, although in most cases governments still stand as they were before the event. However, a disaster also poses an opportunity for governments and international actors to push for more inclusive and egalitarian developmental policies. The fact that a disaster often showcases the weaknesses of a state (such as inequality and discrimination as well as poverty) can also serve as a driver to address such issues. In 1985, a massive earthquake hit Mexico and severely damaged Mexico City, killing about 30,000 people there. Government response was slow and inefficient, leading society to take matters into its own hands, delivering relief goods, rescuing people, and helping each other in that time of dire need. It has been argued that this event caused a further step towards democratisation after many decades of one-party rule, by showing the people how ill-prepared the government was and how they could shape the future by themselves (Lawson 2000). A disaster creates a good opportunity
to address issues such as discrimination, poverty, and general disenfranchisement. As we will see in the case of Haiti, the earthquake has given impetus to the fight against poverty. Crime, as we know, responds to both changes in poverty and, perhaps more importantly, inequality. A disaster may raise awareness of these issues and, through an influx of resources from the international community, create an opportunity for reform. This will have a strong effect on crime and must be inserted into the logic of localised action as well, as we see below.

Situational Crime Prevention

Both post-conflict and post-disaster contexts most often require extensive reconstruction efforts of infrastructure, which may include housing, roads, and sometimes entire neighbourhoods when disasters hit urban areas. Displaced populations may not be able to go back to their original houses and may have to be relocated in some way. The government of Chile successfully introduced crime prevention into its reconstruction efforts after the 2010 earthquake by working with urban planners and experts in the field. A Manual of Crime Prevention in Reconstruction was published (Government of Chile 2010), which addressed how the entire reconstruction effort—from first response to long-term urban renewal—could be conceived with the enhancement of safety and the presence of crime prevention ideas. This is proof that crime prevention has a strong role to play in post-disaster interventions and that it actually does help improve the living standards of victims when implemented in as holistic manner along with issues of governance and institutional strengthening. Laws and new, enforceable building codes can also be a part of a holistic approach to rebuilding. The challenge for designers of policy is how to integrate crime prevention into scenarios where state institutions may not be as strong as in the case of Chile. The international community could very well play a role in this by providing vital assistance in these arenas.

Community and Local Crime Prevention

Both disasters and conflicts impact communities in complex manners. Both scenarios may cause a surge in crime rates and feelings of insecurity. Much can be done to address this issue from the perspective of community crime prevention. The first step, as has been recognised before, is to build resilience into the communities’ social fabric. A resilient community based on trust and social cohesion is better able to withstand natural disasters and prevent crime from spiralling. Conflicts may harm this very important element of the social fabric, and it should be a priority to strengthen or rebuild it. This process begins in a number of ways almost immediately after a disaster strikes or a conflict ends. Tackling and preventing substance abuse, gender violence, and the formation or permanence of gangs and other criminal actors should be a priority for governments and aid agencies. Examples of this can be vocational training for former combatants or those who have lost their source of employment. Demobilisation may also include programmes of support for former combatants who may struggle to adapt to a new, peaceful reality. The idea here is to make communities both socially and economically strong in order to be able to withstand future disasters better. The tragedy of a natural disaster may have positive outcomes if investment is made to make sure that communities are strong and safe.

Conclusions

Crime prevention and community safety are not concepts easily found in post-conflict and post-disaster interventions today. While recognising the immense difficulties first responders, governments, international organisations, and other actors face in the process of DDR and post-conflict state building or in responding to a natural disaster, ICPC believes there is indeed a place for crime prevention in these contexts. If we assume security is one of the first goals any intervention has, crime prevention can offer ways in which communities may feel more secure and crime may be controlled more effectively through prevention both at the onset of the intervention and as a long-term strategy in reconstruction and/or post-conflict reconstruction.
Background

After almost five centuries as a Portuguese colony, Mozambique gained independence in 1975. At the time of independence, the ruling party was the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO), formally established in 1962 as a Marxist–Leninist nationalist party. Civil conflict broke out with rival political group the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), supported by South Africa. The war lasted sixteen years and resulted in the death of one million people and about six million displaced persons (Baden 1997). In 1992, a UN-negotiated peace agreement, the Rome General Peace Accords, was signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO. This would pave the way for new elections and a carefully watched transition to democracy by international observers.

Large-scale emigration, economic dependence on South Africa, a severe drought, and a prolonged civil war hindered the country’s development until the mid-1990s (Baden 1997). In 1994, Mozambique held elections that led to the formation of a government under FRELIMO, which currently governs the country. There has been much controversy surrounding elections in terms of voter fraud and the disqualification of candidates. While the international community was deeply involved in the post-conflict elections, there has been minimal surveillance and measures taken (internally or externally) to ensure fair and democratic election processes over the years (ibid.). Voter turnout remains high, at just under 50%, although this may owe to bribing, which has been recorded. Unfortunately, there are no official statistics regarding the magnitude of bribing or voter fraud.

Mozambique Today

Mozambique in 2009 had a population of 22,894,000 (UNDP 2010a). The socio-demographic characteristics of the country are quite complex. Mozambique has about thirty ethnic groups and the official language is Portuguese. It remains among the poorest countries in the world, ranked 172 out of 177 countries listed in the UN Human Development Index (UNDP 2008). The HIV and AIDS prevalence rate has had an impact on families, and many children are being raised in one-parent households (12.5% among people aged between fifteen and forty-nine) (UNAIDS 2008). A large portion of the population is made up of youth (42.5% are younger than fifteen). Employment opportunities are limited, with many opting to migrate to South Africa for better prospects. Owing to young men leaving the area for work, three out of ten heads of households are female (Baden 1997).

The devastating floods in 2001 slowed growth dramatically. However, according to government records, resettlement of civil war refugees, political stability,
and successful economic reforms have improved the growth rate over time. One the one hand, economic reforms allowed for increased foreign direct investment and the resurrection of the agriculture, transportation, and tourism sectors. On the other, the return of a large number of refugees helped expand market demand.

Violence and Crime

There continues to be much debate over the level of crime and violence in Mozambique. Certain reports suggest rising violent crime rates, including a statement in 2010 by the attorney-general; others point to declining rates over time (Barslund et al. 2007, SAS 2009). There is also discussion on changes in the types of crimes committed (UNICRI 2003). However, there is agreement that Mozambique continues to struggle with crime and violence as a legacy of the war. Many have pointed to the country’s political history as the main component leading to its current situation of violence without legally punitive boundaries (Leão 2004), and noted that a history of violence has hindered social development and marginalised many communities (SAS 2009). Widespread availability of weapons left over from the war, a lack of trust in policing and justice, and inadequate opportunities for young people are also linked to high crime rates (Maslen 1997). Maslen (1997, 3) goes on to suggest violence has been normalised in society: “the legacy of a civil war has accustomed people to see the use of violence as unexceptional.”

Women and young people in particular have been highly marginalised and face increased vulnerabilities (Baden 1997). According to a report by Small Arms Survey (SAS 2009), most Mozambican youth have experienced the effects of war, and especially those living in urban areas are subjected to high rates of interpersonal violence. Other effects relate to a situation whereby many young men and women were forced to join the armed forces and engage in violent acts. As for girls, they have been deprived of formal education (UNDP 2008), and traditional family and social structures have been broken. Considering that half of Mozambique’s population is under eighteen years of age and that youth unemployment is estimated at over 70%, young people in the country are highly vulnerable to violence and crime, either by being victimised or by becoming involved in criminality.

Institutional capacity to prevent and combat violence and crime requires support. Reports suggest the criminal justice system lacks sufficient resources and well-trained personnel (UNICRI 2003). Reporting crimes to the police is rare owing to issues of trust and inadequate victim protection services, among others. At the same time, there are limitations to the processes by which police data is collected, making information unreliable.

Local, Government, and International Action: DDR

Following the end of the war, there was much action to ensure a peaceful transition. However, ongoing high rates of violence and crime in urban centres in the 1990s were a cause for concern as well as for concerted effort to engage in the disarmament of small arms and light weapons (SALW) circulating in Mozambique.

As part of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) leading the peace process in Mozambique, disarmament was one component. The UN disarmament initiative (1994) was largely

Box 5.8 Post-Disaster (UN-Habitat 2007)

In early 2000, a cyclone caused widespread flooding in the country, killing at least 700 people, displacing 650,000 and affecting 4.5 million. Mozambique’s urban residents, especially those living in informal settlements, were hit the hardest, representing more than 70% of all flood-related deaths. It has been argued that exorbitant pricing and highly politicised land distribution forced many poor residents to live in informal settlements, known as barrios, which are located in hazardous sites susceptible to landslides and flooding. Evaluations following the 2000 flood revealed that, within the urban areas affected, flooding and rains had damaged the physical infrastructure and production capabilities of over 1,000 shops and wholesalers. The flood also caused extensive damage to major industries, including those in Maputo, the hub of Mozambique’s industrial production.

Box 5.9 Crime Data

Violent crime, in terms of homicide and robbery committed with a firearm, especially in Maputo province, has been increasing (CG-PRM 1999–2004). A survey by the National Institute for Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, INE) in 2003 found 25.8% of households interviewed had experienced at least one crime during the previous year, predominantly theft of money or property (INE 2003).
considered incomplete. According to one report (UNIDIR 1999), the lack of an efficient and strong disarmament process contributed to the proliferation of weapons in Mozambique as well as in Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia. At this time, crime and violence rates in Mozambique continued to rise.

In 1995, the national government acknowledged that large quantities of illegal weapons were still circulating in Mozambique, and announced a master plan to address the issue. The plan allowed for special rapid reaction units to be deployed to the main areas most afflicted by crime, re-established police district commands, and enabled more cooperation with police forces in neighbouring countries (Leão 2004). It was in this context that the presidents of South Africa and Mozambique agreed on a common approach (Operation Rachel) to curb the transfer of illegal SALW from Mozambique to South Africa through the destruction of arms caches in Mozambique. At the same time, Mozambican civil society set up parallel initiatives—the Christian Council of Mozambique’s Tools for Arms (TAE) project. TAE also incorporated civic education activities to inform communities about the project’s goals and provide information on the dangers of the illicit circulation of firearms (SAS 2009). Participation by civil society was crucial in advancing efforts, as communities felt more at ease disclosing information to local organisations than to the police (Shabangu 2010).

Some experts suggest that the TAE project was not designed as a disarmament initiative for Mozambique but rather as a crime and violence prevention measure (Leão 2004). In fact, it applies prevention principles seen in the engagement of civil society and in building local knowledge on the larger goals of development, peace, stability, and safety. It could be argued these elements can play a role in breaking the “normalisation of violence” in society, as well as in rebuilding social cohesion.

Box 5.10 Results of Disarmament Processes (Leão 2004)

- ONUMOZ collected about 200,000 SALW and handed them over to the government; 24,000 are recorded as destroyed.
- By mid-2003, Operation Rachel had discovered and destroyed over 600 arms caches and several tonnes of weaponry and ammunition.
- The TAE project covered 26% of the Mozambican territory and by 2001 had exchanged 795,856 zinc sheets, 1,808 bicycles, 674 sewing machines, 1 tractor, 2,969 hoes, 532 ploughs, 202 doors, 402 windows, 78 kitchen utensils, 68 machetes, and 600 kg of different seeds for 200,000 weapons and ammunition.

Alongside DDR are crucial parts of development and rebuilding after conflict. The DDR process in Mozambique was challenging, being marked by several outbreaks of unrest. With growing fear of large-scale insecurity and political instability, the government prioritised reintegration. Estimates suggest 93,000 ex-combatants underwent reintegration, with women comprising roughly 2% of the demobilisation process. One major issue was the unequal treatment of and compensation for female ex-combatants. Haeberlin-Lanz (1996) conducted a psychological study of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique which highlighted significant gender differences. While it appeared that reintegration into family and social life was relatively successful, there were indications of considerable hardship, especially for women. None of the reintegration programmes specifically targeted women until the Women’s Department of the Association for Demobilised Soldiers made demands. Baden (1997) states that the process reflects a narrow and misconceived understanding of the process of reintegration, which acts to reinforce a male breadwinner model, and is a missed opportunity for skills development of women and wives of ex-combatants.

**DDR as a Prevention Approach?**

Although they may not seem to be based on a prevention approach, DDR programmes have an important role to play in promoting safety, conflict prevention, and development. For example, DDR initiatives can reduce the availability of unregulated firearms in society as a means of preventing unnecessary violence; assist ex-combatants and their families to rebuild their lives as well as decrease mental health problems and violent behaviour; build community awareness on the importance of reintegration to prevent isolation and stigmatisation of ex-combatants; shift from an association with a history of violence and the “normalised” use of violence in day-to-day conflict resolution; and foster social cohesion. Considering the urgency of reintegration facing Mozambique post-war, it is evident that ensuring safety and security is essential to facilitating the process of state building and advancing socioeconomic development in fragile states.

The DDR process undertaken in Mozambique was innovative for its time and integrated what many later reports on crime prevention and firearms control deem important measures for long-term change. Certain elements were realised in the case of Mozambique. One could argue law enforcement capacity was enhanced as the government “revived” police district commands to provide a stronger public security presence. The government also implemented legislation to ensure long-term attention towards...
Box 5.11 Objectives (UN 2010)

- Increase the capacity and expertise of the law enforcement community to better control the legal firearms trade and prevent its illicit trafficking.
- Strengthen the long-term, self-sustaining national capacities of policymakers in combating illicit firearms trafficking.
- Build local (municipal) capacity for targeted firearms and community policing and community security services.
- Promote the creation of opportunities for multi-sectoral approaches and coordination for the inclusion of armed violence prevention and reduction, and the integration of a culture of peace into the public agendas of local and state governments.
- Increase the availability of baseline information on the impact of armed violence.

Content and design

- Research: conduct national diagnostic research on firearms and assess current state capacities and needs.
- Advocacy: raise the visibility of peace, security, and disarmament issues and instruments by providing mechanisms, forums, and tools aimed at disseminating these concepts and instruments.
- Legal and policy assistance: provide advice and support to enhance capacity development, at the local and national level, within the legal and policymaking areas.
- Law enforcement capacity building and technical assistance: develop regional training initiatives for national governmental focal points, the law enforcement community, and appropriate institutions and organisations on disarmament issues.

Enduring Challenges

While the DDR process was hailed a success, the country currently faces economic instability, the majority of the population lives in extreme poverty, there has been little improvement in reducing rates of violent acts against women, youth (nineteen to twenty-four years of age) remain particularly vulnerable, and institutional capacity is weak (UNICRI 2003). There is also much controversy surrounding the lack of capacity of the judicial system and police services. In addition, a report by SAS (2009) highlights that, while there are indeed promising practices in Mozambique, an enduring challenge is the coordination of these initiatives:

“In a workshop organized by the WHO national office (15–16 April 2004), representatives from the Government of Mozambique and NGOs met to discuss violence prevention. One of the primary constraints identified during the workshop was the lack of effective documentation and dissemination of activities being developed by individual agencies, which led to the concomitant duplication of efforts. The importance of coordinating violence-prevention schemes was emphasized by the workshop participants” (WHO Mozambique unpublished document 2004).

Dealing with these challenges would require long-term planning from the government, cooperation between organisations, and capacity building.

Capacity Building

International organisations such as the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), UNDP15, and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, among others, are working with state officials and civil society to address these deficiencies. The aim is to promote local organisations and international groups. ICPC has been involved in the process by assisting a local organisation, the Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reinsertion (FOMICRES), in developing civil society recommendations for the strategy. ICPC is also involved in advancing the prevention agenda in Mozambique by building institutional and local capacity. This includes addressing the lack of a centralised source for data collection and analysis on crime and violence in Mozambique and of prevention practices, tools, and methodologies at local and national level.

15 Setting up a National Crime Observatory with the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, the Ministry of the Interior, and international partners.
Box 5.12 UNICRI Initiatives in Mozambique
- Supporting the strengthening of juvenile justice since 2005. Assisting in setting up a Criminal Prevention Section in the Tribunal for Minors of Mozambique.
- Establishing a pre-trial Observation Centre and the first post-trial Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre.
- Providing training for judges and police officers.

Box 5.13 Some Recommendations to Address the Impact of Firearms and Firearm-Related Violence in Mozambique (SAS 2009)
- Continuing efforts to eradicate poverty and income inequality.
- Securing social stability through programmes to reduce social marginalisation and economic inequalities such as vocational training for at-risk male youths.
- Encouraging public debate on how to reduce violence.
- Introduction of peace education and alcohol and drug awareness initiatives in school curricula combined with increased access to education.

sound legislation and policy, based on democratic principles and a prevention agenda. The first step is to build capacity at various institutional levels.

Organizations such as the SAS highlight recommendations for advancing violence prevention on the government’s agenda. At the same time, UN bodies such as UNICRI have been highly involved in institutional capacity building through a focus on safety and justice. All of these initiatives require support if there is to be enduring development. This includes reinforcing institutes dealing with safety, public administration, and justice and helping them adapt to the changing needs of society; updating criminal justice legislation; training staff working in public safety and the criminal justice system on improving judicial processes and addressing gender-based violence, discrimination, and youth at risk through information sessions and awareness campaigns; and improving coordination across criminal justice and prevention bodies. Another recommendation would be to establish a central database on crime in Mozambique to allow for immediate and reliable statistics, which would provide the necessary information and mechanisms to develop prevention strategies.

A safe Mozambique is still a distant, albeit accessible, reality. The violent riots during September 2010 revealed the country continues to be affected by poverty and inequality, repressive policing, and weak public safety and justice systems. Overall, internal support in the form of political will and long-term vision for a safer Mozambique is crucial. As this case study has shown, prevention—as that which promotes the right to security and freedom, democratic principles, participation, socioeconomic development, and good governance—has an important role to play in building and securing this vision.
Background

Haiti was the first black republic and is one of the oldest republics in the Western Hemisphere. Despite this, Haiti has been affected by political violence and instability for most of its history (EC 2010). Following years of armed rebellion, overthrow of government, dictatorship, and external interventions, Haiti has become the poorest country in the hemisphere, and one of the poorest in the world. In recent years, it has experienced significant urban growth, owing in part to widespread poverty and inequality, setting the current population at just under ten million.

Ongoing fragility in recent times had kept the international community at a distance, but the international community began to re-establish its presence throughout the mid-2000s. One of the largest interventions is the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti, MINUSTAH), which has the mandate to support security, stability, and governance and promote democratic elections (Lamb 1997). Despite its challenges, Haiti has experienced periods of stabilisation, and saw significant advances and economic development since 2004 (ibid.). Such progress was impaired in January 2010 when an earthquake (of a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale) hit Haiti, killing around 300,000 people, leaving one million homeless, and injuring hundreds of thousands (Vanderbilt University 2011). Around 15% of the nation’s total population were living in the most heavily affected areas (Vanderbilt University 2011). A needs assessment conducted in February to March 2010 concluded that the country had lost the equivalent of more than 120% of its GDP (Lamb 1997). Many experts suggest that, as an already “fragile state,” the effects of the earthquake in Haiti were magnified, thus undermining the state’s capacity to respond to citizens’ demands and cope with old and new problems (Vanderbilt University 2011) and further weakening institutional capacity for crime and violence prevention.

Post-Disaster

Several studies explore the effects of the earthquake on Haiti’s economy, government institutions, and civil society. The overarching conclusion is that Haiti’s already fragile situation (social, economic, political) advanced its vulnerability to the natural disaster. Vanderbilt University (2011) provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of the disaster on citizens’ lives and perceptions. It explores various themes such as governance, social cohesion, crime and perceptions of crime, the justice system, and civic participation before and after the earthquake.

It appears that low system support is widespread in Haiti, and the earthquake eroded political legitimacy in both municipalities affected and also in those that did not see a great impact. At the same time, there is strong evidence to suggest the earthquake translated into higher levels of distrust towards the political system, and also higher social distrust. There is also mounting distrust in the international community, as evidenced by the recent protests against UN presence, especially since the outbreak of cholera is thought to have come from UN aid workers and peacekeepers.

The study further outlines that civil society became more self-sufficient as the earthquake surpassed the capacity of the state to respond to the population’s demands. Citizens have become more involved in citizen-based associations as a way to improve their lives. This has been found before, for example in Mexico: after a devastating earthquake hit Mexico City in 1985, civil society organised and responded when the government could not. The Vanderbilt University study also explores institutional challenges, such as those of the justice system. It highlights that the severe political and economic problems experienced in the country have impeded the implementation of comprehensive judicial reforms. The outcome has been poor capacity of the system to deal with cases, especially after the earthquake, and an elevated backlog. This situation, as well as citizens’ lack of trust in the police and inefficient police response capability, has consequently led to high underreporting of crime.

16 Fragile states such as Haiti are characterised by widespread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, institutional weakness and poor governance, violence, lawlessness, and persistent conflict.
Crime and Violence

Most reports concur that urban violence has increased in Haiti, mainly following President Aristide’s departure in February 2004 and since the 2010 earthquake, especially in affected areas such as Port-au-Prince. The aftermath of the disaster is said to have enhanced insecurity, which in turn is fuelling fears of renewed instability and violence throughout the city (USIP 2010, Vanderbilt University 2011).

Violence and crime continue to be major challenges for Haiti. According to the World Bank’s Violence in the City report (2011a), youth aged eighteen to twenty-four account for 49% of all victims of violence and gangs are named as perpetrators in 72% of cases of reported victimisation. Domestic violence against women and children is the most prevalent form of violence, and women made up 57% of victims of violence, most being victims of rape perpetrated by youth gangs. The Vanderbilt University (2011) study points out that violent crime remains high in Haiti, and the majority of victims (51.2%) said they had experienced either a robbery with a physical assault or an armed robbery.

Numerous reports suggest that increased insecurity in Haiti after the earthquake underscores Haiti’s continued vulnerability to violent crime and political instability (USIP 2010). According to the US Institute of Peace (USIP), overcrowded urban areas affected by high poverty and unemployment combined with weak government institutions will continue to serve as “breeding grounds” for violent crime and armed groups. In the case of Haiti, it is widely recognised that violence and crime are driven by demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors, usually in outbursts (ICG 2010). These factors include structural inequalities in income and opportunity; rapid urbanisation in areas without proper infrastructure and service provision; a large and growing youth population; the continued presence of gangs; the availability of weapons; the expansion of drug trafficking networks; and a weak criminal justice system (World Bank 2011a). It is further argued that violence is deeply entrenched in Haitian political and social life and that, throughout the years, as political leaders have relied on violence to establish and exercise power, these issues have been exacerbated (ibid.).

While there are various studies on violence and crime in Haiti, reliable data are generally unavailable, and there is little that is comparable over time (World Bank 2011). There is no national system for collecting and managing data on violence, which makes it difficult to develop long-term strategies for prevention. Meanwhile, a constant atmosphere of crisis makes it hard to put in place such a system to identify and monitor crime and violence trends in the country.

Prevention Approach

Prior to the earthquake, there were efforts towards violence prevention, building capacity of the state and its institutions, and economic development. Despite the major challenges facing Haiti after the earthquake, many initiatives have been revived. One enduring plan is the Concertation Nationale. This national body is responsible for addressing violence against women and girls. It aims to be the coordinating body for the National Plan to Combat Violence against Women, and is engaged in strengthening the state’s legal framework on related issues. It has led a study showing the lack of mechanisms for collecting information on violence against women, and has provided training on sexual and domestic violence to police officers. The group has also created tools to facilitate reporting and improve service delivery to victims. It is in the process of re-establishing itself and its activities amid the physical and social damage.

Since the earthquake, there has been a flood of interventions by international organisations, but recent strategies focus primarily on stabilisation rather than long-term structural changes (World Bank 2011a). For example, as the Vanderbilt University (2011) study shows, the heavy deployment of international police officers and military personnel after the earthquake has reduced more visible and disruptive forms of violence, yet less visible forms such as domestic violence and sexual violence have not been addressed.
ICPC has been engaging in various projects that aim to work with stakeholders to fill the gaps, have long-term outcomes, and build internal capacity to prevent and reduce violence and crime in certain parts of Haiti. These projects, supported by UNDP, address the lack of data on violence and crime, as well as enhancing existing initiatives. They include mapping violence and crime in areas affected by the earthquake, creating a diagnosis of violence and crime in the camps and surrounding areas affected by the earthquake, developing tools for data collection, and monitoring trends. They also involve training on victimisation surveys for students at the University of Haiti, as part of a larger plan to strengthen the university’s Observatory on Crime.

ICPC is working closely with local authorities and organisations, police services, and the university to ensure the projects are appropriate, participatory, and effective. ICPC’s staff have engaged in several consultations to link to key stakeholders and community leaders, available data, themes to explore, sources and factors contributing to violence and crime, and locations for intervention. ICPC, in association with UNDP and key stakeholders, has developed the methodology for the victimisation survey and various tools for data collection in the targeted regions. Regarding violence against women, women’s groups will conduct safety audits—exploratory walks around the internally displaced persons’ camps—where rates are high. This method will allow for critical assessment of the urban environment and provide for local consultation and participation in identifying the trends and factors involved. Considering there is a significant lack of information on gender-based violence, these safety audits are crucial for advancing intervention and more concrete awareness.

Lack of data on violence and crime in Haiti is a major challenge. The projects attempt to fill this gap by mapping violence and crime in selected areas. This is a coordinated approach, as it will feed into the ongoing mapping activities of UNDP in five cities. The outcome will provide for a better comprehension of variations in types, rates, and sites of victimisation and incidents. The initiative builds local capacity through training on mapping violence and crime, identifying available resources, developing and conducting victimisation surveys and safety indicators, and analysis. This aims to advance the work of the existing Observatory on Crime, which is responsible for providing concrete data and research on violence and crime in Haiti. Therefore, the project is part of strengthening institutional capacity, providing the information for broad-based national development strategies, and integrating safety mechanisms throughout the rebuilding process.

**Is There Room for Prevention?**

While increased international attention and presence in Haiti offers opportunities for social and economic development, Haiti remains a fragile state, carrying a history of instability and institutional weakness. This is where prevention, broadly understood, can help in devising strategies for governance development that include violence and crime prevention in their design. The situation in Haiti must be viewed—with urgency—as an opportunity to reform and recreate structures of governance that advance and promote human rights. The right to security and freedom from fear is inherent to any working justice system. It is important to build and support a transparent and accountable justice system, and also important to recognise the weaknesses and organisational strengths of Haitian communities and harness those in safer community building. ICPC recognised much needs to be done in this very delicate situation but stresses that safety and security, especially of those who are the most vulnerable, are just as necessary as other vital public goods such as health and sanitation.

“Weaknesses in a state’s justice system contribute to violence and instability” (World Bank 2006).

Over the past few years, there has been growing recognition that violence undermines development, especially in fragile states such as Haiti. There has also been more attention to a prevention approach, whereby the prevention of violence and an improvement in security conditions are seen as essential in fostering sustainable development (World Bank 2011). It is also argued that development and violence prevention will not be possible without a focus on strengthening the state’s capacity to provide basic public goods (World Bank 2006). International institutions working in unstable regions of the world are beginning to incorporate violence prevention strategies as a means of sustaining long-term reforms and building local capacity. Some examples include community development and training programmes and strengthening democratic governance structures in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. “Policy toward violence prevention has evolved in recent years from an initial focus on law enforcement toward greater attention to the economic and social drivers of violence” (World Bank 2011). The World Bank is one of the main promoters of the prevention approach, and has highlighted that, for Haiti, underlying causes of

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17 The programmes are based on a prevention approach which focuses on enhancing social and economic opportunities, stimulating local mobilisation, and building local and institutional capacity.
crime and violence must be addressed in the larger scheme of reconstruction and development efforts. Further, the World Bank stresses that dialogue and reconciliation among political parties are further necessary to avoid recurrent crime and political conflict (ibid.).

“Institutional capacity building is a key entry point for breaking the cycle [of violence]” (World Bank 2006).

It is evident that there are countless priorities that need immediate attention in Haiti, such as basic service provision (food, water, shelter, health care), reconstruction efforts, and development assistance. However, at the same time, safety is a precondition for development and the foundation of democratic development, and provides communities with stability and predictability on which to base present and future decisions. As such, the processes involved in rebuilding the state and its institutions must also focus on safety, not as an isolated component but as a part of constructing a healthy, stable, and democratic society.

Considering the recognised link between violence and barriers to development, and Haiti’s high rates of crime and violence, the state and civil society need to build the capacity to advance development. This could be achieved by building institutional capacity to better meet the needs of the population, such as training and sensitisation for the police and law enforcement agencies on gender-based violence and discrimination and the implementation of gender equality policies. Another means of building capacity could be informing and updating the government and local authorities on violence and crime issues in Haiti. This would be followed by training to government officials and even local and national organisations on prevention strategies, tools, and methodologies. Improving socioeconomic outcomes would require more programmes (skills development, microcredit, service provision) for youth at risk and women in order to enhance their opportunities and as a means of preventing victimisation and engagement in criminality.

Internal interest and good leadership are also required, such as improved state capacity to establish security and the rule of law. This can be realised by training those involved in public safety on how to improve the processes in dealing with victims and offenders and ensuring all rights are respected. Legislation would need to be updated, and the justice system would require major reforming, which may necessitate assistance from international legal bodies. Concurrently, a national system for data collection and analysis on crime and violence is essential to facilitating an understanding of local dynamics of insecurity, and its links with poverty, inequality, security, and conflict. This system could be linked to the Observatory on Crime at the state university. The international community could provide support where needed, yet the level and degree of intervention should be debated internally.

“Security and the rule of law are not only crucial to ensuring justice and safety; they are also essential in creating an enabling environment for investments, economic growth, and development” (World Bank 2006).

While Haiti has its specific characteristics and history, these recommendations could be applied to other fragile states. Like other weak institutional settings in the world, the rebuilding process for Haiti requires comprehensive and considerable efforts. These recommendations may seem daunting in their breadth and depth; however, they are part of a long process based on the principles of prevention and safety. As this case study has shown, safety has a major role to play, and embedding violence prevention in the rebuilding of fragile states is crucial not only for reducing vulnerability during disasters or conflict but also for providing the framework for development, stability, and the promotion of human rights.
States go through periods of crisis which may be caused by internal and external conflict as well as major natural disasters. In such situations, what remains after the explosion of violence or forces of nature is a traumatised society, often divided into different factions, large groups of people displaced, and a government trying to establish priorities where everything is a priority. Issues of peacekeeping, peace building, safety of citizens, and security of the state may be mixed, with frequent overlapping.

While responsibility for the safety of citizens ideally rests with a mixed mechanism of formal and informal control, based on state and community actors, its fulfilment depends on the establishment of the rule of law. The process, which is as vital as the restoring of a predictable supply of food, health services, and education, goes parallel with other primary needs of post-conflict settings. In some cases, the process may start under the guidance of the international community rather than national actors. This may be the role of the peacekeeping/peace building forces, in particular the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) of the UN\(^4\).

The types of decisions made in the wake of conflicts are likely to mark the subsequent process and affect the sustainability of political and socioeconomic transformations. Decisions may also involve the donor community as well as influencing the type of assistance provided to post-conflict settings.

In a post-conflict situation, the criminal justice system is often looked on to perform far beyond its capacity. Usually one of the public sectors most affected by the preceding state of conflict or civil strife, it is typically characterised by destroyed or rundown infrastructure, lack of equipment, insufficiently qualified and trained staff, and poor salary schemes. Nevertheless, the international community, as well as national peacemakers, often expect an ailing and underfunded criminal justice system to shoulder a heavy burden, restoring law and order, attaining social peace, and, sometimes, establishing the truth about major violations of human rights.

Once a conflict (or a natural disaster) explodes, safety becomes survival and the roles of actors turn into emergency. When a natural disaster occurs in a country already struggling to improve its security sector capacity, as happened in Haiti with the 2010 earthquake, the additional stress may represent both a challenge and an opportunity. After a conflict or a natural disaster, it is necessary to take stock of what has remained, in terms of important resources and strengths already existing in society, to ensure their involvement as main actors for change.

Two case studies presented below, of Haiti and Burundi, highlight some crucial elements of such situations, which may be summarised as follows:

- Balancing external aid and donor priorities with internal forces and interests. Not all that comes from abroad is good and in the interest of the population. Criminal justice reform and crime prevention planning should be consistent with local traditions and feelings.
- Dealing with the past and identifying processes for healing and reconciliation. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, set up by the Government of National Unity to help deal with what happened under Apartheid, set the

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2 Piera Barzanò has a background in Law, Criminology and Legal Anthropology. She has been working for the United Nations for over 15 years in several duty stations, particularly in Africa. Her main area of work is the support to criminal justice reform, especially in post-conflict countries.
3 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UN.
4 In 2004, the UN General Assembly endorsed the proposal of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change for an SPC of fifty to a hundred officers. In 2006, UN Member States approved an initial operational capacity of twenty-five professional police officers and in October 2007 the SPC became operational. SPC officers were deployed to the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad, MINURCAT) in 2007, to Chad from November 2007 to August 2008, and to the MINUSTAH in Haiti within a week from the earthquake in 2010. The SPC is based at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. Specialised officers assist UN field operations and other UN agencies and programmes around the world. A Judicial and Corrections Standing Capacity, to work with the SPC, was approved by UN Member States in 2010.
example for this, considered essential to establishing a baseline against which to declare a conflict closed and move on with life. In the absence of a shared feeling of closure, the reasons for conflict may remain dormant and undermine any process towards the formation of a functioning state. Examples of application of this model include the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Guatemalan Truth Commission, the Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the Uganda Amnesty Commission, and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture in Chile.

- Tackling stock of what exists, what can be done, and what are the potentials. Population-based surveys are a good tool to capture experience, perceptions, and expectations of citizens about their safety and the institutions responsible for guaranteeing it. Surveys may provide a baseline set of data against which to measure not only trends in crime and violence but also perceptions of security, small arms proliferation, and perceptions of the performance of the police and justice institutions. Their regular use in post-conflict settings may provide precious information on progress in the establishment of the rule of law and a return to a peace setting.

- Working with a plan and identifying guiding principles: good governance, transparency, and accountability, to ensure a long-term, sustainable approach. Many recent post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes have failed because of the missing connection, in the minds of policymakers and practitioners, between security and development concerns (Krause and Jutersonke 2005). A 2006 diplomatic initiative, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, aims to address this issue and link programmatic efforts in armed violence reduction and prevention to relevant development initiatives, especially in post-conflict settings.

- Establishing platforms with all stakeholders, from all different ethnic and/or religious groups, including civil society, the private sector, and state institutions, to advocate for a common approach towards the guiding principles. This may include innovative approaches, such as the “peace accords” experimented with in Haiti with different armed groups.

**Case Study: Haiti 2010 (Kolbe and Muggah 2011)**

The earthquake which hit Haiti on 13 January 2010 killed 220,000 people and made 1.5 million others homeless. Even before the tragedy, the country was facing serious challenges in its attempts to improve its security situation. SAS carried out a number of household surveys from 2004 providing a series of data by means of which it is possible to monitor changes in security over the past decade. Despite the extraordinary stress they had to go through, the population of Haiti perceived a significant improvement as regards security between 2004 and 2007, which continued after the earthquake, accompanied by improved perceptions of the Haitian National Police. The fact that the police were also victims of the earthquake probably facilitated an improved relationship with the community. Surveys also documented the public perception that police involvement in criminal activities decreased after the transition to an elected government in 2007.

Haiti’s attempt to strengthen the rule of law and to advance security sector reform is carrying on in parallel with the reconstruction of areas destroyed by the earthquake. This represents formidable challenges. Resources may not be evenly distributed across the population, which may have been hit by the natural disaster differently in different places. In particular, urban areas in Port-au-Prince attract people from the countryside in search of food, jobs, schools, and hospitals. This stream of migrants is now competing for resources, which are even scarcer than in the past. Immediately after the earthquake, the priority was guaranteeing food and shelter, with a view to preventing a possible humanitarian disaster and an explosion of property and gang crime. This led to the fast strengthening of formal control through reinforcement of the police in the capital, including modernising and upgrading existing police structures and ensuring procedures were in compliance with international standards and in respect of human rights.

On the other hand, initiatives towards community-based forms of policing, as well as informal mechanisms for crime control and alternative dispute resolution, have been developed in specific neighbourhoods. For example, one informal approach was pioneered by the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio in Port-au-Prince, focusing on Bel Air, and consisted of promoting “peace accords” between armed groups with the objective of reducing armed violence and homicides in particular. As a reward, communities reporting a decline in homicide rates would obtain advantages in education (primary school scholarships) and entertainment (neighbourhood parties). In 2009, the peace accords were considered effective ways to increase community safety by 47% of respondents, who either agreed or strongly agreed; this figure increased after the earthquake to 55% in 2010.

In practice, surveys carried out a few months after the earthquake suggest that Haiti remained relatively stable despite diminished policing capacity and obvious weaknesses in key justice institutions, with crime rates lower than feared or predicted. The Haitian National Police also gained some confidence...
in the eyes of the public and in 2010 was pointed to by both the general population and the residents of internally displaced person camps as the main security provider, capable of making their communities safer.

Case Study: Burundi 2005

Years of civil strife, massive and deliberate killings, non-democratic regimes, and ethnic exclusion and divide have characterised the post-independence phase of Burundi, contributing to the entrenching of a widespread culture of impunity, abuse of power, and corruption. In this context, while Burundi was struggling to re-establish its institutions and leave behind the legacy left by years of internal conflict, crime prevention and criminal justice policies represented a real challenge in view of weak law enforcement, the inadequate justice system, unchecked proliferation of weapons throughout the country, and the lack of viable economic opportunities for many young demobilised men.1

A very strong executive power was a constant feature. Legislative power was in the hands of the president of the republic, who would issue government decrees on the basis of proposals by the various ministers. Only in 1992 was a multiparty system introduced by the Constitution, with legislative power then given to the National Assembly. However, the tragic events of 1993 delayed the constitutional reform and affected the justice system in particular.

Based on observations during the transitional phase in 2005, this case study identifies some less obvious issues that deserve greater attention by those working at the re-establishment of the criminal justice system in post-conflict countries.

One area easy to overlook is the definition of the national criminal policy, or its update, in view of the social changes brought about by the conflict and its aftermath. In many developing countries, but even more so in post-conflict situations, no reliable data are usually available on crime trends or the number and type of offences committed. Such data could guide the preparation of the country’s criminal policy and its indicators, with a view to tailoring and measuring the response to crime. Meanwhile, the international community is usually putting pressure on the country to address a series of issues or offences that may or may not be a national priority, instead of supporting a process leading to a well-thought-out criminal policy. The intervention of international legal drafters may result in technically impeccable laws which cannot be applied as they have not been entirely appropriated by, and adapted to, the legal system concerned.

In a situation like Burundi in 2005, the classification of offences and sanctions for the Penal Code required a review based on the needs of a new historical phase, characterised by a quest for social recovery and enhanced public security. In general, there was limited public confidence in the administration of justice, which was perceived as arbitrary and biased against the poorest. It was important to reconsider the social alarm raised, and the risk posed, by various criminal behaviours. For example, in the Penal Code, sexual violence was sanctioned rather leniently under “Offences against the Family and Public Morality” (Heading VI, Section 2 “De l’attentat à la pudeur et du viol,” Articles 382–7). In view of the frequency and devastating impact of this offence on the most vulnerable segment of the population, it was suggested to consider it a serious offence directed against the person. At the same time, theft was punished by unusually harsh sentences and accounted for a good percentage of cases awaiting trial in extremely overcrowded prisons. Denationalising the least serious forms of theft, which were to a large extent a consequence of abject poverty, and introducing alternatives to imprisonment for minor offences would have contributed greatly to improving the situation in prisons and to increasing citizens’ trust in their justice system.

In this context, one important problem in Burundi was represented by inconsistent sentencing patterns. For the same offence, sanctions could be very different, depending on where and/or who was judging. In similar cases, existing sentencing options should be evaluated and the need for a consistent and unbiased application of the law in promoting a sense of justice highlighted.

Another seldom explored aspect is the fact that the decisions of the courts, even the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, had not been collected in an organised manner and jurisprudence had no role in the development of a legal culture. It appeared

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5 For a more complete analysis of the links between crime and conflict, see UNODC (2005).
6 The first republican Constitution was adopted in 1974, when the only political party controlled the government and the judicial power. Judges were nominated by the president and, in the exercise of their functions, were subjected to “the authority of the law, the options of the party, and the revolutionary conceptualisation of the law.”
7 The author, Piera Barzani, worked in Burundi as senior rule of law advisor with the UN Operation in Burundi (Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi, ONUB) from January to June 2005.
8 Even at the Supreme Court, it would be up to the individual judges to remember a particular decision taken in the past and to request a search for the relevant file.
that penal jurisprudence had long been seen as a "danger" because it meant judges leaving behind a traceable history of their decisions. It also entailed being subject to public scrutiny in terms of quality of decisions and motivations. While jurisprudence would increase the accountability of judges, it could also make any intrusion by the executive more obvious. As such, for many years, penal jurisprudence was considered a political issue. This had tremendous consequences, not only for the judiciary but also because jurisprudence could have contributed to social and legal developments in Burundi since its independence. Had penal jurisprudence existed, it would have been an important piece of the discourse on truth and reconciliation around 2005.

Last but not least, among the female prison population, a considerable number of women were charged with offences such as infanticide, witchcraft, and poisoning. Not only were these offences typical or the exclusive domain of female offenders, but also many of the charges were arbitrary and, in view of the fact that virtually no forensic capacity was available, they were based on witnesses or confessions under duress. Thus, women were socially marginalised and abused by the criminal justice system even before being convicted.

9 One of the persons interviewed by the author reported decisions being taken on the basis of non-existent laws.
10 Accusations of witchcraft did not spare men, with charges were based on Chapter III, Section 1 of the Penal Code "Des épreuves superstitieuses et des pratiques barbares."
Introduction

More than one-fifth of the world’s population—over one and a half billion people—live in fragile and conflict-affected states. Fragile states—those whose governments are unwilling or unable to provide basic services to poor people—face a host of development challenges. No fragile state is on track to meet the MDGs, and many of them are caught in cycles of armed violence. Poverty is a common characteristic; insecurity a constant reality (World Bank 2011b). In such contexts, a host of factors combine to create challenges to overcoming insecurity, including weak state institutions, proliferation of SALW, armed insurgencies, organised crime, low-level conflict over resources including land and livestock, corruption, climate change, and, in some cases, the looming threat of the re-emergence of war.

Many states emerging from violent conflict have seen the destruction of public infrastructure, the erosion of social norms, and the perversion of political systems. In situations like these, where the social contract has broken down, the state is unable to fulfil its part of the bargain to uphold the rule of law and create a secure environment for its citizens. Indeed, in some cases, the state and its agents, such as the military and the police, become the primary source of insecurity for much of the population. In other cases, without these state institutions, a power vacuum emerges and a variety of actors (some criminal, some not) move in to fill it. Often, it is not war or militias that concern communities in conflict-affected contexts, but actually crime and criminality that pose the greatest threat. A study by the North-South Institute in 2009 found that, in South Sudan, most community members listed theft and the abduction of young girls as their primary security concerns (Sewonet Abatneh and Lubang 2011).

One response to improve security for individuals in fragile and conflict-affected states is reform of the security sector and the institutions—military, paramilitary, judicial, policing, corrections, and the like—that constitute it. Police reform in particular has the potential to improve the security of communities and their members given the proximate and daily interaction of police officers with the general public. Many communities have also developed their own responses to insecurity, which are yielding positive results.

This Special Contribution explores these two approaches to creating more secure environments in fragile and conflict-affected states, one working from the bottom up, the other from the top down. It identifies some of the major challenges facing community-based initiatives and state-led police reform that continue to contribute to lasting insecurity in fragile and conflict-affected states. Finally, it comments on the specific challenges facing marginalised populations in these contexts, particularly looking at the insecurity of girls and women.

Community Approaches to Creating Security

Societies have developed their own cultural norms to determine what is acceptable behaviour. Actions that deviate from these cultural norms are considered delinquent or, in a sense, a crime. Each society has its own means of addressing these delinquencies, often with the threat of punishment as a deterrent. Outside of state mechanisms, communities usually practise restorative justice, meaning resolutions that will help make up for the loss the community faced as a result of the crime. As such, punishments can vary greatly, and can include compensation, exile, shaming, or even death (Commission of Western Australia 2006, UNDP 2010b). Long-held traditions can run into problems, however, during the imposition of a national, centralised state structure. This can be exacerbated in cases of conflict and reconstruction of the state.
In conflict-affected states that are rebuilding and forming state structures, traditional community methods of crime prevention and provision of security may be pushed aside in favour of a more Western approach to security and justice through state providers. Widespread, long-term, and violent conflict may have destroyed or manipulated community-based security and justice providers, or created new actors regarded as a source of security, such as militias. When a state is rebuilding, it must be conscious of all the actors different communities perceive as legitimate. However, the state must also be cognisant of the needs of individual victims of crime. Slowly, community-based approaches are being integrated into security sector reform and wider state-building processes through innovative mechanisms that draw on the strengths of both the state and the community. These mechanisms recognise the reach and trust of the population that community-based approaches to security and justice hold.

Since communities have the best understanding of their own needs, they are best placed to determine their own priorities for policing. In some cases, community police boards have been created to provide a forum for community members to engage directly with the police in their area. In post-war Sierra Leone, the security sector reform process set up local police partnership boards with elected community members to meet with members of the security service regularly. Boards like this have the ability to set priorities for the community, to assist in highlighting areas for crime prevention, and are monitoring the police to ensure the latter act in an appropriate manner.

In some areas, a community policing approach is also used. This is particularly useful where state police are not trusted or not present. The community policing model can be similar to a neighbourhood watch role, or possibly involve community members conducting their own patrols. In Liberia, community policing forums have incorporated youth “task forces”: gangs that patrol neighbourhoods in the absence of the police. There are claims that the Liberia National Police do not respond fast enough to crime or are absent in some areas, therefore these community-formed groups fill these gaps and work alongside the police to deter and address criminal activity. This mode of policing does allow for some autonomy and greater control of how a community determines its own safety. However, it also runs the risk of the community police wreaking havoc on the communities they are meant to protect, as seen in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where youth-led community patrols use violence to combat what they deem criminal (Baker 2007).

Both these methods recognise the community in many cases has the primary responsibility for setting social norms, including what constitutes delinquent behaviour. Moreover, they both provide opportunities to include those who would not normally be permitted to join decision-making processes—most notably women. Since community policing forums and boards are elected or have open membership, women are free to participate and voice their views on the way policing is conducted. Moreover, they have the ability to provide an alternative perspective that focuses on what women and children feel are a threat to their security, such as sexual violence.

States have also recognised that some crimes—particularly those that have to do with personal property, family, and neighbourhood disputes—are best resolved by the community, using traditional conflict resolution methods. An example can be found in South Sudan, where some Dinka communities look to a traditional court of their kinsmen called the Ban Bith to form a judgement on issues including land ownership and family separation (Wassara 2007). This method often sees a decision and punishment for a crime determined by traditional leaders who will negotiate an outcome that is beneficial to the community as a whole. Punishments can vary, but often feature retribution for those who were wronged. For many crimes, this method of conflict resolution is designed to ensure all parties are satisfied with the outcome, meaning that, once the perpetrator has paid his or her penance, he or she is welcomed back into the community. However, crimes related to domestic issues, such as domestic violence and, in some cases, rape and sexual assault, are also relegated to traditional dispute mechanisms. This can result in the survivor—often a woman—not receiving the justice she deserves, or the protection. For example, in Afghanistan, should an unmarried female community member be raped, it is often suggested she marry her rapist to preserve family honour; in similar cases of honour in areas of Central Asia and the Middle East, she could be killed. Although the community as a whole may feel more secure, there is little justice for the survivor.

This is changing with state reconstruction processes which recognise that, in order to ensure human rights are enshrined in the security and justice sectors, crimes such as domestic and sexual violence cannot be resolved by traditional methods alone. In Liberia, for example, all cases involving sexual and gender-based violence must go to state court. The country has set up a specific court—Special Court E—to try such cases. This approach may not work everywhere. Although crimes involving sexual and gender-based violence must use the state justice system, this does mean the survivor will not face retribution for supposedly ruining a family’s honour. She may still be
killed and her murderer may be able to continue to live with impunity. It is in cases like these—where community- and state-led approaches to security meet—that the weaknesses of the state system are often thrown into sharp relief. Improving the way such state structures operate is the topic to which we now turn.

**Police Reform in Fragile Contexts**

Police reform aims to change an existing police organisation into one that is professional, accountable, respectful of human rights, and responsive to the security needs of local populations (Denham 2008). In many fragile and conflict-affected situations, policing bodies have been used as tools for state repression, often resorting to violence as they break the laws they are meant to enforce. As states move out of conflict and work to become more resilient, police reform is often on the long list of priorities of fragile states and their international supporters. However, while police reform holds the potential to improve security at the local level for many, it faces numerous challenges and is often only partially implemented (Baranyi and Salahub 2011).

In fragile and conflict-affected states, where—as South Sudanese President Salva Kiir is meant to have commented—“everything is a priority,” police reform programmes are often under-resourced, in terms of funding and equipment but also in terms of training. In 2009 in South Sudan, the materials needed to perform police duties were in severely short supply, impeding the ability of the South Sudan Police Service to move around, communicate, and document incidents (Sewonet Abatneh and Lubang 2011). In Liberia, too, police officers sometimes rely on NGOs to hire a motorcycle taxi for them so they can travel to rural locations to investigate allegations of issues such as child abuse and sexual assault. In the case of South Sudan, priority was placed on military reform, arguably at the expense of greater attention to and investment in the police service; similar circumstances are likely in other conflict-affected states concerned with the potential for renewed inter-state conflict.

Even when police services face no competition from other armed forces or paramilitary organisations—such as in Haiti, which disbanded its military in the 1990s—challenges with the police officers themselves may arise. Vetting of police personnel is an important part of the process that often gets overlooked, is paid only lip service, or is implemented only partially or half-heartedly. The goal of vetting is to weed out any personnel who are guilty of human rights violations or other misconduct. Vetting is identified as a crucial step in many police reform processes because police personnel in fragile and conflict-affected states are often drawn from disbanding guerrilla militias or served with the police during a period of state repression. As such, they may need to be held accountable for any crimes they committed, or their presence in the police service may work against building trust between the police and the public. Particularly in places like Haiti, where sexual violence has been a key factor in the conflict, ensuring training and police leadership are focused on creating a professional police force that is respectful of human rights, including women’s rights, is of paramount importance if we wish to improve security at the local level (Fortin and Pierre 2011). To this end, ensuring women are represented in the police service and have the opportunity to hold decision-making roles is a key factor in improving security for all (Salahub 2011).

However, while integrating women into policing may improve the service provided, women—and many men—face hurdles which put them at greater risk, both in and out of the police. One key aspect of this revolves around education. Literacy in particular is a great challenge to women and many men in fragile and conflict-affected states who wish to join the police service. Indeed, it is often a challenge to those who have become police officers through reassignment or demobilisation from other armed forces. The illiteracy rate in the South Sudan Police Service, for example, has been pegged at 90% in recent years. Culturally, women face a further disadvantage, as they are often passed over in favour of male siblings when families decide who will receive the benefits of education. Many women thus do not possess the requisite schooling to be eligible to join the police service. In Liberia, an affirmative action programme was instituted as part of the police reform programme; however, this has had some negative unexpected consequences relating to promotion and retention when women recruited under lowered qualifications do not have the education necessary to advance.

Other challenges outside of the purview of police reform that exacerbate individual and community insecurity which are also quite common in fragile states include the state’s inability to project its power—including its monopoly on the legitimate use of force—across the entirety of its territory. In South Sudan, for example, the government has a tenuous hold at best on the territory making up the world’s newest country. Indeed, after more than thirty years of civil war, SALW in the hands of the general public are ubiquitous. Combine this with lingering tensions among the various tribal groups and important

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3 Interview with NGO worker, Monrovia, Liberia, May 2010. See also Bowah and Salahub (2011).
social structures based around cattle raiding, and a situation emerges whereby low-level conflict among different communities is resulting in severe injury and loss of life on an all-too-frequent basis. In Lakes state alone, no fewer than 249 people were killed and 319 injured as a result of cattle raids in 2011 (Sudan Tribune 2011). The South Sudan Police Service is often unable to intervene, for many of the reasons discussed above or because it is simply not present in great enough numbers to make a difference.

Conclusion

Incorporating community approaches to security and crime prevention is challenging. However, if the state during its consolidation process does not take community practices into account when delivering services, it runs the risk of not being able to assert its authority or garner the respect of the population. This could leave an ineffective state structure, but could also result in the state imposing its presence by force. At the same time, relying too much on traditional bodies may not only weaken the reach of the state but also disadvantage justice for minority groups, women, and children. Continuing to explore ways in which communities can assert more control over their security without infringing on human rights is essential for future state building in conflict-affected contexts.

Similarly, relying on police reform alone to solve the problem of insecurity in fragile states will be at best a half measure. Certainly, it is important to develop a professional, accountable, and rights-respecting police service. But in so doing, attention must be paid to appropriately training and resourcing this institution as well as respecting and engaging with existing community-based security and justice mechanisms to the benefit of the local population. Such approaches to creating security and preventing crime are still new, and much work remains to be done.

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4 It should be noted that South Sudan has been working over the past eighteen months to increase both the numbers and the quality of its police service.
High-tech indoor growing room for female marijuana plants.
© Mark Rose/iStockphoto
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DRUG PRODUCTION IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Sample of large amount of 'meth lab trash' found in a horse trailer following a drug raid on a home in New Lebanon, Ohio, USA, February 16, 2006.
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Drug Production in Developed Countries

Introduction

The international illegal drug trade is undoubtedly one of the most profitable illicit activities in the world. It has been estimated to have a value of between US$300 and US$500 billion a year (Reuter and Greenfield 2001). The World Drug Report (UNODC 2010) estimates that some 788 metric tonnes of cocaine were exported from the Andean region in 2009, each with an estimated value of US$138 million dollars (DEA 2004, quoted in UNODC 2010). The World Drug Report highlights the dimensions of the trade, providing a source of data and information on drugs compiled using data provided by member states. However, it is impossible to know the exact extent of the drug trade: as an illicit activity, it is in its best interests to remain secret. Nevertheless, we do have a good idea of its magnitude thanks to the efforts of academics and organisations devoted to designing methodologies of estimation and other analysis tools as well as governments keeping better data and information on drug production within their borders. Thus, we know most of the drugs consumed in the world come from specific regions and countries (Box 6.1), most from the developing world, especially Central and Southeast Asia and Latin America.

Introduction

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Box 6.1 Producing Pointed Useful Information: The EMCDDA

In 2010, the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) with Europol published an analysis of the production and supply of amphetamines in the EU. This was the first in a series of publications planned to deepen our understanding of drug markets and drug production. It is thus highlighting the importance of generating accessible and usable data to benefit decision makers.

Figure 6.1 ATS Use Trends (Unweighted) by Type as Perceived by Experts of Developed (OECD) and Developing (non-OECD) Countries: 1998–2008 (Baseline: 1998=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Developed countries (OECD)</th>
<th>Developing countries (non-OECD)</th>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>102.6</td>
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<td>104.8</td>
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Source: UNODC (2010a).
However, there is evidence that drug production in developed countries has become substantial, especially in the markets for cannabis, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), and ecstasy-type drugs (Figure 6.1). The US, Canada, and Western and Central Europe are important producers, particularly of ATS, which is consumed internally or used for export to other markets. The effects of this phenomenon on community safety as well as the possible contribution of crime prevention as a way to tackle its adverse effects have been ignored. This is why this chapter of the International Report focuses on drug production in developed countries and its effect on local communities. Most developed countries produce three types of narcotics: cannabis, methamphetamines, and ATS (AIC 2011b, EMCDDA 2010, USDOJ 2011). We thus focus on these types of drugs.

Drug Production in Developed Countries: Numbers and Facts

This chapter focuses mainly on drug production in Canada, the US, Western Europe, and Oceania. The dynamics of drug production in each country and region may vary, but they remain important markets and places of operation for organised crime and as such must be addressed by crime prevention as well as other criminal justice system options.

It is important to recognise that this topic has a longstanding tradition in both policy and academic research. Drug markets have been explored from many different viewpoints, and it would prove impossible for ICPC to include in this chapter all the research and initiatives that deserve mention. The chapter is focused somewhat on North America, especially Canada, mostly for reasons of practicality in terms of access to information during the research phase, and also because of space constraints. ICPC has also endeavoured to include other cases throughout the text, such as those of the US and Australia.

Canada

Canada is now an important producer of cannabis and its derivatives, both for internal consumption and for export, mainly to the US. It is the most seized illicit drug in the country and is produced mostly in the provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario, although the Maritime provinces have also shown producing capacity (RCMP 2010). UNODC estimates that, for the year 2007, Canada produced between 1,399 and 3,498 metric tonnes of cannabis herb. In comparison, the Netherlands in 2008 produced between 323 and 766 metric tonnes and the US between 3,149 and 7,349 metric tonnes. For reference, Colombia in 2006 (the latest reference year available) produced around 6,000 metric tonnes (UNODC 2011). Cocaine and marijuana represent the two most commonly trafficked illicit substances in Canada. This market is controlled mainly by Asian organised crime groups. Canada is also a global supplier of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) (ecstasy). This is a recent trend—until 2004, the majority of Canadian seizures of MDMA were not locally produced (RCMP 2010)—pointing to more significant involvement of Canadian organised crime groups. The equivalent of 2.6 million doses of MDMA was seized in the Pacific region in 2009 (ibid.); most shipments go to the US.

The US

The US is a consumer and producer of methamphetamine and other ATS as well as cannabis and crack cocaine. These are produced in remote rural areas of the country and can also be found in larger urban centres (O’Dea, Murphy, and Balzer 1995). Gangs—of different ethnic profiles—are routinely involved in the production and sale of these drugs. Although Mexican and South American gangs control most of the cannabis and cocaine trade, it is noteworthy that local cannabis production is important, as is the production of methamphetamine (UNODC 2011). Whether for locally produced or imported drugs, US organised crime groups have developed a complex network of distribution to satisfy demand. In recent years and as a result of more effective law enforcement, many ATS-producing operations have moved south to Mexico and Central America, from where they can easily supply the US market (ibid.). However, in the specific case of methamphetamine production, the US has seen an increase in the number of laboratory facilities reported, and this has driven up global numbers. In 2008, the US reported a total of 7,226 methamphetamine laboratories (including storage facilities and dumping sites) out of a world total of 8,295. While these numbers mark an increase on the previous two years, they are still significantly lower than the 17,853 facilities reported worldwide in 2004 (ibid.). Seizures of methamphetamine rose from 4.89 metric tonnes in 2007 to 7.37 in 2008, a significant increase and the largest worldwide.

Europe

Cannabis is the most commonly used drug in Europe, followed by cocaine and ATS. Local production is low, but there are increasing reports of domestic cannabis production being fuelled by the presence of organised crime groups (EMCDDA 2010). This is reflected in the fact that all 29 European countries report some form of domestic production, although this is difficult to quantify owing to the variable nature of the
phenomenon (ibid.). Europe concentrates up to 80% of reported production of amphetamines (UNODC 2010) and also most of its consumption (EMCDDA 2010). Europe is also the world’s main producer of ecstasy, with 3.3% of adults reporting lifetime use of this drug (ibid.). In terms of crime, all drug-related offences except those for ecstasy have shown an increase in Europe, with cannabis-related offences accounting for between 50% and 70% of all drug offences. Only in three countries does cannabis not account for a majority of offences, namely, the Czech Republic and Latvia, with methamphetamines, and Lithuania with heroin (ibid.).

Oceania Region

In terms of both cannabis and ATS, the local Australian market is supplied largely by domestic producers situated across the country (AIC 2011), with Southeast Asian and motorcycle gangs involved in growth and distribution (Willis n.d.). Because of the geographical difficulties inherent in importing drugs into Australia, it is more cost efficient for criminals to produce these substances locally to avoid unnecessary detection risks (AIC 2011). By the same token, Oceania accounts for between 9% and 10% of the global ATS market (Schloenhardt 2007). The region reports 2.5% of usage by local population (Australia 2.7% and New Zealand 2.1%), the highest in the world (IDPC 2011). This is a worrying trend—albeit one which has shown a slight decrease recently (UNODC 2010). The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) has just released a paper stating that survey and urine analysis of police detainees shows a marked increase in the use of methamphetamine, coming after two years of decrease (AIC 2011a). Users report an increase in the quality and availability of the drug as well (ibid.). In 2008, Oceania also reported the highest prevalence of use of ecstasy, with between 3.6% and 4% of the population aged sixteen to sixty-four years of age reporting use. In 2005–2006, up to 390 clandestine laboratories producing ATS were identified in Australia (Schloenhardt 2007). In New Zealand, 180 were identified in 2004.
Map 6.2 Illegal Drug Facilities Dismantled in the EU Reported to Interpol

Source: EMCDDA (2010).

Figure 6.2 Drug-Related Offences in Europe

The trends represent the available information on the national number of reports for drug-related offences (criminal and non-criminal) reported by all law enforcement agencies in the EU Member States; all series are indexed to a base of 100 in 2003 and weighted by national population sizes to form an overall EU trend.

Trends in reports for drug-related offences by type of offence and by drug type in the EU Member States

Source: EMCDDA (2010).
The Effects of the Presence of Drugs at the Community Level, Health Costs, and Community Safety

The establishment of a drug market in a community can bring about important challenges to local safety. O’Dea, Murphy, and Balzar (1995) describe some of the ways organised gangs and other criminals settle into a community, especially those outside cities where drug markets are more established. Individuals with membership in gangs in large cities (such as Los Angeles, California) can move to smaller towns and begin a process of not just setting up production facilities but also creating a local clientele that provides income. They assure their permanence in the community by creating local demand and also produce for external consumption. In some cases, they may also try to take over the local market from local gangs in a process that may see a rise in levels of violence, as has been documented for Jamaican gangs in the state of Florida, US. In many cases, the effect of this on local communities can be dire. The presence of drugs in the community may exacerbate already existing social problems—socioeconomic, racial—and further alienate communities from other sectors of society.

Many issues emanate from the presence of drugs in a community. However, from the perspective of crime prevention and community safety, it is practical to focus on two dimensions. First, drug manufacture and use cause health hazards; these have been well documented. Second, there is evidence that criminal markets, and specifically drug markets, whether local or transnational, tend to contribute to environments of violence (Andreas and Wallman 2009). There is also evidence at the international level that many of those arrested for a wide range of illicit activities are frequent drug users. Whether or not drug use is an actual causal factor in crime is still being debated (IDPC 2011, UNODC 2010). This has direct costs in terms of public health, which may be understood in terms of the health costs incurred by victims of drug-related violence (e.g. hospital costs) and the costs associated with actual use of drugs whenever a market opens.

Health costs relating to the use and presence of drugs in a community are very high. Their abuse is correlated with higher rates of incarceration and arrest, thus pointing to a relationship with violent incidents as well. The economic costs of substance abuse, including crime and its associated costs, has been estimated at up to US$487 billion a year (McKenzie, Pinger, and Kotechi 2011). Serious substance abusers can be a threat to themselves and others, to his/her family’s wellbeing, or to the community as a whole. The presence of drugs and drug use in a community also tends to attract criminals not necessarily related to the drug trade, which can increase levels of violence. The arrival of new gangs and drug producers in an already monopolised market may trigger violence as criminal groups fight for control. Thus, we see an increase in both health costs and crime rates in communities where drug producers and sellers settle.

Crime incidence and other socioeconomic factors linked to drug abuse and production—such as poverty, racial segregation, unemployment, and family disruption (Sampson, Radenbusch, and Earls 2011)—may harm the collective efficacy of a community (ibid.), which in turn impedes its capacity to deal with and respond to crime and insecurity. The presence of drug production and sale, which go hand in hand in the developed world, can be conceived of as further debilitating factors to communities which may already suffer from the factors mentioned above. Thus, drug issues in the developed world must be seen both a community safety issue and a public health issue in order to minimise their undesired effects on community safety and cohesion.

Preventing the Effects of Drug Production and Trade in Developed Countries: A Complete Approach

A number of strategies have been implemented at both the national and the international level to tackle the issue of drug production and its effects in developed nations. As a multifaceted problem, it is important to note efforts have been made to cover it from different perspectives. However, some new approaches may be worth exploring in the future as the limits of well-known repressive strategies become more apparent with time. The two main types of drugs being produced in developed nations (cannabis and ATS) need different approaches. Cannabis has become very common and is now produced and consumed mostly in internal markets through social connections (UNODC 2010); it is decreasing in importance as a transnational drug. ATS and ecstasy-type drugs, on the other hand, are increasingly becoming transnational businesses that cater also to local
demands. As such, and also because of the potential for increased benefit for communities, we focus mainly (but not exclusively) on ATS and ecstasy control and prevention.

Targeting Precursors as Prevention

One of the most common strategies in dealing with the local production of ATS and ecstasy-type drugs is to cut off access to raw materials through tighter control of their precursors—the basic chemicals from which ATS are produced. The logic is that, by not allowing criminals access to their raw materials, they will not be able to produce the drugs (UNODC 2010). However, these actions have sometimes resulted in criminals becoming more creative, in terms of not only accessing precursors but also replacing them with other, more easily available products. The most common results of a hardening of precursor access are as follows (UNODC 2011):

- Manufacture drops and the price and purity (that is, the value) of the drug decreases.
- The source(s) and/or supply routes of precursor chemicals change(s).
- The precursor chemical itself (form or type) and/or manufacturing process change(s).
- The location of manufacture shifts to more vulnerable lower cost areas.
- Substitute psychoactive substances may appear.

Precursor control can be effective to a certain degree but does not guarantee the eradication of drug production. The government of Mexico responded to the increase in the local manufacture of amphetamines and methamphetamines in 2007 by restricting the import of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine—two important precursors—and eventually banning all import of these chemicals altogether. This resulted also in a decrease in seizures in the US, although production there is said to be rising (UNODC 2010).

In the case of Europe and MDMA manufacture, efforts have been made to curtail access to ecstasy precursors. The EU has negotiated international agreements with China, one of the largest producers of 3,4-MDP-2-P—a key precursor of MDMA—to improve cooperation, tracking, and control. This has resulted as well in production moving into other areas of the world, particularly in Asia. While challenging, however, precursor control can have a positive effect in terms of slowing down local drug production, and has been shown to make this activity more difficult for criminals. This is dependent on well-coordinated efforts to identify new bases of operation, new types of drugs, and use of new precursors. These control policies must be implemented in conjunction with local "evidence-based prevention and treatment programmes" (UNODC 2010, 119).

Community Intervention and Community Safety

Prevention is a key component when tackling local drug problems, both production and consumption. As local demand is increasingly satisfied by local production, especially in terms of ATS and cannabis, these issues must be dealt with in a joint manner. Successful interventions and programmes to address drug production and trade locally require solid partnerships between authorities and the communities involved. Community members may know the most about criminal activity in their midst and can be an important source of information for authorities. Governments must create strong links with their communities and have open channels of communication so they can be informed of new developments in the community, such as the arrival of new gangs or the appearance of a production facility. In order for this to work, the actions of the government and its actors must be perceived by the community as having a measure of legitimacy (Tyler and Fagan 2008).

There have been a number of attempts to generate such a relationship in the developed world. In the community of High Point, North Carolina, US, the local police faced an important problem18. A drug market had established itself in the community, leading to many other problems, such as degradation of public spaces, low property values, economic decline, reduced opportunities for young people, widespread availability of drugs, and increased violence. This was called an "overt drug market." Instead of using traditional repressive methods to address the drug problem in the community, the local police partnered with community leaders and organisations to jointly produce a strategy and a plan of action, subsequently called the "drug market initiative."

As a first step, actors in the project sought to understand the narrative and social norms that ruled the current situation and the drug market in the area. They discovered community–police relations, as well as those of the police with youth involved in the drug market, were governed by a series of stereotypes on both sides that were impairing cooperation. On the one hand, the police harboured the belief that the community “protected” criminals and had no incentive to do anything about the drug market there, and that a lack of moral standards was present. On the other, the community perceived the police to be overtly repressive, historically racist, and uninterested in what happened in the community. Understanding these narratives through shared actor involvement was key to the success of the programme.

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18 All information on the High Point Programme comes from Kennedy and Wong (2005).
enabling actors to realise that they routinely misunderstood each other (police, community, and drug dealers) and that the first step would be to air these misconceptions; only after this could cooperation ensue. Meetings were held between the community and the police. It was important for local people to recognise that they too could have a stake and a say in the direction their community took if they realised their potential to control what happened.

Thus, the project was developed in three stages, all discussed with the community. First, the community and the police identified those members of the community involved in the drug market. Once this had been achieved, those with serious criminal careers (parole violators, those with serious arrest warrants against them for violent crimes) were arrested. Anyone else involved was advised—through home visits—that their case was being banked pending a future meeting with the community. At the same time, community actors, such as employment offices, social workers, and schools, among others, were mobilised to be able to procure help for participants in the programme. People trusted by drug dealers were also mobilised as contacts and as gatekeepers. Once this had been achieved, dealers were called into a “call-in” with their trusted persons, the community, and the police. The community was the central actor here, not the police. It was communicated to the dealers that the community could not tolerate their activities anymore and that they in no way condoned their illegal enterprises. Surprisingly, a majority of the dealers identified attended the meeting. They were told the police had already documented their activity and they could face serious consequences if they continued, but also that the community wanted them to be a productive and active part of the community and the police did not want to arrest them. They were also told services were available, which were channelled to them immediately if they wanted through a service coordinator.

The results of this programme were significant. Violent crime dropped by up to 29% in some communities. Drug markets did not reappear and overall community relations improved, although many of the dealers went on to reoffend, if not in the same market. With time, the police developed a strategy of presence in the community that helped assure the drug market did not reform. The key issue in the success of the programme was the community’s ability to regain control of what was happening inside it and of what was acceptable behaviour. The programme is interesting because it presents all stages of a successful policy, including a broadly consulted design phase involving academics, members of the community, and authorities. Very importantly, the results have been evaluated and analysed for future improvements. Overall, it is a good example of local action leading to positive results.

Innovating Approaches in Crime Prevention: Australia’s Harm Minimisation Approach

Australia has a longstanding record with policies and initiatives that target drug markets, especially local ones. Indeed, the country’s experience has positively influenced many policies in other developed countries. The National Drug Strategy (NDS) has been in place since 1985 (Government of Australia 2011). This is based heavily on the principle of harm minimisation and tackles all aspects of the drug market: supply, demand, and use. It centres primarily on the periodical production of a framework, the National Drug Strategic Framework (NDSF). It is important to mention that these frameworks are agreed on and designed through extensive consultation periods with a diversity of actors, which include communities, professional associations, academics, and government agencies. To date, three NDSFs have been designed. The first covered the period 1998–1999 to 2003–2004 and the second 2004–2009; the newest one covers the period 2010–2015. They all represent an integrated approach to tackling the issue of drugs in Australian communities.

The newest NDSF (2010–2015) has some important characteristics that deserve mention. First, it is evidence driven. It recognises the importance of evidence-led programmes and policy design and, as such, highlights the importance of solid data as a key ingredient in decision making. This is reinforced by the establishment of three research centres linked directly to the NDS, namely, the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre (NDARC), the National Drug Research Institute (NDRI), and the National Centre for Education and Training on Addiction (NCETA). Research is thus the basis for any evidence-based programme. The NDSF is also holistic, in that it seeks to reduce the supply of drugs, the demand for them, and the wider social harm that comes from it. It is also focused on partnerships between different sectors, in this case health and law enforcement, in an attempt to address the complex issue of drugs and to build long-term capacity (Government of Australia 2011). Figure 6.3 shows the basis of Australia’s approach.

The harm reduction component of the NDS outlines specific goals to be attained through prevention, particularly at the community level, and also underscores the importance of working at the family and individual level to minimise the harm drugs and alcohol cause. This is achieved through a series of initiatives such as evidence-based education campaigns, peer-based preventive approaches, accessible treatment for users, and other approaches.
New Initiatives from Different Regions:
New Roles for Prevention and Paths to Explore

In recent times, there has been debate about the negative results of traditional wars on drugs as carried out on many fronts in the world. Increasingly, the repressive approach used to tackle the drug trade has come under criticism from academics, politicians, and community organisations. Patterns of drug production and consumption, while constantly changing, show few signs of decreasing. Massive investments have been made in “war on drugs” efforts, with few results so far. As a result, a number of initiatives have emerged that, beyond community-level organisation, seek to address the drug trade and drug production in a different way. Proposed new approaches include an emphasis on prevention and on the health costs of drugs.

In 2009, a consortium of high-level politicians and intellectuals (headed by former President of Colombia César Gaviria, former President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo, and former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso) created the Latin American Initiative on Drugs and Democracy. This seeks to re-evaluate and reframe the war on drugs and makes a clear statement regarding the lack of effective results to date. Broadly, the initiative pushes for an open debate regarding the decriminalisation of certain soft drugs, such as cannabis. It is critical of prohibitionist policies and eradication programmes that seek to eliminate the totality of the drug trade and claims the pursuit of this policy has generated more violence and has had little effect on patterns of consumption. It also claims the drug trade as it is now has undermined the power of the state in many cases and has the power to corrupt many others, and that it fuels other forms of criminal activity, such as armed violence, gun trafficking, and overall violence among gangs and between the gangs and the state.

Along with a policy of decriminalisation, the initiative advocates for the implementation of harm reduction as a more humane way to tackle the drug issue. This view demands support for drug users, such as free injection sites like the controversial one in the East Side neighbourhood of Vancouver, Canada, opened by the city government, which has generated legal battles both for and against. The initiative also calls for broad community participation as well as cooperation from the health sector, the media, and the education sector, to prevent the use of and trade in narcotics alongside decriminalisation. Thus, the initiative presents five main points (Government of Australia 2011):
1. To transform addicts from illegal buyers to patients of the health system.
2. To assess, from a scientific and medical perspective, the decriminalisation of cannabis for personal use.
3. To reduce consumption through educational, preventive, and informational programmes aimed primarily at youths.
4. To focus repressive measures on organised crime itself and not on drugs.
5. To realign policies relating to cultivation with complete alternative development strategies.

Point three of this initiative is particularly relevant for crime prevention, in that it makes this central to the development of drug policies in the future. On both the consumption and the production fronts, prevention is fast becoming one of the main ingredients in any policy prescription. Tackling consumption may work well as a form of prevention of future crimes and drug production.

The International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) includes a number of international organisations that seek to steer debates on drug policy towards harm reduction and away from traditional repressive measures. IDPC was formed in 2007 as a forum for policy analysis and technical assistance for national and international partners. It actively promotes evidence-based action at an international level and bases its work around five core policy principles (Government of Australia 2011):

1. Drug policies should be developed through a structured and objective assessment of priorities and evidence.
2. All activities should be undertaken in full compliance with international human rights law.
3. Drug policies should focus on reducing harmful consequences rather than the scale of drug use and markets.
4. Policy and activities should seek to promote the social inclusion of marginalised groups and not focus on punitive measures towards them.
5. Governments should build open and constructive relationships with civil society in the discussion and delivery of their strategies.

Another front in this attempt to change the way countries and the international community face the threat of drugs is the Vienna Declaration (The International AIDS Society, ICSDP, and the British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS 2010). Launched in the process of the XVIII International AIDS Conference in Vienna, which took place in July 2010, this argues that current wars on drugs are generating enormous costs and preventing control of the AIDS epidemic by criminalising users. This results in ever-increasing rates of incarceration which, in the long and medium term, harm communities’ sense of identity and

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**Box 6.3 The European Forum on Urban Safety—The Vienna Resolution**

In 2011, the European Forum on Urban Safety (EFUS) and other partners launched the Vienna Resolution. Based on the principles espoused in the Vienna Declaration and other recent international forums, this seeks to address drug trafficking and consumption in cities guided by human rights, public health, international cooperation, the right treatment of drug users, and local empowerment. The main principles of the Resolution thus are (EFUS 2011):

- Reinforce partnerships and cooperation so everyone (including drug users) can contribute to a common approach.
- Foster a global debate on controlled decriminalisation of these health issues (drug consumption and in particular addiction to psychotropic substances).
- Target repressive more clearly towards control of markets, especially international ones, which means recognising drug trafficking, and the underground economy linked to it, as one of the most destructive factors threatening social cohesion and coexistence in our cities.
- Constantly favour and strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the scientific, political, and technical arenas.
- Facilitate the work of local officials when it comes to adapting treatments offered to the actual needs of affected citizens.
- Focus any prevention or therapeutic approach more specifically towards women. Vulnerable groups must also benefit from specific and adapted policies.
- Consider therapeutic monitoring as an effective alternative to imprisonment, but also offer adapted treatments to inmates.
- Ensure any national or international policy takes into account that drug trafficking and consumption do not affect only large cities but also small and medium ones which, throughout Europe, are currently struggling to tackle these issues and are subject to flagrant inequalities in terms of financial means and health capacities.
security. It also argues that current drug policies are expensive and show modest results. Human rights are at the core of the Vienna Declaration, which proposes a number of axes of action:

- Undertake a transparent review of the effectiveness of current drug policies.
- Implement and evaluate a science-based public health approach to address the individual and community harms stemming from illicit drug use.
- Decriminalise drug users, scale up evidence-based drug dependence treatment options, and abolish ineffective compulsory drug treatment centres that violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Unequivocally endorse and scale up funding for the implementation of the comprehensive package of HIV interventions spelled out in the WHO, UNODC, and UNAIDS Target Setting Guide (2009).
- Meaningfully involve members of the affected community in developing, monitoring and implementing services and policies that affect their lives.

These international-level initiatives are important for crime prevention and community safety because they substantially change the focus of drug policy from an explicitly repressive one to one that is more concerned with communities’ wellbeing and with tackling drugs as a public health issue and not only as a criminal matter. Within this vision, it is very possible for crime prevention and community safety to contribute to the development of innovative and cost-effective policy ideas in order to help governments deal with their local drug issues. Empowering communities at the national and international level, as reflected by the High Point case and the above-mentioned initiatives can have positive results.

Conclusions

The drug trade in developed countries has changed substantially. While heroin and cocaine remain drugs whose production is heavily localised, cannabis, ATS, and ecstasy (as well as other synthetic drugs) are increasingly being produced and consumed locally, particularly the former two. This is a result of policies that have made it more difficult for traffickers to move drugs internationally. This has not meant fewer drugs are being produced or consumed. Indeed, UNODC (2010) reports no significant decreases in international drug production. Rather, drug producers have begun settling in communities in the developed world, many times bringing with them a series of problems which, at the community level, derive from the drugs themselves as well as from overtly repressive state responses and other prevalent socioeconomic factors. Prevention and community intervention can be a sustainable and effective strategy at the community level to address these issues, and some programmes have already been designed to involve local communities in the process and to rely less on repressive measures to deal with drug production and consumption. It is important to stress the centrality of communities in the decision-making process and in the implementation of drug policies. Positive results from these initiatives demand more attention be paid to preventive measures and harm reduction strategies in the future.

At the international level, a debate is taking place regarding the efficacy and cost effectiveness of traditional repressive drug policies. Arguments against repressive measures are often backed by good data that show that traditional wars on drugs may not be having the expected results. Actors in all sectors have become aware of the need to reassess the current situation and create spaces for debate on possible alternative approaches. A preventive approach to drug abuse and a focus on the health issues may yield better results. It is encouraging to see prevention and community-based action becoming more engrained in what used to be a policy area focused mainly on repression and incarceration. The case of Canada provides an important illustration of this: Canada has in recent times developed a drug production market that is now involved in the export of narcotics and not just local consumption, and this presents important challenges. The next section provides an in-depth look into how this country has responded to these challenges and the potential shape of its future drug policies.
Illicit Drug Production: Unsafe and Unhealthy Communities

“It is increasingly clear that drug control must become an essential element of joint efforts to achieve peace, security and development. At the same time, there must be reinforcement of the international community’s commitment to shared responsibility and the basic principles of health and human rights” UNODC (2011, 8).

According to the World Drug Report (UNODC 2011), drugs generate crime, violence, and other social problems that harm communities. In some regions, illicit drug use is contributing to the rapid spread of infectious diseases like HIV and hepatitis: “we are also witnessing more and more acts of violence, conflicts and terrorist activities fuelled by drug trafficking and organized crime” (ibid., 9). Violence or the threat of violence by organised crime groups is a significant threat to public safety (CISC 2008). Organised illicit drug activities create a general sense of insecurity in communities and have a variety of significant effects on individuals and society. Illicit drug activities, unlike any other criminal activity, fuel violence, and can involve violence between traffickers over control of territory. Socioeconomic costs associated with the illicit drug trade include property crimes, assaults, and homicides. Illicit drug use also has a number of adverse health effects, including the spread of infectious diseases, drug addiction, prenatal developmental problems, and public health risks from the illegal dumping of toxic by-products from the manufacture of illicit drugs, such as methamphetamines (ibid.).

Violence is present to some degree at every stage of the drug industry, from production to retail marketing (Reuter et al. 2004). At the production end, violence can be used to create policy environments sympathetic to drug production, to regulate competition among drug producers, and to coerce population segments into the production and processing of drugs.

In the case of Canada, a major concern is the relationship between drugs, organised crime, and violence. A federal government study of organised crime concluded that the drug trade has a significant impact on Canadians and longstanding socioeconomic effects, and entails substantial violence (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2001). These effects are seen in different contexts: on the one hand, the economic costs, including for health care (e.g. for HIV and AIDS and hepatitis), lost productivity, property

<table>
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<th>Table 6.1 Social Costs of Drug Markets</th>
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<td>SOCIAL STABILITY, HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION</td>
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crime, and enforcement, are estimated to exceed C$5 billion annually (ibid.). On the other, substance abuse is one of seven criminogenic factors contributing to criminal behaviour. Nearly two-thirds of offenders entering the federal corrections system have drug abuse problems, and an estimated 53% participate in substance abuse programmes while serving their sentences (Rehm et al. 2006).

It appears there has been a decline in the number of homicides linked to drug-related activities. According to Statistics Canada (2009), there were 28 homicides in 2008 that were linked to the victim’s illegal activity, such as the drug trade and prostitution, down from 58 in 2007. However, drug-related offences overall increased between 2009 and 2010, driven mainly by cannabis (Figure 6.4) (ibid.). Part of the overall increase in the rate of drug crime can be attributed to increases in youth (aged twelve to seventeen years old) accused of drug offences (Figure 6.5). In 2007, youth aged sixteen and seventeen years were among those with the highest rates of drug-related offences (ibid.). While the rate of adults charged with drug offences has also risen over the past decade, the increase has been much less than that for youth.

Young people are significantly vulnerable to the illicit drug market, and can be and are directly involved in the production, exportation, trafficking, and purchase of drugs (Richter-White 2003). Organised crime’s involvement in drugs provides for easy availability of illicit substances and the increased use of certain drugs by youth (Adlaf et al. 1995). The most direct harms from licit and illicit drugs occur in high-risk
The Costs of Drugs (Office of the Auditor General 2001, Rehm et al. 2006)

Canada spends CA$2.3 billion on enforcement (police, courts, and corrections) and CA$1.1 billion on direct health care costs every year dealing with illegal drugs.

The Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse estimates the cost of illicit drug abuse at CA$22.8 billion per year, or CA$725 for every Canadian.

In Vancouver, an estimated 70% percent of criminal activity is associated with illicit drugs. About 63% of federal offenders have drug abuse problems.

The largest cost to Correction Service Canada (CSC) is incarceration. The most serious offence, by 17% (3,400) of offenders, is drug-related. CSC estimates that about 7% of its offenders are associated with organised crime.

Illicit Drug Production in Canada

Illicit drug production is part of a complex and highly profitable illegal system involving countless countries around the world. Canada is one of many producing countries, and has become a prominent manufacturing location for cannabis, methamphetamine, and MDMA. The Canadian federal government estimates illegal drug revenues at CA$7 billion to CA$10 billion a year. The Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey (Government of Canada 2009) estimates that, over the past five years, the reported rate of use of illicit drugs overall has decreased, attributable primarily to the decreased rate of past-year cannabis use. However, Canada remains in a strong global position in the methamphetamine and cannabis production and export trade, with production remaining consistent with or increasing slightly as compared with previous years (RCMP 2010). As such, Canada continues to face major challenges, as profits derived from the Canadian illicit drug market continue to drive most organised crime in the country and organised crime groups continue to adapt production and distribution methods in response to law enforcement pressures and activities (ibid.).

Drug Production

It appears drug production in Canada remains strong despite declining rates of drug use among the population. In terms of cannabis, the 2009 Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey (CADUMS) showed marked differences between drug use by youths and adults. In 2009, there was a decrease in the prevalence of past-year use of cannabis across all respondent groups – males, females, youth, and adults – as compared with 2008. However, it clearly demonstrated that prevalence of use among youth (26.3%) remained higher than that among adults (7.6%). While rates of possession and trafficking of cannabis have been lower in recent years than during the 1970s, production of cannabis has risen substantially. Some of this increase may be attributed to the existence of “marijuana grow ops” (RCMP 2010), indoor or outdoor facilities where marijuana plants are illegally cultivated. Not only have these types of operations been associated with violent crime, but also they can also generate safety hazards, health problems, and economic losses for members of the community.

Annual Canadian cannabis production is estimated to range from 1,399 to 3,498 tons (Government of the US and Government of Canada 2008). Production continues to be predominant in Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia, where a significant decline in grow operations has been documented since 2003 owing to increased enforcement and effective partnerships with governmental and NGOs (Statistics Canada 2009). In fact, in 2009, domestically produced cannabis continued to be the most seized illicit drug in Canada, in terms of both frequency and quantity, and in 2008 almost one-half of cannabis resin seizures in the Americas were made by Canada (899 kg) (RCMP 2010). It is interesting to note that the amount of cannabis produced in Canada tends to exceed domestic demand (2009–2010).

Canada has seen a significant resurgence in the use, trafficking, and production of methamphetamine throughout the country. This has occurred mainly since 2003, as organised crime interests in the methamphetamine trade have grown significantly. In August 2005, the Canadian government responded to these concerns by reclassifying methamphetamine under Schedule III of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) (from Schedule I). Methamphetamine is now considered a higher threat...
Methamphetamine is manufactured in clandestine laboratories with various production capacities. Availability remained strong across Canada in 2009, reflecting steady production capable of supplying both domestic and world markets, especially Japan and Australia. One reason for this situation is that, globally, methamphetamine continues to be one of the most desired ATS (RCMP 2010). At the same time, the flow of Canadian-produced methamphetamine to the US is limited, with seizures increasing. An estimated 97% of methamphetamine seized in Canada originates from domestic laboratories (Government of the US and Government of Canada 2008). However, over the past few years, there has been a decrease in the number of methamphetamine laboratory seizures. Meanwhile, the number of “super labs” located in both western and eastern Canada has increased dramatically.

The vast majority of clandestine laboratories raided in Canada continue to be located in urban areas, primarily in the Vancouver region, the Greater Toronto Area, and the Montreal region (Figure 6.6). In addition, super labs, used for the mass production of certain synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine, have been located by the police in British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec (CISC 2008). While there is longstanding involvement of outlaw motorcycle gangs in methamphetamine production and trafficking, independent groups also are active across the country (ibid.). Such groups operating in the Quebec region continue to specialise in producing methamphetamine tablets for the regional market as well as for elsewhere in Canada. In western Canada, aboriginal street gangs are active in methamphetamine trafficking in both urban centres and their communities, and Asian criminal networks have become increasingly involved in the trade, mainly in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. Organised crime in Canada has also exploited the addictive properties of methamphetamine as a means to market other synthetic substances (Government of the US and Government of Canada 2008). Since 2003, methamphetamine, among other substances, has been a secondary ingredient in ecstasy tablets produced in domestic laboratories. The lacing of other drugs, such as cocaine, marijuana, and heroin, with methamphetamine, either to cut costs or possibly to accelerate addiction, was observed between 2004 and 2006. However, despite evident increases, offences in this category accounted for only 14% of all drug crimes in 2007 (RCMP 2010).

Actions Undertaken by the Government of Canada

Reports suggest Canada has generally followed the US approach to the international drug trade, yet has devoted more resources to treatment than to enforcement (Leduc and Lee 2003). This is seen in Canada’s National Drug Strategy, launched in 1987 and renewed in 1992 and 1998, which emphasises reducing demand and increasing the number of effective treatment programmes. This focuses on the abuse of alcohol and pharmaceuticals as well as street drugs.

Canada is party to a number of international instruments, including the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotrophic Substances. In 1990, shortly after it

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21 Clandestine laboratories capable of producing ten pounds of methamphetamine in twenty four hours.
Box 6.6  Illicit Drugs: The Federal Government’s Role (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2001)

Federal government has not set clear objectives.
- Recommendation: To achieve the desired results of any programme, the government must set clear and measurable expectations or objectives.

Departmental reports lack information on results; law enforcement statistics need improvement; Canada does not know how well it is managing illicit drugs.
- Recommendation: The government should improve on sparse and outdated information on the nature, extent, and consequences of the illicit drug problem in Canada; develop performance information that includes costs, expectations, and results; and report on a comprehensive basis to Parliament and Canadians on how well Canada is dealing with illicit drugs.

Good leadership and coordination are essential.
- Recommendation: Implement an effective coordinating structure; establish common objectives and a common strategy; respond quickly to emerging issues; ensure collective performance expectations are stated clearly; ensure performance is measured and reported; report comprehensive performance information; and recommend changes that cross departmental lines.

Need a balance between the two different approaches: reducing demand for and supply of illicit drugs.
- Recommendation: Achieving this balance means integrating the work of all players involved in enforcement, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, and harm reduction.
drug strategy to focus specifically on a single class of drugs. This is an RCMP-led programme designed to prevent the production and distribution of illegal synthetic drugs in Canada and to reduce the overall influence of organised crime on drug trafficking in Canada (Public Safety Canada n.d.a.). It targets the illicit synthetic drug industry on three fronts: through enforcement, deterrence, and prevention, and also aims to inhibit the diversion of precursor chemicals from foreign and domestic sources.

At the same time, the government has committed approximately CA$102 million from the National Anti-Drug Strategy to implement the Enforcement Action Plan (ibid.). This seeks to increase law enforcement’s capacity to seize grow operations and synthetic drug production and distribution operations. Another component is the National Framework for Action to Reduce the Harms Associated with Alcohol and Other Drugs and Substances. This links federal, provincial, territorial, municipal, and community initiatives to common principles, goals, and priorities, with Public Safety Canada acting as the coordinating body between health, law enforcement, policing, and corrections.

**Prevention**

Illicit drug production and trafficking pose a significant threat to an individual’s right to security and safety. The drug trade has destroyed families and communities around the world and had adverse impacts on the socioeconomic wellbeing of citizens and of certain states. Governments are increasingly focusing their attention on building safer communities through prevention strategies that provide a means for ensuring stability, upholding and protecting human rights, and addressing the root causes of drug production and consumption. According to the World Drug Report (UNODC 2011), there has been progress in prevention through family skills training, youth programmes, and HIV prevention, treatment, and care. Awareness-raising initiatives on illicit drugs and the adoption of legislation that provides alternatives to incarceration are complementing these efforts. At the same time, the international community has called for more comprehensive and integrated approaches to help confront the global threat from drugs more effectively. This entails better data and analysis to enrich policy and the building of partnerships such as through regional cooperation, but also governments and civil society working together to invest more in development, productive employment, and increased safety.

Historically, Canada has incorporated prevention into its national anti-drug platform. More recently, the National Anti-Drug Strategy shows a strong emphasis on prevention. The Speech from the Throne in October 2007 highlights that the strategy is a focused initiative whose goal is to “contribute to safer and healthier communities through coordinated efforts to prevent use, treat dependency and reduce production and distribution of illicit drugs” (quoted in Department of Justice of Canada 2010). Some important points in the strategy include its focus on promoting and strengthening the use of alternatives to incarceration, with a particular emphasis on youths, indigenous men and women, and street prostitutes; building knowledge and awareness among criminal justice, health and social service practitioners, and the general public on drug treatment courts; and collecting information and data in order to promote best practices and the continuing refinement of approaches.

Considering the National Anti-Drug Strategy has not yet been evaluated in terms of outcomes, it is difficult to assess its effectiveness. However, in terms of prevention, it appears its Prevention Action Plan is comprehensive in nature. First, mandates to address crime prevention and drug education and awareness

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The Prevention Action Plan focuses on preventing illicit drug use among young people. It provides information to those most affected by drug use, including parents, young people, educators, law enforcement authorities, and communities. The Prevention Action Plan will:

- Refocus existing community-based drug use prevention strategies, programmes, and services for youth.
- Provide information directly to parents, educators, and health professionals.
- Develop materials for school-based awareness and prevention strategies for elementary and secondary school students.
- Discourage illicit drug use through a new national public awareness campaign.
- Provide financial help to communities for local projects to tackle the growing challenge of illicit drug use among young people.

The government of Canada has committed CA$30 million in new funding over five years to support the Prevention Action Plan. This new funding will bolster existing prevention efforts.
Box 6.8 The Safe Streets & Communities Act (Department of Justice of Canada 2011)

Establish mandatory minimum penalties for serious drug offences when they are carried out for organised crime purposes, or if they involve targeting youth. The proposed legislation supports the National Anti-Drug Strategy’s efforts to combat illicit drug production and distribution and help disrupt criminal enterprises by targeting drug suppliers. For the purpose of this initiative, serious drug offences comprise production, trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, importing and exporting, and possession for the purpose of exporting.

Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to establish mandatory minimum penalties for the aforementioned offences for drugs listed in Schedule I, such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, and in Schedule II, such as marijuana. Generally, the mandatory minimum penalty would apply where there is an aggravating factor, including where the production of the drug constitutes a potential security, health, or safety hazard. Also, the maximum sentence for production of Schedule II drugs, for example marijuana, is increased from seven to fourteen years.
There has been much debate surrounding the impact of Bill C-10 and the Penalties for Organised Drug Crime Act on prevention. On the one hand, it has been argued it advances a repressive approach and removes judicial discretion, preventing judges from considering underlying factors affecting at-risk populations. Moreover, it will do little to prevent crime and violence, rehabilitate offenders, or compensate victims. On the other hand, the government states the bill is crucial for advancing safety and security in communities across Canada, in that it will improve the overall efficiency of the judicial system in tackling illegal drug trafficking, for example. In addition, the government claims Bill C-10 demonstrates a commitment to victims, and further ensures criminals are held accountable for their actions. In any case, if the bill is passed, it will require some time before the potential effects and outcome of the legislation are visible. At the same time, while the bill may have a significant impact on illicit drug production in Canada, it is yet to be seen if it will work with or against existing prevention initiatives around the country, including the National Anti-Drug Strategy, and if prevention will continue to be the foundation for Canada’s focus on building safer communities.
Bustling night-time market at Varanasi, India. Crowds of shoppers and market traders in the hustle and bustle of a city street. Mumbai, India, November 27, 2010. © Gary Martin/iStockphoto
SAFETY IN CITIES:

ICPC’s Global Survey of 2011
Mexico City is one of the largest cities in the world with an estimated population of 25 million.
© Andres Balcazar/iStockphoto
Introduction

The demand for evidence-led action and policymaking is currently high. Pointed and useful information is needed to respond to the safety needs of communities all over the world, and especially in places as diverse and complex as modern cities. Data gathering has become a priority for governments and other organisations, as a tool for decision makers and also to inform and validate policies. A lack of information and a disregard for collecting it can lead to costly and unsuccessful policy choices. In the attempt to gather information on the role and action of local authorities in crime prevention and community safety in a systematic manner, ICPC in 2011 launched the Global Survey on Safety in Cities. This is the first survey of its kind and seeks to collect vital information on community safety and crime prevention in cities. It now offers the first database on safety in cities around the world, which will facilitate comparative analyses of local initiatives. In this chapter of the International Report, we present some of the main findings of the Global Survey for the first time.

Methodology and Survey Design

The Global Survey on Safety in Cities was designed as a tool to gather information on urban crime prevention internationally and as such for response by those in charge of crime prevention policies and/or public safety at the city/municipal level. In this sense, the Global Survey is an “expert survey.” It was designed to be used in a web-based format and was written in four languages—English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish—in order to make it as accessible as possible.

The Global Survey is divided into three main sections. The first collected data on general socioeconomic characteristics of respondent cities as well as confidential information on the person responding (name, address, place of work, position, etc.). Data related to municipal population, budget, and rural/urban nature were also collected, as well as responses related to the nature of the crime problems in the municipality and law enforcement capabilities. This included information on reported crimes and size of police force. The second section collected responses regarding the city’s crime prevention programmes (if they did not have one it explored the reasons why). This was the largest section of the Global Survey and explored the design of the crime prevention programme; its implementation related to budget, partnerships, aims, involvement of different levels of government, funding, and time frame; and diagnostics and evaluations. The main goal of this section was to gather as much detail as possible regarding the prevention programme. Finally, the third section explored respondents’ perceptions regarding crime issues in the community, such as alcohol and drugs, armed violence, and gangs. It also asked what place security had as a priority relative to other issues such as employment, health, and education. The Global Survey was distributed using a snowball technique, using ICPC’s vast international networks.

There are certainly some limitations in a survey of this nature. One potential issue relates to representativity. In order to fully represent the wealth of experiences worldwide, the number of responses would have to be significantly large. There are thousands of cities in the world; clearly, even the most ambitious survey could not hope to obtain a fully representative set of responses, least of all in the first few months. Therefore, we do not claim this survey is representative of the entirety of the world’s cities. We do, however, believe it provides vital information on trends and perspectives within crime prevention which can be useful to decision makers and academics alike. Another barrier is language. By limiting the amount of languages the Global Survey was translated into, the number of possible responses became limited to certain regions and linguistic groups. Translation into languages such as Mandarin, Russian, Arabic, and others would have enabled a larger sample. Nevertheless, the number of responses and countries represented is, even accounting for the limitations described, a significant statement of the importance security and, more specifically, crime prevention have gained in recent times.

22 ICPC is very grateful to all its partners and friends for support provided in the diffusion and promotion of the Global Survey.
ICPC is still receiving responses to the survey. The cut-off date for this publication was October 25, 2011, and the data do not reflect responses from after this time. After the cut-off date, a cleanup process began whereby we identified potential “fake” or “empty” responses. Fake answers were those that provided obvious false data (e.g. municipal budget: “1000,000,000,000,000”); empty responses were those where the respondent began with his/her personal information but did not respond to anything else; after a further unsuccessful contact with the respondent to encourage them to respond, the entry was deleted. These lost responses amounted to a total of 6% of all responses.

### The Survey: General Descriptive Data from Respondents

A total of 174 full responses were collected for the Global Survey in a five-month period. Significantly, thirty-four countries are represented: 17% of the world’s countries (Table 7.1 shows the response rate by region). This is a significant number and makes the results all the more useful. Most of the respondents were urban, with 59% claiming to be so and 37% mixed. This reflects the realities of urbanisation that have become prevalent in the past few decades. With a majority of people living in cities, their problems and issues have become central to crime prevention.

The three most reported crimes (Figure 7.1) are theft, property crime, and assault. This gives us a notion of potential areas of focus for prevention policies. Municipalities are to a very large extent responsible for their public safety. Figure 7.2 shows up to 88% of such respondents are in charge, to different levels, of public safety programmes. Local governments continue to be entrusted with and involved in public safety. This is an important advance but must be reinforced by ensuring they have enough capacity to deal with crime threats. This is especially true where local governments face important threats from, for example, organised crime.

It is of note that, in many cases, the municipality is not the sole responsible actor in the provision of public safety at the municipal level. Figure 7.3 shows the level of involvement of other national actors, such as the central government and provinces/states, with responsibility shared almost equally.

The source of funding for public safety programmes is also an important matter, as many times it determines what the budget is used for. Different political agendas may create conflict when the budget is shared, and limited oversight may also create inefficient policy. Figure 7.4 shows the main sources of funding for local public safety programmes. We can see most of the money for these programmes comes from the municipal budget (67%), followed by an almost equal distribution between central and provincial/state governments, with 14% and 11% each. Thus, municipalities are very involved in providing a functional public safety programme from the financial perspective. Local governments need the full support of the national government and other levels of government in order to fulfil this responsibility.
A topic of interest to ICPC is the need for locally based crime observatories and monitoring centres. ICPC has been very involved with projects such as these and is also in the process of designing a methodology for the certification of observatories according to international standards of quality. Therefore, a question was posed in the Global Survey relating to the presence of observatories and monitoring centres. The response (Figure 7.5) is encouraging: over 50% of respondents claimed to have a monitoring centre or observatory. Even if this means only a modest effort at gathering crime data, it is indeed a positive trend that can be reinforced in the future as a prevention tool.

**Crime Prevention in Cities**

The main goal of the Global Survey is to create information regarding crime prevention in urban settings. Figure 7.6 shows what percentage of municipalities has a crime prevention or community safety strategy. It is encouraging to see almost three-quarters of respondents indicate the presence of a strategy of crime prevention or community safety in their community. In the cases where no strategy was present, respondents were asked why this was so. Figure 7.7 shows their answers. The most cited reasons for not having a prevention or community safety programme were by almost equal degrees lack of political motivation and lack of financial backing. In third place, we find lack of training, which underscores the importance of capacity building at the local level.

The main goals of community safety and prevention programmes respond to the local needs of the population (see Figure 7.8). Theft is the most targeted crime by programmes respondents described. Interestingly, health issues such as substance abuse and safety in school are also given importance, as are vulnerable populations and road safety; these issues are found in many communities, especially those of an urban nature. Organised crime is often the responsibility of the central government, and this is reflected in the low level of centrality organised crime and human trafficking have in these programmes, even though, as we have seen in this Report, human trafficking can be targeted successfully at the local level through prevention strategies.
The next logical question relates to the kind of prevention strategies implemented as part of the prevention programme. The mechanisms available for prevention are many, although local programmes often focus on awareness campaigns. This is followed by situational crime prevention. Figure 7.9 illustrates this. Social or local crime prevention is also widely used, as it is within the reach of local governments to work to foster social cohesion and create environments of trust in the community. A good example of this is the High Point programme discussed in Chapter 6 dealing with drugs in developed countries. Involving the community in these types of programmes is very important in successful crime prevention, as is the involvement of other actors. It is encouraging that close to 94% of respondents claim to have partnerships built into their programmes. In most cases (90%), the partner is the police. Close to 75% are partnered with educational services and other neighbourhood associations. This points to a higher community involvement when crime prevention policies are in place. It is important to point out that close to 60% of programmes count the private sector among their partners. ICPC has been working for some time now to promote this kind of partnership, and its latest project in Colombia is a good example of this (see Figure 7.10 and Box 7.2).

Different actors can be involved at different stages of the strategy, that is, in the design, implementation, and/or evaluation. The Global Survey asked respondents at what stage partners are involved.
Box 7.2 Public–Private Partnerships: ICPC’s Experience in Bogota, Colombia

ICPC’s approach lies in the mobilisation of a range of stakeholders from different sectors (national and local governments, civil society, private sector, the media, etc.) to develop participatory strategies, whereby every actor bring their own expertise and experience to contribute to crime prevention. From a few years ago, ICPC has been private–public partnership as a collaborative trend that can have a positive impact on crime reduction, related not only to businesses but also to the community as a whole.

In 2011, ICPC partnered with the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota and the World Bank to develop a guide to foster public–private partnership in community safety and violence prevention. The private sector holds a key position from which to contribute positively to the wellbeing and safety of communities. Businesses and companies have assets and expertise that can contribute significantly to crime prevention (e.g. project management and marketing skills, media influence, creativity and innovation, access to technology and resources, etc.).

Using this guide, ICPC, the Chamber of Commerce, and the World Bank seek to inspire and foster the private sector to get involved in crime and violence prevention projects that will benefit communities. The publication presents a broad panorama on how businesses are becoming more and more concerned with improving social and living conditions (corporate social responsibility) through initiatives to create safer communities. It provides a full compendium of examples of practices from different regions (the Americas, Africa, Asia, Oceania, etc.) where the private sector is participating in projects in crime and violence prevention. Moreover, the guide explains step-by-step how businesses and companies concerned with community safety can get involved in crime prevention initiatives.
struggle with access to solid data. Often, authorities must make decisions based on not much more than good knowledge of local issues. This approach has its limitations, and more solid information is needed to inform programmes and form priorities. The Global Survey asked respondents to list their most common sources of data (Figure 7.14 shows the results). Not surprisingly, the majority use data provided by the police, with criminal justice statistics and victimisation surveys coming next. Data from social services and other organisations are also used, but to a lesser extent.

Results are the driving force of any policy, and crime prevention is not immune to this. We asked respondents to list the results of the policies they had implemented. Figure 7.15 presents the results. Most initiatives report positive outcomes of crime reduction. This is further enhanced by reports of a decrease in perceptions of insecurity and also a strengthening of social cohesion. Close to 26% of programmes do not report any results yet. There is a possibility the responses to this question are somewhat over-optimistic. They do, however, give sustenance to the principle that crime prevention pays off by actually reducing crime and fear of crime in the long term.

It would seem so far from the information presented in this chapter that the news is very good regarding crime prevention and community safety policies. A majority of respondents do have a strategy in place, and this has produced results that show a reduction in crime rates and fear of crime and perceptions of insecurity. However, there is one more component to a successful strategy: the verification and evaluation of results, policies, and programmes. The results of the survey in this area are less encouraging. Overall, verification and evaluation are not widespread (Figure 7.16 shows the results). Almost 76% of all programmes are not independently verified. A similar picture emerges when we look at responses for evaluations (Figure 7.17): over 60% of strategies are
not evaluated. This brings into question the results claimed for many of the programmes and strategies in place and is an important deficiency that needs further attention.

**Perceptions at the Municipal Level**

The last section of the Global Survey asked respondents to answer a number of questions regarding what they perceive to be the most important safety issues in their communities. Figure 7.18 shows health remains the number one priority, but this is followed very closely by security. Indeed, the difference between the two is a mere 1.2%, which could well be within the margin of error. These two are followed by poverty, education, and jobs. These results show clearly that security has become a priority for many communities.

The Global Survey also posed a question regarding armed violence (Figure 7.19). The results show a large amount of municipalities are concerned about this issue: 14% see it as a “very big problem.” The top five categories (mid to large problem, or six to ten) make up 40% of responses. This means 40% of respondents are concerned about armed violence in their communities, with some significance. This can have serious implications for future policy and also for how we conceive of arms at the local level.
Alcohol abuse shows similar patterns, as is evident in Figure 7.20: 62% of respondents are in the top five categories (from somewhat to very concerned about this issue).

Drug trafficking is also an issue that is growing in importance at the local level. As Chapter 6 showed, this issue is no longer situated only in the developing world, but is more and more present in every country in the world. As such, the top five categories for this question take up just over 60% of responses. Once again, the majority of respondents are concerned about the effects of drug trafficking in their communities.

Lastly, gangs also seem to be a priority concern. Figure 7.22 shows the result for this question: as we can see, this issue also shows a high level of preoccupation.

**Conclusions**

The first results of the Global Survey on Safety in Cities both are encouraging and point to areas where more work is needed to achieve better results. The Survey shows an important presence of crime prevention and community safety programmes and ideas at the local level. It paints a picture of a wide variety of strategies which not only include national actors at all levels but also seem to be driving towards larger implication of other actors, such as the private sector. Amid this good news, though, there is a need for more diversity of strategies. We see an exaggerated focus on awareness campaigns and less on other equally successful strategies such as job training and direct work with potential victims and perpetrators. Meanwhile, it is encouraging to see a high level of consultation and community participation in decision-making processes, and there is evidence of wider use of data-gathering options such as monitoring and observatories, as well as consultation with other sources of information for the purpose of strategy formation. All these results point to potential good results in crime reduction and building a safer environment for communities.
Box 7.3 The Future of the Global Survey

There is more information in the Global Survey that has yet to be explored: this is a tool and a source of information for the long term. In the near future, ICPC will be able to present regional and country-specific analyses based on the Survey results. As responses increase, new waves of the Survey will be launched as a way to access information over time and thus be able to make more nuanced analyses.

However, the results also show an important deficiency: a very low level of verification and evaluation of crime prevention programmes and strategies. This is a serious matter, one which all actors involved need to address. Evaluation is as important as community participation to the continuing success of policies, yet only around 25% of respondents stated their programmes were independently evaluated or verified. This is clear evidence of an important area for future focus. Evaluation and review of policies is an integral part of the crime prevention process and must look at three main components, to be included in all evaluations if possible:
1. How well policies and programmes have been implemented, and have achieved the objectives set.
2. The immediate outcomes of projects, both expected and unexpected.
3. The long-term outcomes and impact of these programmes.

This can be done within the framework of performance measurement, that is, a practice which aims to identify factors that may have an impact on the performance of a programme to inform decision makers on better ways to take action regarding their policies. This relies on the generation of long- and short-term performance indicators and data, and also reviews the financial accountability of programmes and their clarity of definition and purpose. This is one tool of many that can be implemented as a way to assess and evaluate the results and performance of a given safety programme. Many countries have made advances in integrating crime prevention and community safety into mainstream policymaking, but much remains to be done in terms of formalising evaluation as an integral part of this process.

Gangs, armed violence, trafficking, and substance abuse generally are important concerns at the community level, according to the Global Survey. This needs to be taken into consideration when devising community safety strategies, as these need to deal with issues that may be much more complex that the ones traditionally facing communities. Armed violence is a very good case in point: it is an important concern for respondents and one that requires stronger partnerships at the national and international level as well as mobilisation of all community actors in a concerted manner. New prevention strategies may have to be defined to tackle this issue, and this is a task for the prevention community to take on in the very near future.
Crime prevention is becoming one of the central tenets in crime policy. In the past decade, and since the publication of the UN Guidelines, much progress has been made in integrating crime prevention into evidence-based policy design. Today, prevention initiatives are common at all levels of government and community organisation. Still, much remains to be done to make prevention more widespread. ICPC’s 2012 International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety explores a number of important issues that can help in attaining such a goal. This third edition of the International Report addresses four very distinct and internationally significant topics.

First, it touches on and analyses human trafficking and exploitation, a crime high on the agendas of governments and organisations alike. It showcases how international attention has generated a large number of laws relating to human trafficking and how these are being translated—slowly—into national action plans. The important role of prevention in these plans is highlighted, as well as progress being made at ground level through two case studies. The world has moved forward quickly to address the issue of human trafficking, as evidenced by the large number of NAPs governments have adopted in the past ten years. However, the crime remains a concern and a challenge, given its global scope. It is important to highlight as well the links between human trafficking and exploitation. There are at least twelve million “modern day slaves in the world,” many of them victims of trafficking. The two phenomena are intertwined and must therefore be addressed together in a holistic manner. Prevention through education, development, and investment can bring about positive changes on both fronts, alongside pointed shorter-term prevention programmes for those at risk.

The Report also looks at the wealth of experience in crime prevention and community safety in informal settlements. As more and more people live in cities than ever before, governments and communities are facing important challenges in making these and their surrounding urban areas safe for their inhabitants. The problems are many, and a variety of approaches have shown good results. What is important to highlight is that community involvement and multi-sectoral partnerships are key ingredients in the success of safety initiatives on the ground, especially in communities affected by high levels of informality and crime. Urbanisation all over the world underscores the importance of addressing the crime and safety issues that the one billion people living in these situations experience on a daily basis.

The Report also analysed two very new arenas in crime prevention: post-conflict and post-disaster scenarios and drug production in developed countries. The aftermath of a natural disaster such as an earthquake or tsunami is a very sensitive time, and rates of some crimes tend to increase in such situations. Weak states can be overrun by the needs of their people; stronger states may also struggle to address emergencies. Aside from the tragic loss of lives and livelihoods that follows a disaster, reconstruction efforts present opportunities to build safer and healthier communities. The inclusion of crime prevention as a guideline for reconstruction and emergency interventions can have, and indeed has had, as in the case of Chile, a positive impact on affected communities.

By the same token, crime prevention has a role to play in post-conflict scenarios. Safety is a key ingredient in lasting peace, and ensuring the safety of the communities involved in and surrounding the conflict is important in the success of any peace or disarmament process. Security is the most important basis on which to rebuild institutions of governance, and developmental crime prevention can be a contributing factor in this process, alongside locally based safety programmes. Both post-conflict and post-disaster scenarios present opportunities to generate, through focused interventions, the opportunity for a more secure and safer reconstruction and for more democratic institutions.

Drug production in developed countries has been increasing recently, and today many such countries are major producers of cannabis and synthetic drugs such as ecstasy and methamphetamines. Communities in these countries are thus experiencing
the effects of active drug markets at the local level. Several initiatives have shown that prevention can help reduce the harm created by drugs in a community. For example, with regard to the production of methamphetamine, it is important to try to restrict the market for precursors as much as possible as a way to limit criminals’ ability to produce the actual drug. Community-based approaches have also shown promise in the prevention (and eradication) of local drug markets, as shown by the results of the High Point experience in the US. By advancing the collective efficacy of the community, it is able in the future to deal better with risk factors. On the other hand, national plans such as those designed by Australia and Canada demonstrate the importance of evidence-driven policymaking and a complete approach that tackles the supply, demand, and health factors involved in the drug trade.

Finally, the International Report presents the very first results of the Global Survey on Safety in Cities, a major effort by ICPC to generate data and information on crime prevention programmes at the international level. The Survey was launched in early 2011 and received a very good rate of response. Close to 200 responses from thirty-four countries were received. There was encouraging news in terms of the prevalence of crime prevention programmes, and further evidence of recent growth in this regard. Many cities also report engaging in partnerships with the public and private sector as well as with local communities. Having said this, much needs to be done in terms of evaluation and verification of programme results. Evaluation needs to be recognised as a key element in any prevention strategy: for initiatives to succeed, they must adhere to solid evaluation procedures that are scientific and reliable, to ensure future programmes can benefit from lessons learnt and improve.

The 2012 International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety is part of ICPC’s long-term vision of contributing to the growth of crime prevention. We sincerely hope, just as in past editions, this iteration of the Report has sparked the initiative, creativity, and imagination of those involved in crime policy at all levels and it will be a call to action to create, now and in the future, safe, cohesive, and healthy communities everywhere.
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Participate in the first global survey conducted by ICPC (www.crime-prevention.intl.org) on municipal strategies for the prevention of crime and community safety!

Urban safety is increasingly becoming a central subject to cities around the world. In order to produce the first global overview of measures developed by municipalities in regards to safety, we ask that you complete this questionnaire. In responding to these questions, you will take part in the first comparative analysis on local crime prevention initiatives developed around the world!

The questionnaire is based on six themes and gathers information on the actions and level of involvement of the municipality/city in crime prevention. It will take you about 30 minutes to answer it.

Please feel free to send any questions/comments when you submit the completed questionnaire. All identifying information about the municipalities (such as its name) will be kept strictly anonymous and will only be used by ICPC for data storage purposes. All potential use of non-anonymous data will be under strict approval by the municipality. This particular information will not be disclosed to other third parties. Anonymous data may be shared with our partners for research purposes. Note that, if permitted, we may contact you after receiving the questionnaire.

If you prefer to complete this questionnaire electronically a copy of the questionnaire can be found at: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/globalsurveyonsafetyincities

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.

Please send or email the completed questionnaire to: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 465, rue Saint-Jean, bureau 803 Montréal (Québec) H2Y 2R6 CANADA

T +1.514.288.6731 F +1.514.288.8763 globalsurvey@crime-prevention-intl.org
Contact Details

Name: ____________________________
Function: _________________________
Address: __________________________
Name of the municipality/city: __________________________
Country: __________________________
Phone: ____________________________
E-mail: ____________________________
Website: __________________________

Section 1. Socioeconomic Indicators of Municipality/City

1. What is the total population of your municipality/city?

2. Is your municipality/city:
   - Urban?
   - Rural?
   - Mixed?

3. What is the annual budget of your municipality? (Please provide in local currency)
   $ ____________________________

4. If available, what is the homicide rate per 100,000 people in the municipality?

5. What are the municipality’s 3 most reported crimes?
   1. ____________________________
   2. ____________________________
   3. ____________________________
   □ N/A

Section 2. Infrastructural Factors in Municipality/City

6. Is Public Safety part of the Municipality’s responsibilities?
   □ Yes
   □ No

7. Which other political level are involved? Please tick as appropriate.
   □ National/Federal Government
   □ Province/State Government
   □ Other (please specify):

8. Does the municipality have its own security/safety force or service (police, municipal guard, etc.)?
   □ YES:
   How many members does the force/service have?
   □ NO, go to question 10

9. Is this force/service armed or not?
   □ YES
   □ NO

10. What is the municipal budget allocated for safety?
    $ ____________________________ (In local currency)

11. What is the main source of funding of the safety budget?
    □ Municipal budget
    □ National/Federal Government
    □ Provincial/State government
    □ International donor
    □ Other (please specify):

12. Does your city/municipality have a crime observatory (or monitoring centre) related to crime prevention and/or violence in general?
    □ YES: What is its name?
    □ NO

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1 These contact details are solely for the purpose of contacting you to check information, should we need to. These details will not be used in any report.

2 Or the equivalent in your country.

3 Crime observatory or monitoring centre refers to ongoing research or data collection undertaken by the municipality to monitor crime trends and patterns to influence effective policy development to address current issues and identify emerging problems.

4 Example: Sensitization campaigns on drug abuse, road safety, etc.
Section 3. Description of prevention strategy/policy

13. Does your municipality have a crime prevention or community safety strategy/policy?
   □ YES: What date was this implemented (dd/mm/yyyy)?
   □ NO: Why hasn’t your municipality developed such a strategy/policy? Please tick as appropriate and go to question 33
   - Lack of finances
   - Lack of human resources
   - Lack of training
   - Lack of political will
   - Other (please specify): How long a period of time does this strategy cover (in years)?

14. What issues are covered by the municipal strategy/policy? Please tick as appropriate.
   □ Theft (commercial or residential)
   □ Vulnerable population (elderly, youth, child, women, etc)
   □ Armed violence
   □ Homicides
   □ Domestic violence
   □ Organized crime
   □ Youth offending
   □ Road safety and public transport
   □ Safety in schools and colleges
   □ Corruption
   □ Substance abuse
   □ Hate crime and racially-motivated crime
   □ Street gangs
   □ Prostitution, sex trade
   □ Human trafficking
   □ Other (please specify):

15. What types of preventive measures are carried out as part of the prevention strategy/plan? Please tick as appropriate.
   □ Awareness campaigns
   □ Situational crime prevention
   □ Social crime prevention
   □ Other (please specify):

16. Is there a department, body or committee in your municipality that is responsible for implementing this strategy/policy?
   □ NO: Which other department/directorate is responsible for the strategy/policy?
   □ YES: How many staff members are engaged?

17. Does the prevention strategy/policy have any partners?
   □ YES (please tick as appropriate):
     □ Police services
     □ Court services
     □ Educational services / School board
     □ Private sector
     □ Neighbourhood associations
     □ Other municipal bodies (please specify):
   □ NO, go to question 19

18. At what stage of the strategy/policy are your partners involved? Please tick as appropriate.
   □ Defining the strategy
   □ Implementation
   □ Evaluation
   □ Other (please specify):

19. Does civil society participate in the development of the strategy/policy?
   □ YES (please tick as appropriate):
     □ Through consultation
     □ Direct participation
     □ Other (please specify):
   □ NO

20. Have you undertaken a diagnostic or safety audit on safety issues in your municipality?
   □ NO, go to question 23
   □ YES

21. Who undertook this process? Please tick as appropriate.
   □ The Municipality
   □ Other level of government
   □ Independent consultant
   □ University (please specify):
   □ Other (please specify):

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5 Example: Community development initiatives to promote social cohesion, campaigns to reduce bullying, initiatives to support parents/single parents Skill building programmes for youths and/or at risk populations, etc.
22. Which data resources do you use in order to evaluate and identify the problems of crime in your municipality? Please tick as appropriate.
- Police statistics
- Criminal justice statistics
- Victimization survey and/or population survey
- Self-reported questionnaires
- Data from health services
- Data from social services
- Data from organizations
- Data from transport services
- Other (please specify):

23. Have you made use of new technologies as part of the crime prevention strategy/policy? Please tick as appropriate.
- NO
- Crime mapping
- CCTV
- Others:

Section 4. Results of the Crime Prevention Strategy/Policy

24. What are the results, to date, of the municipal crime prevention strategy/policy? Please tick as appropriate.
- Decrease in crime rates
- Decrease in perceptions of insecurity
- Strengthening social cohesion
- No results available yet
- Others:

25. Who has monitoring or registering the results? Please tick as appropriate.
- Municipal observatory
- Police service
- Public safety committee
- International organization
- NGO
- Other (please specify):

Section 5. Evaluation of the Crime Prevention Strategy/Policy

28. Has your municipal crime prevention strategy/policy been evaluated?
- NO, go to question 32
- YES

29. What type of evaluation was undertaken? Please tick as appropriate.
- Process/implementation evaluation
- Impact evaluation
- Cost-benefit calculations
- Other (please specify):

30. Who conducted the evaluation? Please tick as appropriate.
- The municipality
- Another administrative authority
- An International Organization
- A university (please specify):
- Other (please specify):

31. Have the findings of the evaluation been integrated into new developments of the municipal strategy?
- NO, go to question 33
- YES (please describe how they have been integrated?), go to question 33

32. Why? Please tick as appropriate.
- Lack of funds
- Lack of technical resources
- Lack of expertise
- Lack of time
- Not necessary
- Other (please specify):

27. Are these results public?
- NO
- YES
- Partially
33. There are many factors that make up a peaceful community. Which factors do you believe to be the most important? Please rank the following variables from 1 to 5, in order of importance (where 1 is the most important and 5 the least important).

____ Jobs/Economy
____ Health
____ Crime prevention strategy/Public safety
____ Poverty Elimination
____ Education

34. Do you perceive armed violence to be a problem in your municipality?
   (0: not a problem at all; 10 : very big problem)
   □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5
   □ 6 □ 7 □ 8 □ 9 □ 10

35. Do you perceive alcohol abuse to be a problem in your municipality?
   (0: not a problem at all; 10 : very big problem)
   □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5
   □ 6 □ 7 □ 8 □ 9 □ 10

36. Do you perceive drug trafficking to be a problem in your municipality?
   (0: not a problem at all; 10 : very big problem)
   □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5
   □ 6 □ 7 □ 8 □ 9 □ 10

37. Do you perceive gangs to be a problem in your municipality?
   (0: not a problem at all; 10 : very big problem)
   □ 0 □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5
   □ 6 □ 7 □ 8 □ 9 □ 10

38. In your municipality, what are the factors that could influence future developments in crime prevention policies/strategies? Please tick as appropriate.
   □ Lack of financial/material resources
   □ Lack of human resources
   □ Lack of training
   □ Lack of long-term continuity
   □ Institutional resistance
   □ Difficulties in forming partnership locally
   □ Difficulties in forming partnership internationally
   □ Interest group and pressure group influence
   □ Other (please specify):
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Chapter 4
Informal Settlements


Chapter 5

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Chapter 6
Drug Production in Developed Countries


Chapter 7

**Safety in Cities: ICPC’s Global Survey of 2011**

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Further Readings

Chapters 1 and 2
Introduction and Crime Overview


Chapter 3
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Chapter 4
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**Chapter 5**

**Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Areas**


Chapter 6
Drug Production in Developed Countries


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The ICPC’s 2012 International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety presents key subjects on the international agenda regarding crime and violence, highlighting forms in which prevention can address these issues to generate more resilient and cohesive communities around the world.

The third edition of the Report focuses on five topics of significance for crime prevention policymaking at the international level: Human Trafficking, Informal Settlements, Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Areas, Drug Production in Developed Countries and ICPC’s own Global Survey on Safety in Cities. It analyses these issues from the prevention perspective and contributes to the larger debate on responses to crime.

The International Report provides information and tools to help governments, local authorities, international organizations and other actors implement successful crime prevention policies in their countries, cities and communities.

This new edition of the International Report is also available online via our website, along with editions in French and Spanish. An Executive Summary, available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Japanese, Portuguese and Spanish, is also available on the site.